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ABSTRACT

The Education Voucher Demonstration is a large-scale educational and social intervention that began in the Alum Rock Union Elementary School District, San Jose, California, in September 1972. First funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity, it is now sponsored by the National Institute of Education. This report describes the development of ideas about education vouchers in recent years, their translation into an operational model, the negotiation of an agreement with Alum Rock for a federally subsidized voucher demonstration, the first year of the demonstration, and Rand's tasks in analyzing the demonstration. Also assessed are the effects of the demonstration during the first year. The study is addressed to educators; policymakers at federal, State, and local levels; and members of the general public who are interested in educational innovations. (Author/JF)

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A PUBLIC SCHOOL VOUCHER DEMONSTRATION: THE FIRST YEAR AT ALUM ROCK

PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

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PREFACE

This report describes and analyzes the workings of an education voucher demonstration during its first year (academic year 1972-73).

There are three other volumes in this series. They are:

R-1495/1-NIE, *A Public School Voucher Demonstration: The First Year at Alum Rock, Summary and Conclusions*, June 1974.
R-1495/2-NIE, *A Public School Voucher Demonstration: The First Year at Alum Rock, Technical Appendix*, June 1974.
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The Education Voucher Demonstration is a large-scale educational and social intervention that began in the Alum Rock Union Elementary School District, San Jose, California, in September 1972. First funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity, it is now sponsored by the National Institute of Education.

Since April 1972, Rand has been collecting and analyzing data related to the demonstration. Our work documents events and outcomes in the demonstration; analyzes social, political, economic, and educational impacts of the demonstration; and identifies implications of the voucher concept for federal, state, and local education policies.

The study is addressed to educators, policymakers at the federal, state, and local levels, and members of the general public who are interested in educational innovations. We have attempted to relegate technical discussions to appendixes, and to summarize key issues and findings at the beginnings of sections in nontechnical terms.

The report should be read with three caveats in mind:

- First, a number of voucher models have been proposed and debated. The one OEO originally considered included both public and private schools. The model currently being tested in Alum Rock differs from that plan in two major respects: only public schools participate, and the demonstration guarantees continued operation of schools and employment of teachers, regardless of "market" demand. These modifications raise serious questions as to whether the Alum Rock demonstration is a voucher system at all. It could be described as a system of open enrollment combined with decentralization of administration and instructional policy. However, the federal government, the media, and the Alum Rock district all describe the project as a "voucher" demonstration, and we have followed this usage.

  Whether the Alum Rock demonstration is a voucher system or not, it may be an important exemplar for the future of public schools. Within the framework of a public school system, it is designed to provide greater autonomy and management responsibility in the operation of individual schools; greater initiative and discretion to teachers; and diverse choices for parents and students in the form and content of schooling.

- Second, this report deals only with the first year of a multiyear demonstration. Trends noted initially may speed up, slow down, or even be reversed as the demonstration continues, and significant developments may yet be in the making. Rand is still collecting data on the demonstration and conducting analyses of first- and second-year data. This report itself will be the subject of debate and reanalysis. Therefore, judgments concerning the ultimate significance of the demonstration are as yet neither justified nor intended.

- Third, this report should not be interpreted as concluding that the Alum Rock model "works" or "does not work." The consequences of such a complex intervention are likely to defy such simple judgments. Also, conclusions as to whether the Alum Rock model is a useful exemplar for other districts depend upon the values which various constituencies in American education place upon the demonstration's diverse objectives and outcomes.

The Alum Rock demonstration may have important implications for the effectiveness, creativity, and cost of public schools. It would be a mistake, however, to attempt to use this report as evidence for or against voucher systems in general, or other specific voucher models. Not only is the Alum Rock model unique, but the district itself is in many ways different from other districts. Therefore, judgments about the relevance of our findings to other districts must be made with both the characteristics of the model and of the Alum Rock district in mind. It is also possible that so-called "Hawthorne" effects influenced people's performance and hence the course of the Alum Rock demonstration. Participants were well aware that many eyes were on Alum Rock as the only "voucher" system in the nation, and the resulting national attention and publicity may have influenced their behavior.

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

This report describes the development of ideas about education vouchers in recent years; their translation into an operational model, initially under the aegis of the Office of Economic Opportunity; the negotiation of an agreement with Alum Rock for a federally subsidized voucher demonstration; the first year of the demonstration; and Rand's tasks in analyzing the demonstration. It also assesses the effects of the demonstration during the first year, subject to the caveats described in the Preface.

EDUCATION VOUCHERS AND THE ALUM ROCK MODEL

Definition of Vouchers

Voucher plans are designed to introduce the market mechanism into the educational system. Various voucher plans have been proposed by economists, starting with Adam Smith. Most contemporary plans, including such varied approaches as those advocated by Professor Milton Friedman and Professor Christopher Jencks, include four common features:

- Parents choose the schools their children will attend.
- In order to pay the schools of their choice, parents receive certificates—vouchers—from a governing agency, which redeems the vouchers against public funds upon receiving them from schools.
- Both public and private schools are eligible to enter and compete in the voucher marketplace.
- Schools survive only if they receive enough income to pay their expenses.

Voucher proponents argue that vouchers will overcome rigidities in the educational system brought about by the public schools' virtual monopoly of elementary and secondary education. They contend that the quality of schooling will improve because vouchers will promote educational innovation and diversity, parental interest in education, and school responsiveness to parent and student needs.

Opponents claim that vouchers could foster segregation by race and class, undermine the Constitutional separation of church and state, encourage hucksterism in the schools, increase the tax burden for public support of schooling, undermine existing systems of professional tenure for teachers and administrators, and destroy the shared democratic values fostered by the traditional system of public schools.

Genesis of the Alum Rock Demonstration

In the late 1960s the federal Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) began investigating vouchers as a way to improve the educational opportunities of poor families, and retained The Center for the Study of Public Policy (CSPP) of Cambridge, Massachusetts, to study the voucher concept. In March 1970, CSPP proposed and OEO agreed that a voucher demonstration should be tried and that a "regulated compensatory" voucher model would be most appropriate for testing. This model was to include:

- Public and private schools.
- A "basic voucher" equal in value to current per pupil spending in the public schools of the districts where vouchers were tested.
- An extra "compensatory" voucher for poor children that would give them more "purchasing power" in the educational marketplace.
- Limitation of school "tuition" to the local value of the basic voucher.
- A lottery system of admission for schools whose applications exceeded openings.
- Free transportation for children enrolled at schools distant from their homes.
- Rights of student transfer from one school to another at any time, with transfers to be accompanied by prorated portions of voucher dollars, and with school revenue entirely dependent on enrollment.
- Establishment of an autonomous public agency, the Education Voucher Agency (EVA) to manage the demonstration, including fiscal arrangements and start-up activities, and allocating funds for providing information to parents. (The local board of education might or might not serve as the EVA.)
- No guarantee of survival for public or private schools, whether new or preexisting, unless voucher income covered expenses.

In 1971, on the basis of the CSPP report, OEO authorized voucher feasibility studies in four school districts. Three of them rejected the voucher model, for a variety of reasons: fears that parental choice could lead to racial segregation; reluctance to serve as guinea pigs for an untested model; general decline of support for OEO initiatives by organized leaders of poor people; opposition by teacher organizations; and absence of state legislation that would permit private school participation.

In Alum Rock these factors were finally not persuasive. The district, serving some 15,000 pupils in a predominantly Mexican-American area of San Jose, California, perceived a number of possible fiscal and organizational advantages. In particular, the Alum Rock Superintendent of schools saw a voucher demonstration as a means of advancing preexisting district policies of administrative decentralization and parent participation, while infusing substantial federal funds into the district.

The Alum Rock feasibility study did lead to considerable controversy within the district, but by January 1972, the school district and OEO agreed on a compromise "transition model" demonstration, which would receive federal support for five to seven years. The model had the following features:

- The demonstration would initially involve public schools only, with 6 of the district's 24 schools participating (participating schools are called voucher schools; other schools in the district are called nonvoucher schools). Some planning funds were provided, looking toward eventual development of new "community schools," which would be something like private schools.[1]
- Each participating school would offer two or more distinct program options ("mini-schools") to parents; children already attending a given school and their younger siblings were guaranteed the right to continue attending that school (so-called "squatters' rights").
- The district would provide the basic voucher from its current income and OEO

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[1] California state law as of 1972 did not authorize private school participation; the law was later amended, but the OEO-Alum Rock agreement was based on the assumption that "community schools" would be the greatest departure that existing legislation would permit.

would provide a compensatory voucher for each child who qualified for the federal free lunch program.

- Teachers' job tenure and seniority rights were guaranteed.
- The Alum Rock Board of Trustees (school board) and Superintendent were put in charge of the demonstration. An Education Voucher Advisory Committee (EVAC), composed of voucher school staff and parents, was established.
- The district contracted with a newly formed private organization, the Sequoia Institute, to establish a central voucher staff responsible for assisting in start-up, internal evaluation, and parent counseling.

The transition model as approved for Alum Rock was quite different from the regulated voucher model recommended to OEO by CSPP; as this report will explain, the model actually implemented during the first year was even more remote from the CSPP version. In other words, what the Rand study examined during the first year was not a test of the CSPP model, or even of the transition model itself.

OEO granted the district $1,585,756 for the school year 1972-73. Table S.1 and Fig. S.1 show how these funds were spent.

Table S.1

DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED BY FEDERAL VOUCHER GRANTS, 1972-73

Category	Amount ($000)		Percent of Total Grant	
Central administration		433.4		27.3
Organization development training[a]		69.0		4.4
Indirect school-site support				
Administration	128.5		8.0	
Inservice teacher training	280.0		17.7	
Substitute teachers	58.8		3.7	
Transportation	11.0		0.7	
Total, indirect support		478.3		30.1
Direct school-site support				
Compensatory voucher	509.1		32.1	
Classroom space	15.0		0.9	
Total, direct support		524.1		33.0
Teacher salary guarantee		36.0		2.6
Central staff salary guarantee		30.0		1.8
Grants to new schools, community		15.0		0.9
Total, all categories		1,585.8		100.0

[a] Alum Rock employed the services of an organization development consultant, the Center for Human Resources and Organizational Development (HRC), to work with principals, teachers, and central staff involved in implementing the voucher demonstration. Organization development training is designed to facilitate organizational change, by improving interpersonal communication and group problem-solving skills, and encouraging participative decisionmaking.



Fig. S.1—Breakdown of voucher demonstration grant budget by area of support, 1972-73 school year

Alum Rock District and Community

The Alum Rock Union Elementary School District lies in the eastern section of San Jose, California. San Jose was a center for the Santa Clara Valley farming area before World War II. Its population grew very rapidly from 1945 until 1970, but has begun to level off since then.

Approximately half the school children in Alum Rock are Mexican-American, 40 percent are Anglo, and 10 percent are black. Most are from lower middle class or lower class families. The population is highly transient, with a 30 percent annual residential turnover. Most families live in single-family residences, and there is no pattern of ethnic or racial housing segregation (San Jose has the most desegregated housing pattern of any metropolitan area in the United States).

There is little effective political mobilization or focus for organized social change in the district. There are ethnic activist organizations, but they have been unable to elect candidates to the school board. Voter turnout at school elections is light, ranging from 10 to 20 percent of the electorate. Voters have consistently passed bond issues in Alum Rock despite a recent national trend against passage of school finance measures.

The district, which serves kindergarten through eighth grade, grew from 5000 students in the late 1950s to 15,000 in the late 1960s and has remained relatively stable since then. The district's budget has quadrupled in the past decade to a current level of more than $17 million. However, the district has one of the lowest assessed property valuations per student in California. Despite high tax rates, income from local revenue sources continues to be low, a fact that undoubtedly accounted for some of the local interest in the OEO initiative.

Teacher organizations in the district have nonetheless succeeded in obtaining teacher salaries comparable with those in other more affluent districts. Teacher relations with the District Superintendent are cordial and cooperative.

The Superintendent, Dr. William Jefferds, has been employed by the district since 1952 and has served as Superintendent since 1968. He has promoted policies to decentralize decisionmaking to the school level, increase parent participation in the schools, and actively recruit minority staff.

The six 1972-73 voucher schools share the general socioeconomic characteristics of the district. The participation of these six schools was initiated by their principals, subject to approval by a majority of teachers at each school. The schools—five elementary and one middle school—are within five miles of one another (four are within two miles of one another). In 1972, both school staff and parents perceived the five elementary schools as of approximately equal quality; consequently, voucher parents were not prompted to transfer their children to particular favored schools at the first opportunity.

THE RAND STUDY

In April 1972, OEO awarded Rand a contract, subsequently renewed by NIE, for the study and analysis of the Alum Rock demonstration. OEO and NIE contracted with a separate data management contractor, C. M. Leinwand, Associates, for collecting school and student data from the district and preparing computerized data files for use by Rand, the district, NIE, and other researchers. Rand has also subcontracted with a survey research firm, Field Research Corporation, to carry out parent/community surveys in Alum Rock. Rand is an independent, external evaluator, working cooperatively with the district but solely responsible for study conclusions.

Analysis of Social Demonstrations: The Voucher Case

Large-scale demonstrations are very different from rigorous experiments. In practice, demonstrations rarely follow closely their original blueprints. Success is hard to define, objectives change, and it is usually impossible to apply scientific controls for the measurement of program effects, such as random assignment to different treatments, or the selection of matching groups. The Alum Rock voucher project is a large-scale social demonstration of this kind—a subsidized prototype rather than an experiment in the scientific sense. It was clear from the outset that no study would be able to discover and assess the meaning of every facet of the participants' behavior, and it was also clear that standard statistical methods for determining the effects of an experimental intervention were not strictly applicable in this case. We therefore decided to select only a limited number of variables for analysis, and to try to be sensitive to unanticipated developments during the course of the demonstration. This approach suggested an emphasis on careful description of demonstration processes and events, and the collection and analysis of data on the basis of what actually happens in the demonstration as well as on preselected criteria. It has also led us to stress the distinctions between short- and long-term findings, because definitive policy conclusions are still remote. Finally, it has led us to use many different indicators of outcomes, and multiple sources of information, because the intervention is so complex as to preclude high-confidence reliance on a single source.

Policy Issues

In Rand's Technical Analysis Plan of February 1972, we suggested that experience from voucher demonstrations might contribute to the debate over the following public policy issues:

- Should parents somehow be given a more direct voice in choosing their children's schools?
- Should public policy encourage more diversity in the schools, and if so, how?
- Should the public support private and parochial schools, and if so, how?
- Should there be market incentives in elementary and secondary schooling, and if so, what kinds?
- If the answer to any of the above questions is "yes," to what extent are vouchers a necessary and sufficient device to shape such new policies?

In turn, evidence relevant to these issues could specifically contribute to public policy decisions about whether to introduce the voucher mechanism to other communities. To assemble this evidence, we proposed to collect and analyze data in three broad categories of the effects of the demonstration:

- The education of students;
- The cost and efficiency of the schooling process; and
- The relationship between citizens and their schools.

Subsequently, during the first year of the Alum Rock demonstration, a fourth important category of effects emerged: effects on the roles of school professionals and on patterns of internal school district decisionmaking.

During the first year we therefore collected data on diversity of educational options, the exercise of parental choice, parental satisfaction, school governance, the organization of classroom instruction, the role of teachers and administrators, educational costs and resource use, the distribution of students by ethnicity and socioeconomic status (SES), and student achievement.

To gather this information we used a number of methods, including parent/community surveys, teacher surveys, community observation, personal interviews, collection of record data, classroom visits, meetings with mini-school faculties, collection of budget and accounting data, achievement testing, and affective testing. These data are much more complete for voucher schools and for the period since September 1972 than for nonvoucher schools and the prevoucher period.

POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL ISSUES OF IMPLEMENTATION

The CSPP voucher model proposed a new way to organize and deliver educational services, which would lead to a new set of relationships among people in the system, calculated to provide new incentives and to engender change in behavior and attitudes. The CSPP report said little about how to transform an existing school system into an example of this model. The provisions of the Alum Rock model, derived in part from the CSPP model, reflect the first attempts to deal with that problem. The rules on "squatters' rights" and teacher job safeguards, for example, represent concessions by OEO to the wishes of parents, teachers, and administrators who objected to changes in teacher tenure arrangements and the right of children to attend their neighborhood schools.

The Alum Rock model itself, however, was only a set of general rules, waiting to be elaborated and in some cases modified as the project was carried out. Implementation—the translation of written guidelines into working procedures—in turn required the solution of both technical problems and political issues surrounding the new relationships implicit in the model.

Political Issues

The most important political issue of the first year of the demonstration was a conflict between the six voucher school prinicpals and the central voucher staff (Sequoia Institute) over the distribution and exercise of decisionmaking authority in a number of key areas. This issue largely took the form of a struggle between the contending parties over the relative independence of the "internal" evaluation staff, which was to gather information about the conduct of the demonstration, and of the parent counseling staff, whose job it was to inform parents about their rights and options. The Superintendent and his regular staff, caught in the middle of this dispute, sought mediation and compromise. The formal rules of the demonstration stipulated that policies on these issues were to be decided by the Board of Trustees, with advice from the Superintendent and the Education Voucher Advisory Committee (EVAC). The Superintendent was to be advised by the Sequoia Institute, and EVAC was to provide the views of teachers, administrators, and parents at the schools.

In practice, things worked out differently. Decisions about the conduct of the demonstration and the flow of information to parents largely reflected the influence of the six voucher school principals; the only effective counterbalance to their authority was the Superintendent, who did not always intervene. The adversaries to the principals' group in both areas were members of the Sequoia Institute's central voucher staff, including the evaluation and parent counseling staffs, who believed they represented the interests of parents as envisioned in the original model.

The principals were able to dominate the decisionmaking process for a number of reasons. They formed a small, cohesive group with similar professional backgrounds, similar problems, and a shared belief in the desirability of decentralizing administrative authority to the school site. They had time to participate in decisionmaking, understood the administrative intricacies of the disputed issues, and had access to considerable discretionary funds. They derived legitimacy from their early support of the demonstration and from the fact that they often spoke as representatives of a larger constituency—their school faculties. Their participation in an organization development program sponsored by the district also bolstered their unity and effectiveness. (See footnote to Table S.1.)

Some other interested participants, such as the Sequoia staff and EVAC, lacked one or more of these attributes. Parent groups, organized teacher groups and the Board of Trustees either exhibited little active interest in policy issues or, when their interest was keen, they also lacked one or more of the principals' advantages of cohesiveness, available time, legitimacy, grasp of the issues, and access to resources.

The principals took well-defined positions on each of the policies in question:

- Arguing that release of test data and uniform internal evaluation would inhibit diversity among mini-schools, the principals insisted that (1) student scores on standarized achievement tests not be released to the public until the spring of 1974, and that (2) the voucher staff's internal evaluator be barred from imposing any requirements for evaluation on the individual mini-schools.
- The principals insisted upon exercising veto power over the activities of the parent counseling staff in their respective school communities, on the grounds that the veto power would promote decentralized authority.

The principals were successful on both counts, which gave them substantial de facto control over the internal evaluation and parent counseling staff during the first year. The voucher staff, however, was dismayed by the way the principals had circumscribed its activities, and appealed the evaluation controversy to the Superintendent toward the end of the first year. The Superintendent fashioned a compromise that returned a small degree of autonomy to the internal evaluation staff.

Technical Problems

Implementation of the voucher model required development of new administrative support services for budgeting and student attendance accounting.

The essential task was to create rules for allocating income to individual schools and mini-schools based on enrollment—an "income-outgo" budget. This process, in turn, raised difficult questions about the extent to which schools should be eligible for additional discretionary income:

- If their teaching staff earned less than the district's average teacher salary,
- If their administrative costs were spread over a larger than average student enrollment, and
- If they chose to maintain relatively high class sizes, thus reducing the size of the teaching staff.

Finally, decisions had to be made about the relative allocation of funds to mini-school accounts, largely controlled by teachers, and to whole school accounts, largely controlled by principals.

New attendance accounting and budgeting systems were also needed to allocate voucher dollars among the participating schools and mini-schools.

None of the new systems was implemented adequately during the first year. The voucher money for each student remained with the school he attended at the beginning of the year, regardless of transfers. With the aid of supplemental federal grants, the district appeared to be solving these problems toward the end of the first year. But it is important to recognize that during 1972-73, a voucher school could gain little or no financial advantage by attracting more students, because discretionary funds were in effect locked in for the year after fall 1972 enrollment was completed. However, this situation did not become known to the voucher schools until the end of the first year.

CREATION, RESPONSIVENESS, AND EFFECTS OF THE MINI-SCHOOL

The Alum Rock "transition model" was predicated on a belief that competition for voucher income would improve instruction in the six participating schools and their mini-schools. A popular mini-school would expand to accommodate parental demand, while an unpopular one would have to change or dissolve. Teachers from defunct or shrinking mini-schools would transfer to the growing ones.

The success of this mechanism requires that: a truly diverse set of options be created; parents have enough interest and information to choose the best option for their child; parents have the right to transfer to preferred options; the size of mini-schools be responsive to parent demand; and funds actually follow the student.

Creation and Diversity of Mini-schools

In the spring of 1972, in response to the requirements of the OEO-Alum Rock agreement, teachers at each of the six voucher schools began to consider educational objectives and strategies for the mini-schools in their buildings. They also had to decide which teachers would be associated with each mini-school. Because of the close deadline for distributing mini-school descriptions to parents, the teachers had only a few weeks for these tasks; there was little participation by administrators and even less by parents.

At the six voucher schools, 22 mini-schools emerged. Of the voucher teachers responding to our November 1972 questionnaire, 79 percent stated that the teacher assignment process, largely governed by the teachers themselves, was fair, and 76 percent reported that they were teaching in the program they had wanted most.

Our analysis of mini-school programs indicates that 11 mini-schools emphasized general basic academic skills; 3 emphasized specific basic skills (2 reading, 1 math/science); and the other 8, while not neglecting academic subjects, had different interests. (Two of them emphasized the fine arts, 2 emphasized learning about different cultures, and 4 were "activity-centered," teaching basic academic skills through practical, everyday activities.)

In November of the first year, 57 percent of the teachers reported that their mini-schools represented "significant departures" from their schools' previous educational methods. And 79 percent reported they were conducting their classrooms "very differently" from the way they had in the past.

The Rand staff observed 103 of the 126 classrooms in the demonstration for periods of time ranging from a class period to half a day, and held structured discussions about time allocation and mini-school resource-use with all mini-school faculties. These efforts yielded two major findings about program diversity:

- No gross discrepancies were detected between the program emphases described in the parent information booklet in the spring of 1972 and the programs as implemented in the 1972-73 school year. These descriptions were brief, however —a page long—and somewhat general. While many teachers reported making changes in their programs between September 1972 and June 1973, none of them altered basic program orientation.
- Diversity among the mini-schools was real but limited. In their use of instructional time, for example, 19 of the 22 mini-schools devoted about 40 percent of their instructional time to reading and language arts and about 25 percent to arithmetic. On the other hand, there were important differences in how the mini-schools used the other third of their instructional time—largely in social studies, science, art, music, and program activities. (There were also differences among the mini-schools in educational philosophy, classroom organization and resource use.)

Resource Use

Mini-school budgets for discretionary funds are determined by the number of students eligible for compensatory vouchers (basic voucher funds are largely committed for teacher salaries and the district's other basic instructional costs). During 1972-73 the mini-school discretionary budgets ranged from a low of $3534 to a high of $42,775, with an average of about $18,000. These funds were allocated as follows:

Item	Percent of Total
Instructional materials	60
Teacher aides	15
Equipment	9
Teacher salaries	7
Field trips	6
Portable classrooms	3

Those figures are averages, however; there was considerable variation among schools. For example, some mini-schools allocated as little as 15 percent or as much as 97 percent of their total budget to instructional materials, and from zero to nearly 30 percent for teacher aides.

The increased level of instructional expenditure made possible by compensatory vouchers was perceived by teachers as one of the main advantages of the demonstration. In fact, 82 percent of the voucher teachers agreed in November 1972 that "all things considered, *the* major benefit of the voucher system is the additional money received by schools in the district." (Emphasis added.) In a later telephone survey of teachers (March 1974), 54 percent cited money or its effects as *one* of the main positive features of the demonstration. It is clear that the financial "carrot" of compensatory vouchers was, at first, instrumental in generating teachers' support for the demonstration. More years are needed to assess whether supplementary federal funding will remain a significant factor in explaining teacher support for the demonstration.

About 35 percent of the compensatory voucher funds remained unspent at the end of the first year. This implies that there was more money than there were ways for the teachers to spend it, but the time constraints created by the rapid start-up of the demonstration may also have been a factor. In some cases, lack of information about availability of funds or delays in central processing of requisitions may have contributed to this outcome. A broader implication is that a learning process may be required before teachers can find ways to use discretionary funds effectively.

Unresponsiveness of Mini-schools to Enrollment Demands

At the beginning of the 1972-73 school year, mini-school sizes were adjusted (through reassignments of teachers) to accommodate virtually all students in the programs their parents had listed as first choice. During the school year, however, popular mini-schools were generally unwilling to expand in response to parental demand. In several instances where parental demand was sufficient to support program expansion, mini-schools declared themselves "temporarily closed" to further enrollment. In these cases, several factors—weak financial incentives, professional norms against competition, faculty cohesiveness, concern to maintain quality of instruction, and space considerations—worked to influence their decisions not to expand.

Weak Financial Incentives. As a general rule, the more students a mini-school enrolled, the more income it could earn. However, once its existing classrooms were filled, the financial incentive for a mini-school to open new classrooms was weak. A mini-school that opened an additional classroom could not be sure how

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many more students it would attract. Moreover, the amount of additional income earned depended on how many new students would bring compensatory voucher funds with them. Consequently, after considering salaries and other instructional costs, it was often unclear whether a given mini-school could make a "profit" by opening more classrooms and hiring more teachers. Perhaps even more important, though, was the fact that many mini-schools already had more discretionary money than they could effectively plan to spend. For those programs, the prospect of extra earnings was no incentive. The earnings would not show up on staff paychecks, nor were they needed to buy materials, hire aides, or schedule field trips, since the schools already could afford to buy what they needed.

Professional Norms Against Competition. Many teachers in the demonstration viewed overt competition between mini-schools as undersirable and unprofessional, and forthright criticism of competing mini-schools as flatly unethical. Positive promotion of one's own mini-school was viewed as somewhat more acceptable. A few mini-schools took the cautious step of printing simple circulars to send home to parents of children in their own schools. None solicited parents through radio, TV, the newspapers, or direct mail. When one mini-school received some modest attention in a local newspaper, some other teachers regarded the event as unfair advertising.

Faculty Cohesiveness. Mini-school faculties were social as well as professional groups. If a new teacher was to be hired, applicants had to be screened by the mini-school for professional competence and personal compatibility. Some mini-schools declined to expand, fearing that a new member might disrupt their existing patterns of interaction and organization.

Concern for Quality of Instruction. Many mini-school faculties believed that to expand enrollments continually in response to demand would reduce the quality of instruction. Continuous fluctuations in enrollment would create extra burdens on the instructional planning process. Growth meant hiring new teachers unfamiliar with the philosophy and methods of the mini-schools; and it could require the use of trailers as temporary classrooms—a recourse unpopular with the faculties.

Instructional Space. Unpopular though they were, trailers were sometimes a necessary evil—all the more annoying because, besides requiring additional expense and administrative effort, it sometimes took several weeks to get them. Worst of all, trailers added to crowding in certain common facilities such as cafeterias, libraries, playgrounds, and bathrooms.

The foregoing factors, together with other problems of implementation, tended to constrain the willingness of popular mini-schools to expand. The effect on the demonstration may well have been to reduce interprogram and interschool transfers during the year below what they otherwise would have been, although this cannot be established with complete certainty.

Effects of Mini-school Organization on Instruction and Planning

The creation of the mini-school and the access of mini-school faculties to discretionary money increases teachers' control over the curriculum. In the spring of the first year, voucher teachers were nearly unanimous in agreeing that there had been a shift in decisionmaking authority from the school district level down to the individual school, and two-thirds felt that the shift had been a "considerable" one. Two-thirds of the voucher teachers also indicated that "more teacher authority" was one of the main advantages of the demonstration. Teachers felt more responsible for educational outcomes since it was "their" program they were implementing. Many said they felt like managers of instruction and of their mini-schools. As time passed, teachers looked to principals less for formal direction and more for informal guidance. Teachers often appeared to develop a sense of accountability to their teaching peers. No longer isolated in their classrooms, they found themselves planning jointly, spending money jointly, and turning to each other for suggestions and help. Given the responsibility to spend money, many teachers found they did not know enough about what kinds of instructional materials are available, and some were stimulated to find out more.

Increased teacher involvement in planning and influence over decisionmaking was not, of course, without its costs in time and energy. Almost all of the voucher teachers reported working extra hours. Fifty percent, in fact, reported working six or more extra hours per week compared to the previous year. Some of the extra demands on teachers' time seemed especially burdensome: 88 percent cited "too many meetings" as a main disadvantage of the demonstration, and 69 percent cited "too much paperwork." The increased teacher workload may have been transitional in nature, caused by the need to learn how to operate effectively in a changed role under new rules. On the other hand, teachers' commitment to their work may be enhanced in a lasting way by the structural features of mini-schools and the transition model.

The mini-school form of organization facilitates instructional planning across grade levels by taking advantage of shared teacher familiarity with a particular group of students. The individual teacher in this setting does not have to rely solely on the cumulative record folder with its brief comments about an individual student. The mini-school also allows more cohesive planning; teachers can work together to shape a curriculum to meet the objectives of the mini-school and the needs of the students. This kind of planning is of course much easier in small groups than it would be in faculty groups of 20 or more teachers. In the voucher schools, where 19 of the 22 mini-schools had 7 teachers or less, such consultation and planning became a reality. In fact, three-fourths of the voucher teachers indicated that "improved teacher teamwork" was a major advantage of the demonstration.

Increased cohesiveness within mini-schools also brought with it a problem: tensions between mini-schools in the same building. Differences in educational philosophy became more evident as different mini-schools developed their own distinct curricula and forms of classroom organization. Increased interaction within mini-schools was naturally accompanied by decreased interaction between mini-schools. Also, the existence of competition between mini-schools was a factor which contributed to interpersonal tensions between programs. The importance of these tensions is indicated by the agreement of 65 percent of the voucher teachers that "friction between mini-schools" was a main disadvantage of the demonstration.

In most of the mini-schools there were too few students in at least some grade levels to form classes for those grades alone. The result was formation of multiple-grade classrooms, which led to changes in patterns of instruction. In some cases, however, it was the desire to change instructional patterns that led to the regrouping of students. Multi-age groupings are rarely found in U.S. schools, and, like the mini-schools, they represent a significant unanticipated innovation of the demonstration's first year.

Of the 126 classrooms in the demonstration, 85 had some combination of grade levels, and in nine mini-schools all classes were multiple-grade classrooms. Partly in response to the need to deal with different grade level students, many mini-schools sought to individualize instruction. In fifteen of them individual or small-group instruction was more common than instruction directed to the whole class.

Thus, cooperative teacher planning, peer group responsibility among teachers, and individualization of instruction began to appear as a result of the organizational and financial structure of the demonstration.

Benefits and Costs to Teachers

As the foregoing discussion has indicated, the first year of the transition model demonstration and its mini-school form of organization resulted in both benefits and costs to voucher teachers. Among the primary benefits to teachers were the following:

- Increased discretionary funds for instructional use;
- Increased influence over educational decisions;
- Faculty cohesiveness within mini-schools; and
- Increased stimulation to innovate.

Among the primary costs to teachers were the following:

- Increased workload,
- Tensions between mini-schools;
- Inconveniences arising from student enrollment and transfer privileges; and
- Job or status insecurity.

The last of these costs, job or status insecurity, deserves special consideration here since it is presumably one of the major sources of nationwide teacher resistance to the voucher concept. As indicated previously, the Alum Rock transition model included several features designed to reduce the effects of consumer demand on teachers' job security: the public-schools-only feature effectively forestalled any exodus of students from the district, and the guarantee of continued teacher employment in the case of underenrollment further protected teachers from the vagaries of the marketplace. Thus, it is not surprising that only 31 percent of the voucher teachers felt in the spring of 1973 that "job insecurity" was a main disadvantage of the demonstration. However, feelings often ran high among those teachers who did worry about job security, and the additional factor of *status* insecurity was still present. Even if continued employment were guaranteed, it would be a blow to any teacher's ego to have to leave a program because of declining parental or student interest in that program. In the one voucher school which experienced such a decline in enrollment the first year, the faculty chose to allocate compensatory voucher money to retain the two teachers who would otherwise have had to look for another position in the district.

At the conclusion of the first year, most voucher teachers were ready to assert that the advantages of the demonstration outweighed the disadvantages. In fact, attitudes of voucher teachers generally changed from favorable to more favorable as the first year progressed. For example, the percentage of voucher teachers who believed that the demonstration would increase the quality of education in Alum Rock grew from 56 percent in November 1972 to 74 percent in May 1973; the percentage who felt that "giving parents a choice between different types of programs for their children" was a good idea rose from 69 percent in November to 87 percent in May; and the percentage who reported being pleased about participating in the demonstration increased from 79 percent in the fall to 84 percent in the spring.

PARENTS' ATTITUDES AND RESPONSES

The chief way in which a voucher system changes the role of parents in the school system is by allowing them to choose their child's school, thereby giving them potential economic leverage over the schools. The Alum Rock proposal to OEO also stipulated that, "The community will participate actively in the operation and governance of the transitional voucher demonstration. Individual schools and programs will encourage parental participation at a meaningful level in their respective decisionmaking processes."

Parent Satisfaction and Attitudes toward School Governance

Both parental exercise of voucher options and collective participation in school decisionmaking depend partly on the initial attitudes of parents, particularly on their satisfaction and their attitudes toward their proper role in school governance. For example, parents may be dissatisfied with the schools but deem it improper to intervene.

At the beginning of the demonstration, participating parents were already satisfied with their schools. When surveyed in November 1972, more than 70 percent of voucher parents (those participating in the demonstration) thought their children were already getting a "good" or "very good" education in Alum Rock. Nonvoucher parents (those not participating in the demonstration) were almost as well satisfied.

Parents' attitudes toward whether they should influence school decisions depended on the kind of decision that was involved. At the beginning of the demonstration, for example, many more thought that parents should have a voice in curriculum planning than thought parents should share in the decision to hire and fire teachers.

Collective Parental Participation in the Demonstration

There were a number of mechanisms through which, theoretically, parents could have influenced decisions within the demonstration. As mentioned earlier, the Education Voucher Advisory Committee (EVAC), composed of one teacher and one parent from each voucher school, was set up to advise the Superintendent and Board of Trustees on demonstration-related issues, but its precise functions and powers were left ambiguous in the OEO-District agreement. A number of mini-schools did set up parent advisory committees, but, unlike parent advisory committees in schools receiving funds under Title I of the federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act, these committees had no formal authority.

The first year saw no dramatic change in the preexisting pattern of limited parent participation in the school system. Small groups of parents did influence the decisions of several school faculties on whether to join the demonstration in the second year. Where mini-school parent advisory committees were established, they hardly ever had much influence on mini-school decisions. EVAC proved to be a peripheral group in the first year. It met infrequently and had little knowledge of current issues; the participating parents did not press for more decisionmaking power.

In general, parents showed little interest in decisionmaking in the demonstration. Two factors must be considered, however. First, parent participation depends not only on initial parent interest but also on how much the schools encourage and organize such participation. In Alum Rock, school professionals were ready to accept parents as "consumer participants," but they had ambivalent feelings about parent organizations helping to decide rules or policies for either mini-schools or the demonstration as a whole.

Second, participation in school affairs partly depends on parents' political and organizational skills, which may take time to develop. It took several years for Title I school parent advisory committees to become active in Alum Rock, but once they did they constituted an effective force. For example, in those cases where parents influenced new schools to join the demonstration, "Title I parents" seem to have been among the most influential. It is possible, then, that the present low level of collective parent participation in the demonstration may change in the future. There are some signs during the 1973-74 school year that such a change may be taking place.

Parental Awareness, Information, and Choice

In November 1972, 17 percent of the voucher parents said they had not heard of the voucher demonstration even though their children had already been attending voucher schools for two months. Of those who had heard, one-fourth could not remember what mini-school program they had chosen for their child. Anglos and blacks were somewhat better informed about the voucher demonstration than were Mexican-Americans, particularly those Mexican-Americans interviewed in Spanish. Better educated and wealthier parents were a little more likely to know about vouchers.

In the fall of 1973, after a year's experience with the demonstration, 94 percent of the original demonstration parents were aware of the demonstration, and differences in knowledge among ethnic groups had decreased.

In November 1972, most parents who had heard of the demonstration said they had received adequate information about it. In choosing a mini-school almost all parents relied on the written information and program descriptions provided by the schools or on conferences with teachers or principals.

Many parents were not well informed about the basic rules of the demonstration in November 1972. Three voucher parents in five did not understand the rule governing student transfers, and over half did not know that the demonstration would provide free transportation if they wished their child to attend a school other than their neighborhood school. A year later, in the fall of 1973, voucher parents were much more familiar with the rules of the demonstration.

About 70 percent of the parents who were aware of the demonstration in the fall of 1972 felt that the demonstration offered them about the right number of options. In general, parents perceived real educational diversity in the range of mini-schools offered, liked the idea of having a choice, and felt satisfied with the mini-school offerings available.

In selecting a school—as distinguished from selecting a particular mini-school within a school—parents strongly tended to select the school nearest their home or the one their child previously attended. In November 1972, less than 15 percent of the aware parents chose a school primarily because it contained a particular mini-school they wanted, and only an additional 15 percent cited the nature of mini-schools as even one of the factors they considered in selecting a school. This should not be surprising, given that mini-schools had not operated before and therefore had no reputations, and that all schools offered roughly similar arrays of mini-school choices (a traditional or basic skills mini-school plus several "innovative options").

Throughout the first year parents displayed a very low propensity to transfer their children between either mini-schools or schools and, as we have noted, they were not on the whole encouraged to do so by principals or teachers. However, transfers to nonneighborhood schools increased noticeably at the beginning of the second year. Parents from the different ethnic groups exhibited roughly equal propensities to transfer their children between schools and mini-schools.

Changes in Parental Attitudes in the First Year

After the first year of the demonstration, original voucher parents were as well satisfied with the schools as they had been at the beginning. The percentage of these parents asserting that their children were getting a "very good" or "good" education increased from 74 percent in November 1972 to 80 percent in November 1973. Enthusiasm remained high for the job being done by principals and teachers. The proportion of parents who believed the voucher demonstration would improve the Alum Rock public schools rose from 76 to 84 percent. Finally, between November 1972 and November 1973, there was a noticeable increase in the proportion of original voucher parents who stated that parents should be able to help shape a variety of school decisions. In November 1973, 52 percent of these parents said that parents should have a voice in hiring and firing teachers, as compared to 36 percent in November 1972; and 62 percent favored parental involvement in hiring and firing the school principal, as compared to 54 percent the previous year. The proportion of original voucher parents favoring parental influence on curriculum decisions increased from 63 percent to 70 percent while the proportion supporting a role for parents in school expenditure decisions rose from 55 to 60 percent.

Student Ethnic and Social Class Distribution

Critics of voucher proposals have argued that, in the absence of controls, parental choice of schools could lead to increased ethnic and social class segregation, particularly if parents were allowed to supplement their vouchers with private funds.

The Alum Rock demonstration involved neither private schools nor parental supplements to vouchers, and also included the safeguard of lottery assignment provisions. Therefore, increases in segregation would be less likely in Alum Rock than in some voucher models. Furthermore, Alum Rock is much less segregated than are most school districts with large minority populations. Nonetheless, we conducted analyses to see whether ethnic or social segregation increased during the first year. Our conclusion is that it did not.

COSTS AND BUDGETING

The federal grant for the first year of the demonstration was $1,585,756. A question of considerable interest is the extent to which the initial grant paid for "start-up" costs, which will decrease in the future, and the extent to which there will be continuing extra costs as a result of the demonstration.

The major budgeted activities that were supported by the federal grant, accounting for 85 percent of federal funds, were administrative costs ($191,683); parent counseling staff ($91,857); inservice training and organization development training ($399,400); compensatory vouchers ($509,100); and student and financial accounting ($128,500). In the second year of the demonstration, with an increase to 13 voucher schools, the federal grant doubled, with 85 percent of the total still devoted to these five activities.

Of these items, inservice training and organization development training most clearly qualify as start-up costs because their phased reduction has been agreed upon by the district and the National Institute of Education. Some of the central administrative costs have gone into the development of new budgeting and student attendance accounting systems, and the major burden of those tasks has also been completed. In addition, some future reduction of student and financial accounting costs at each school may be possible. A major portion of the activities supported by other categories, such as the costs of the compensatory voucher and the parent counseling staff, could conceivably continue indefinitely.

The demonstration has caused the district to move toward a type of budgeting distinctly new in American school districts. Traditionally, school districts have budgeted expenditures into a series of "line items" (such as personnel, maintenance, etc.) and then allocated a portion of each line item to a school on the basis of a formula. The conventional budget practice does not allow the school to "trade off" expenditures between one category and another. The new budget process, by contrast, gives considerable discretionary authority to teachers and principals. In Alum Rock this authority extends primarily to compensatory voucher funds. The district also sought to establish budgets that would rise or fall during the year as enrollment increased or declined; but for technical reasons, this innovation had to be delayed until the second year.

Recall that, under the voucher demonstration, the school district provided a "basic" voucher for each child out of its current income, and the federal government supplied the compensatory voucher funds for disadvantaged students. Under a voucher concept of budgeting, the basic voucher—the per student share of the total district budget—would have been allocated to the school the child attended, and the schools, in turn, would have contracted with the central office for any centralized services they wanted (purchasing, business, personnel, special services, community relations, etc.). Such a "pure" approach, however, undoubtedly would have caused dislocations in the central office and the possible reduction of central staff. In Alum Rock, therefore, before the basic voucher was allocated to school budgets, a sum of money was deducted to support central administrative costs including all central office personnel. As a consequence, the basic voucher awarded to the schools provided just enough funds to cover the salary costs of school personnel, with only a few dollars per pupil more in discretionary money. State regulations governing class size, and district agreements with teacher organizations, limit the extent to which schools can generate additional discretionary money by reducing their use of teachers and administrators.

Thus, the federal compensatory voucher money has been virtually the only source of discretionary money for schools and mini-schools. If this continues to be true, it is unclear what aspects of decentralized authority can survive the ultimate termination of the federal grant. Moreover, to the extent that teachers' support for the demonstration depends on the extra funds, the durability of that support is uncertain.

EXPANSION OF THE DEMONSTRATION IN THE SECOND YEAR

After a year's experience with vouchers, the demonstration expanded from 6 schools with some 4000 students in 1972-73 to 13 schools with some 9000 students in 1973-74. At the same time, either through inaction or overt rejection, 12 schools remained outside of the demonstration. (A new middle school opened in September 1973, increasing the number of district schools from 24 to 25.)

As they had in 1972, principals supplied the major impetus for schools to join the demonstration for the second year. In four of the "expansion" schools, parent groups exerted a noticeable effort on behalf of joining the demonstration—and at one other school, parents successfully blocked participation. In all cases the teachers themselves, although at times under pressure, made the final decision. The extra money available to voucher schools, the opportunity for innovation, and the prospect of added authority and autonomy appeared to be important motivations for teaching staffs to join. Also, while the major teachers' organization, the Alum Rock Educators Association, maintained an official neutrality, the organization's top officials, on the whole, favored the demonstration. On the other side, the expectation of extra work, hesitancy about organization development training, and reports of conflict and competition at demonstration schools were major reasons cited for teacher resistance to the demonstration.

In March 1973, a group of young teachers from outside the district proposed to add a new alternative to the demonstration for 1973-74, a school called Greater Resources Organized with Kids (GRO-Kids). As this is written, one year later, the GRO-Kids program is still in the preparatory stages, largely because of a complex series of legal questions and the resistance of a portion of the district's Board of Trustees and professional staff. During the year of controversy it has become clear that no operational procedures exist for adding "community initiated" schools to the demonstration. Such procedures may well result from the debate over the entrance of GRO-Kids into the system. New state legislation passed during the first year of the demonstration has been interpreted by the Alum Rock Superintendent in such a way as to give the Certificated Employees Council (a district bargaining group composed almost totally of teacher representatives) an important role in determining the rules for private school participation in voucher demonstrations. Thus, it appears likely that "community initiated" alternatives will be permitted only if they conform to district-teacher agreements on salary and working conditions. The Board of Trustees has approved GRO-Kids participation on these terms, and the GRO-Kids organizers may open their school in the fall of 1974.

STUDENT OUTCOMES

For the first year of the demonstration, the data on student achievement in voucher schools, as measured by standardized achievement tests, are somewhat contradictory. Results from the California state testing program seem to show that reading scores for voucher schools fell off compared to their past scores and compared to scores in nonvoucher schools. However, results from the Metropolitan Achievement Test (MAT), which was administered at Rand's request in voucher schools, seem to show that voucher school students' scores increased during the year about as much as those of students in Alum Rock Title I schools, who received the same test. Furthermore, for 1972-73, on California state tests, Title I children did better than voucher children on average; while for MAT tests in the same year, the opposite was true: voucher school children did better than Title I children. More detailed analysis of these data is now underway to try to understand the apparent discrepancies, but it would, in any case, be a mistake to give much weight to achievement scores after only one year of the demonstration, when the new programs were just getting organized.

Rand's data on other measures of student outcomes in the first year of the demonstration are limited. Unexcused absence rates were slightly lower in voucher schools than in nonvoucher schools in 1972-73, but they had also been lower before the demonstration. Rand administered affective tests in voucher schools in the spring of 1973, but the purpose was to select the best test for future use and so there are no affective test results at this time which would shed light on student outcomes. Also, Rand's first interviews with students were conducted in the second year of the demonstration. The available measures of vandalism cast virtually no light on the effects of vouchers on student attitudes.

CONCLUSIONS

These conclusions are based on findings from the first year. They are therefore tentative and subject to revision or amendment as the demonstration evolves.

1. Even where it provides the financing, the federal government will probably find it difficult to control in detail how voucher models operate in the face of strong local interests. The demonstration in Alum Rock was largely shaped to fit the district's needs and as those needs have changed, so has the demonstration.

2. It is possible to bring about organizational and procedural changes in moderate size school districts—including variants of the voucher model—without jeopardizing the basic functions of the district. However, there are some conditions which make success more likely, and other conditions which are necessary for successful implementation. Success is more likely:

- If the innovation complements existing trends in the district. In Alum Rock, the voucher demonstration reinforced an existing policy of administrative decentralization.
- If enough time and technical assistance are provided for planning, which was not the case in Alum Rock before the demonstration. With more time and more help, the demonstration would probably have been implemented more efficiently, and would have been able to adhere more closely to its stated objectives.
- If the district is not highly mobilized politically. Where any controversial educational change is proposed, well organized local interest groups are likely to feel compelled to take sides. The proposed change therefore becomes less acceptable as it appears to become more controversial. The absence of a well organized community in Alum Rock, whatever its other consequences, helped to launch the voucher demonstration relatively smoothly.

The following conditions are probably necessary for successful voucher demonstrations:

- Support of an effective superintendent of schools. This was a decisive factor in Alum Rock. More generally, such support is necessary for success, but it is by no means sufficient. In addition, the more successful the superintendent is in institutionalizing change, and embedding it in the habits of district staff, the less essential he becomes for the long-run success of the demonstration.
- External financial support. At first, extra financial support will be necessary, both to help the district to plan and implement new procedures and to help overcome the natural inertia of the bureaucracy.
- Bringing all the groups affected by the change into the process of planning for change, unless those groups are voiceless or powerless. In Alum Rock, teachers and principals in the six original voucher schools volunteered to enter the demonstration and planned their own mini-school structures. A few teachers who felt that they had not been fully consulted expressed considerable anger

with this process. If this feeling had been widespread the fate of the demonstration would have been in serious doubt.

- Tangible rewards for those who have to change their behavior as a consequence of the demonstration. In Alum Rock, teachers and principals were asked to work harder, risk their professional reputations with untried organizational arrangements and procedures, and adjust to new ways of doing things. In return, they were offered more autonomy, and more direct control over their professional lives. Without these benefits during the first year, it is doubtful that the demonstration could have continued in its present form.
- Careful attention to technical details. Once the issues of "grand design" have been thrashed out, the technical problems of implementation are the demonstration's most vulnerable point, since they are often left until last, and their difficulties are often underestimated. In Alum Rock, the district did not work out the new student attendance and financial accounting systems very well in the first year, which prevented the staff from carrying out the demonstration design as originally specified, and made it difficult for mini-schools to plan. However, the technical gaps were not severe enough to undermine the confidence of teachers, principals and parents in the voucher administration, or erode their commitment to the demonstration.

3. Mini-schools might well flourish without vouchers, but competition for students and discretionary funds may make them work better. Because they may have more opportunities for effective planning, teachers in mini-schools are also likely to benefit more than their colleagues in the typical school from improvements in existing educational information resources and technical assistance.

4. A public school system is unlikely to develop schools or mini-schools that are competitive and independent for at least the first few years of a voucher demonstration without strong outside pressures. Teachers and administrators are likely to succeed in preventing such competition, because

- They regard competition as unethical and unprofessional.
- They see it as a threat to job security, despite any protective guarantees, because it establishes a potentially dangerous new precedent with unpredictable long-run consequences.
- The movement of students between schools or mini-schools makes it hard to plan, since educational planning as now practiced depends on predictable student enrollment and budgets.

On the other hand, strong outside pressures to expand competition in a public school system may well produce an organized reaction, encouraging demonstration participants to cooperate against those pressures, which would threaten the existing stability. In Alum Rock, the six voucher principals, rather than competing with one another for students, cooperated against the central voucher staff, which was trying to implement some elements of a market system. And Alum Rock teachers have been instrumental in preventing a competitive threat from a proposed new community school. An attempt to force the issue of competition could threaten the stability of the demonstration. In the long run, as teachers and principals grow more confident, or as parent groups become stronger and more active, more competition may become possible. Until then, it is likely that only a demonstration which builds strong competitive features into its design from the outset will be able to test this feature of voucher theory.

5. At the same time, in a system which is not highly competitive (e.g., a system with few financial incentives, with strong job security guarantees, and with limita-

tions on program enrollment) parents will not have the economic power to ensure school responsiveness. This is the case in Alum Rock, despite parents' nominal right to transfer students to any mini-school of their choice, together with some portion of their voucher dollars. In such a system, however, schools may be responsive to parent and student needs for other reasons:

- From a sense of professional commitment and the desire to succeed in a new venture once the decision has been made to try it. "Competition" in such a milieu is for prestige, reputation, recognition, and community support—or at least to prevent the disgrace of failing to attract students—rather than for dollars or job security. This is currently the situation in Alum Rock.
- As a response to direct non-economic parent pressure like that exerted successfully by some Alum Rock Title I school parents in the past. Voucher school parents did not exert this kind of pressure during the first year.

6. As things now stand, the demonstration is not much of a test of the original voucher model. But it could tell us a lot about the effects of a radically decentralized system with elements of voucher model financing and direct parent participation in educational decisions.

7. The decentralization of authority in general is closely tied to the decentralization of authority over expenditures. If the federal grant remains virtually the sole source of discretionary money for the schools, then little decentralized authority may survive after the federal grant ends. And we do not know yet whether the district can develop other institutional reforms that will outlast the federal grant. It remains to be seen whether parental participation or teachers' fondness for their new autonomy will help the present arrangements to take root.

8. Quite apart from special rules built into the demonstration to prevent segregation by race or class, the first year in Alum Rock does not tell us much about the propensity of voucher systems to promote or discourage segregation. Private schools, the feature of proposed voucher models most widely criticized as likely to promote segregation, are not part of the Alum Rock demonstration. The district was also unusually well integrated before the demonstration began, so that a significant movement toward segregation with only one-fourth of the district's schools participating in the demonstration would have been unlikely. These factors make the first year of the Alum Rock demonstration a poor basis for making educated guesses on this issue.

9. Similarly, the first year of the demonstration did not provide enough information to allow us to predict probable levels of parent satisfaction with vouchers or the effects of vouchers on student achievement. The high level of parent satisfaction we observed could have been the result of genuine interest, of relative ignorance, or of reaction to the appearance and excitement of something new. Our achievement test results are limited and somewhat contradictory. Our opinion is that students have not been exposed to a relatively normal learning routine long enough to warrant even tentative conclusions about the effects of a limited voucher model on achievement.

The major discernible effect of the first year of the demonstration has not been upon parents' behavior or students' academic achievement, but on the roles of central district staff, principals, and teachers. Each voucher school has gained new autonomy, and teachers are now working in new cooperative arrangements and with new discretionary power over resources. It remains to be seen whether the various changes will improve the quality of education and the relationships between citizens and their schools.

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GLOSSARY

AFT: American Federation of Teachers. A national teachers organization affiliated with the AFL-CIO.

AREA: Alum Rock Educators Association. Previously Alum Rock Teachers Association (ARTA). Affiliated with the California Teachers Association and the National Education Association.

ARAS: Alum Rock Attendance System. System to compile attendance records. Developed and substituted in 1973 for RECAP.

ARTA: Alum Rock Teachers Association. Renamed Alum Rock Educators Association (AREA) in 1973.

Basic Voucher: Educational voucher supplied to all students, equal to the district's per pupil expenditure in the previous school year.

Catchment Area: Geographic area from which a school draws its students, sometimes called attendance area.

CEC: Certificated Employees Council. Organized under California state law, CEC is composed of representatives of certificated employees (primarily teachers) organizations and is authorized to "meet and confer" with district management concerning wages, working conditions and other district policies.

C. M. Leinwand, Associates, Inc: Corporation in Newton, Massachusetts. Contractor for the data management of the voucher demonstration. Also called Data Management Contractor (DMC).

CPE: Center for Planning and Evaluation. A unit of the Santa Clara County Office of Education which carried out voucher feasibility study for OEO in 1971.

CSPP: The Center for the Study of Public Policy. A Cambridge, Massachusetts research institute which developed the regulatory compensatory voucher model for OEO. Also provided technical assistance to school districts which had expressed interest in the project.

CTA: California Teachers Association. An affiliate of the National Education Association.

Central Voucher Staff: *See* Sequoia Institute.

Compensatory Voucher: Supplementary voucher given to poor children to give them more "purchasing power" in the educational marketplace and encourage schools to develop programs to meet their special needs. Eligibility for compensatory voucher is self-declaration by family of eligibility for federally-funded lunch programs. Per pupil compensatory voucher in 1972-73: K-6 — $226; 7-8 — $322.

"Discounted" Compensatory Voucher: Compensatory voucher adjusted downward to take into account Title I funds that may also be available to voucher schools.

DMC: Data Management Contractor. *See* C. M. Leinwand, Associates, Inc.

EVA: Education Voucher Agency. Independent agency proposed by CSPP to supervise voucher activities. Not implemented in Alum Rock voucher demonstration.

EVAC: Education Voucher Advisory Committee—Committee of voucher parents and school staff to advise the School Board and Superintendent on voucher project.

Expansion Schools: Seven schools entering the demonstration after the first year. Also referred to as "new" voucher schools in contrast to the six original or "old" voucher schools.

FRC: Field Research Corporation. San Francisco-based survey research organization. Administered parent survey for Rand under subcontract.

GRO-Kids: Greater Resources Organized with Kids (GRO with Kids) Inc. Nonprofit corporation organized to develop a "community-initiated" school within the Alum Rock voucher system.

HRC: (Center for Human Resources and Organizational Development.) Santa Cruz-based organization development consultant which was hired by Alum Rock to work with principals, teachers and central staff involved in implementing the voucher demonstration.

Income/Outgo Budgeting and Accounting System: Developed to track the flow of students and dollars within the system of voucher schools.

Internal Evaluation: Evaluation of the demonstration carried out by the Sequoia Institute voucher staff.

Mini-schools: Individual educational programs in voucher schools.

NEA: National Education Association. National organization of teachers, of which AREA (Alum Rock Educators Association) is an affiliate.

NIE: National Institute of Education. Federal agency which assumed responsibility for the voucher demonstration from OEO in 1973.

OEO: United States Office of Economic Opportunity. Federal agency which funded voucher demonstration initially.

Open Enrollment: A policy allowing students to choose the schools they attend.

RECAP: Regional Education Center for Automated Processing. System used to compile attendance records during the first year of the Alum Rock Demonstration. Replaced by ARAS during the 1973-74 school year.

SB 90: California Senate Bill #90, a property tax relief-school finance measure enacted into law in 1973. Provides increased state support for school districts with small property tax bases; also provides special funds for districts with large numbers of disadvantaged students.

SB 600: California Senate Bill #600. Permits up to four "demonstration scholarship" (voucher) programs in California, including private schools which meet prescribed standards. Also provides that selected sections of the State Education Code may be waived for experimental purposes in both voucher and nonvoucher schools. Makes participation in and decisions concerning voucher programs subject to the school district's meet-and-confer process with certificated employees. Enacted into law as the Demonstration Scholarship Act of 1973.

Satelliting: Provision whereby mini-schools with enrollment in excess of physical capacity locate classrooms at other school sites.

Sequoia Institute: Nonprofit corporation formed to provide administrative services to voucher demonstration, under contract to the district. Voucher Project Director and Coordinators of Parent Information, Public Information and Evaluation are Sequoia employees. Also known as "voucher staff" or "central voucher staff."

Squatter's Rights: Provision of the Alum Rock voucher demonstration whereby students attending a given school, and their younger siblings, are guaranteed the right to continue attending that school.

Title I: Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, providing compensatory education funds for schools with educationally disadvantaged children.

Transition Model: Term used for the voucher model implemented in Alum Rock, to denote transitional features of the demonstration, e.g., public schools only; participation initially limited to six schools.

Voucher Staff: *See* Sequoia Institute.

I. THE RAND STUDY

BACKGROUND

In April 1972, the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) awarded Rand a contract to study and analyze the voucher demonstration in the Alum Rock Union Elementary School District. Within OEO, the Experimental Research Division funded and helped design the demonstration, while the separate Evaluation Division funded and supervised the Rand study. In July 1973, the National Institute of Education (NIE) succeeded OEO as sponsor of the voucher demonstration, and NIE contracted with Rand to continue its study and analysis, which was scheduled to extend throughout the period of federal sponsorship of the demonstration, tentatively planned for five to seven years in Alum Rock.

Throughout the study, a separate Data Management Contractor, C. M. Leinwand Associates of Newton, Massachusetts, has been responsible for collecting certain school and student data from the district and preparing computerized data files for use by Rand, NIE, the school district, and educational researchers. In addition, Rand has subcontracted with Field Research Corporation of San Francisco for the conduct of parent/community surveys in the district.

Rand has been acting as an independent external evaluator. Our study has been conducted with the cooperation of the Alum Rock district, and in some instances has been responsive to the suggestions and requests of district personnel, but in all cases the final decisions as to the conduct of the evaluation have been exclusively Rand's responsibility, within general guidelines established in agreements with OEO and NIE.

STUDY OF LARGE-SCALE SOCIAL DEMONSTRATIONS

The Alum Rock voucher project is a large-scale social demonstration, a complex intervention in a changing social system. Its aim is to assess a large-scale, long-term trial of a new approach for educational reform.

Large-scale social demonstrations differ from rigorous scientific experiments in a number of ways:

- A demonstration in practice is likely to diverge considerably from original plans or theories.
- Criteria of program "success" are difficult to define and make operational. In practice, they may have to change as the program and its objectives evolve.
- Scientific controls are seldom available, since conventional strategies for designating experimental and comparison groups (e.g., random assignment, matching) are largely precluded by the character of the intervention.
- Key program elements—staff, site, treatment characteristics—are seldom standardized; they are likely to vary over the course of a demonstration in a given community, and among different communities participating in the program.
- Unknown intervening variables make it difficult to determine cause and effect relationships in a complex social setting.

For these reasons, conventional principles of experimental design are not precisely applicable. The plan for study and analysis must be a flexible instrument that focuses on the relationships between preselected independent and dependent variables, and is also sensitive to unanticipated processes and consequences. These characteristics of large-scale social demonstrations have led to the following emphases in our research approach:

- Careful description of events and processes; it is important to know what actually occurred in the demonstration, not merely what the plans were.
- Selection of data collection and analysis tasks on the basis of what is actually going on in the demonstration, rather than exclusively on preselected criteria.
- Careful distinction between interim results and long-run findings. Social change tends to be slow-paced and subtle, rather than quick and dramatic. In a demonstration of this magnitude, "definitive" policy conclusions will emerge, if at all, only after several years.
- Reliance on many indicators of outcomes and many sources of information on the behavior, perceptions, and attitudes of participants. In a complex social setting, the comparison of information from different sources is a safeguard against incorrect interpretation.
- Attention to discrete elements of the intervention, as well as to their interrelationships. The voucher demonstration employs a number of new rules and administrative devices. It is important to assess the effects of each of these arrangements, as well as their combined effects, since some may be of independent interest to policymakers.

One important question raised by the characteristics of the demonstration and by the Rand approach to evaluation is how much, if at all, it will be possible to generalize from Alum Rock experience to other districts or the country at large. That is, did changes occur at Alum Rock as a result of the voucher intervention, or as a result of special characteristics of Alum Rock, or of other intervening variables, such as state or national trends or public policies? In scientific experiments, the effects of a treatment are determined by comparing the group receiving the treatment with an otherwise identical group that does not receive the treatment. The treatment and nontreatment groups are chosen on the basis of random assignment. Given the nature of social demonstrations, and the voucher demonstration in particular, this kind of experimental design is impossible. However, it is possible to arrive at certain generalizations, based on comparisons of voucher and nonvoucher schools in Alum Rock, comparisons of Alum Rock with other districts and comparisons of Alum Rock teachers, parents, and students with similar people elsewhere. Rand's Technical Analysis Plan of February 1972 and Appendix I of this report discuss the use of comparison groups, and their application to the voucher demonstration. In brief, we can say that over the five-to-seven year period of the demonstration it should be possible to generalize about treatment effects beyond the demonstration site, although such statements will necessarily be qualified. Such generalization will be carried out through the use of selected comparison groups, including those "created" at new voucher demonstration sites.

VOUCHER THEORY, POLICY ISSUES, AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Theory and Practice of Vouchers

The policy issues of concern in Rand's research are suggested both by the "grand objectives" of the voucher demonstration, as explicated in design and theory, and by the demonstration in actual practice at the first site in Alum Rock. Space does not permit a comprehensive discussion of these issues here, but we summarize below the central questions that drive the research effort.[1]

The argument for trying out an education voucher system is clearcut.[2] Most children attend their local public schools which, under the influence of state regulation and school board consensus, offer a rather standardized brand of schooling. If parents or children want to change the quality or nature of schooling, their real choices are limited. They can try to change school policies, which means trying to change an established bureaucracy. They can choose another school in the district or another school district, but for various reasons—such as the similarity of programs within and between most districts, and the economic and social costs of moving—this choice is more apparent than real for the average person. Or they can send their children to private or parochial schools, an alternative that is too expensive for most parents and often unavailable locally.

Education vouchers represent a possible way around these impediments. Parents would receive a voucher redeemable in public funds for each child of school age, and could use it to finance the tuition costs for any participating public or private school, subject to admission requirements. Local school boards and state education agencies would continue to raise funds for schooling, and would deposit them in the voucher redemption fund. Individual schools might be under public (school board) or private management, but all would be required to meet state standards, to prevent fraud or low-quality performance (although according to voucher theory, consumer choice probably would eliminate most substandard operations over the long run). In various voucher proposals, incentives are proposed to encourage schools to work with disadvantaged students, protect existing teacher tenure rights, prevent admission policies that would discriminate by race or social class, and so on.[3]

It is easy enough to see that such a system might offer a wider range of choice to parents and students. But how would its operation affect students, parents, educators, and the community at large? By reference to a *theory of vouchers* (see Fig. 1.1), we can set forth how a "successful" voucher system is presumed to work.

State legislatures, state education agencies, and local school boards (possibly with inputs from educators' organizations and community groups) would establish voucher eligibility regulations for existing and new schools. The creation of an elementary and secondary education marketplace, like the one already found in higher education, would motivate educators to establish new schools and thus new educational choices.

The exercise of parental choice, it is presumed, would lead to greater parental

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[1] Rand's approach is described in detail in *Technical Analysis Plan for Evaluation of the OEO Elementary Education Voucher Demonstration*, Technical Dissertation, The Rand Corporation, February 1972.

[2] For a similar exposition, see National Institute of Education, "Education Vouchers: A Research Design and Implementation Strategy," Washington, D.C., March 13, 1974 (mimeograph).

[3] (See Sec. III below; see also Center for the Study of Public Policy, *Education Vouchers: A Report on Financing Elementary Education by Grants to Parents*, Cambridge, Mass., December 1970; and National Institute of Education, op. cit., pp. 6-15).


Vouchers provided to parents
Voucher eligibility regulations for schools
Incentives to create new schools
New schools
Parental choice among range of public and private schools
Increased parental control over schooling
New incentives for public and private school teachers and administrators to be more responsive to needs of parents + children
Increased parental satisfaction with school system
Public and private school innovation, program diversity, responsiveness
Improvements in student achievement and related educational outcomes

Fig. 1.1—Model of assumed cause and effect relationships in the Education Voucher Demonstration

influence over and satisfaction with schooling because more programs suited to individual student needs would be possible under a voucher system. Parent economic power would supply new incentives for teachers and administrators to respond to parents' and children's needs, thereby leading to more innovation, diversity, and responsiveness in schooling. Students would reap the rewards of better academic achievement, more favorable attitudes toward school, and a greater sense of efficacy or of control over the environment. It should be noted, however, that in contrast to many large-scale educational interventions of recent years (such as federal compensatory education programs), improved academic achievement is not an indispensable element of a successful voucher program. If parents, students, and educators prefer vouchers to the existing system, thanks to opportunities for choice, innovation, and greater responsiveness to individual needs, then vouchers could be considered a success whether or not academic achievement, as ordinarily measured, improves.

Objections to Vouchers

As presented by voucher proponents, the theory sounds attractive. But many people have grave reservations—so grave that they even call into question the merits of a demonstration such as the one at Alum Rock. For example, National Education Association officials testified before Congress in 1971 in opposition to a demonstration of education vouchers, on the grounds that the scheme was so pernicious that any use of government funds to test its strengths and weaknesses was inadvisable.

Many of these reservations, if shown to be valid, would probably outweigh the presumed advantages of vouchers.

One major objection is that a voucher system would allow rampant hucksterism to invade education. If schools offered the lure of profits, the full panoply of advertising and sales efforts might be turned on the public. Parents, particularly unsophisticated ones, might have no way to distinguish between true and false claims, and the result might be inferior schooling that benefits no one but educational entrepreneurs. A related objection is that American society is already dominated by corporate profit motives, which do not always coincide with the public interest. To introduce the profit motive into children's education would allow corporate motivations to shape one of the most precious of social rights—the rearing of new generations. Many people believe that television, with its reliance on mass audiences for advertising revenues, has already had bad effects on children, and cite TV as evidence of the unwisdom of allowing profit motives to encroach further into child development.

A second important objection is that the new system, bent on attacking the perceived sameness of our public schools, will destroy the democratic values that public schools share and instill. Almost all Americans who have gone to school in the past century have attended public schools. The schools have been the greatest single institutional force for transmitting American values and socializing children from variegated backgrounds. A voucher system, by prizing diversity and encouraging the breakup of uniformity, could undermine that vital role of American public education.

Many critics charge that voucher systems would open the way to segregation by social class, race, and economic status. In its "pure" form, a voucher system would allow parents to supplement voucher funds with their own money. Well-to-do families could therefore band together as a clientele for expensive voucher schools, which would in effect bar children of low-income families. Similarly, schools in a "pure" voucher system could erect racial or religious barriers to admission. While some voucher models provide safeguards against class and race segregation, they cannot guarantee open admission.

Most voucher proposals would allow parochial schools to participate, and many people view this provision as an attack on the Constitutional separation of church and state, and yet another potentially divisive effect of vouchers.

Educators representing public schools also fear that voucher school admission criteria could be used to skim off the cream of the student population for private voucher schools, leaving the public schools with most of the poor students and students with difficult learning problems.

Faculty and administrators of public schools also perceive voucher systems as a real threat to their job security and tenure provisions. If fewer people send their children to existing schools under a voucher system, who will pay for public school teachers and administrators? In theory, they could work in those schools, public or private, that flourish under vouchers. But theory is not much of a substitute for tenure.

Finally some believe that a voucher system would inexorably force increases in the cost of public elementary and secondary education, creating severe public finance problems. As voucher schools offered a variety of attractive educational options under a "pure" system, so the argument runs, parents would press for increases in voucher values so that they could send their children to schools that offered enriched programs. In any event, if children now enrolled at their parents' expense in private and parochial schools were to be enrolled there under a voucher system at public expense, there would obviously be a substantial increase in the public costs of schooling. This would create particular difficulties in states such as Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and New York, which have large proportions of Catholic students, many now attending parochial schools.

Policy Issues

Our inspection of the key propositions of the theory of vouchers has revealed an extensive constituency whose interests may be affected by demonstration processes and outcomes. Students, parents, the community at large, educators, and public servants, both elected and appointed, all have a stake in the demonstration. Organizations and institutional interests may be deeply affected: the public education system, private schools, institutions of government, professional organizations. Finally, there is the elusive but important stake of the public interest.

Rand's Technical Analysis Plan of February 1972 suggested that experience from voucher demonstrations might contribute to the debate over the following public policy issues:

- Should there be some way to give parents a more direct voice in choosing their children's schools?
- Should public policy encourage more diversity in the schools, and if so, how?
- Should the public support private and parochial schools, and if so, how?
- Should there be market incentives in elementary and secondary schooling, and if so, what kinds?
- If the answer to any of the above questions is "yes," to what extent are vouchers a necessary and sufficient device to shape new policies?

In turn, evidence relevant to these issues could specifically contribute to public policy decisions about whether to introduce the voucher mechanism in other communities. To assemble this evidence, we proposed to collect and analyze data in three broad categories, that would cast light on how the demonstration would affect:

- The education of students;
- The cost and efficiency of the schooling process; and
- The relationship between citizens and their schools.

Subsequently, during the first year of the demonstration, a fourth important category of effects emerged: effects on the roles of school professionals and on patterns of decisionmaking within school systems.

During the first year we therefore devoted particular attention to diversity of educational options, student outcome measures, exercise of parental choice, parental satisfaction, school governance, organization of classroom instruction, role of teachers and adminstrators, educational costs and resource use, and ethnic and socioeconomic (SES) distribution of students.

Within these areas of interest, questions have been suggested by specific features of the demonstration as it is actually practiced in Alum Rock. For example, we have addressed the following issues:

- Incentives that may be tapped by the introduction of limited competition for students into a public school system.
- The consequences of using mini-schools, rather than schools, as the basic "educational unit" in the system—e.g., the effects on teacher roles and perceptions, instructional strategies, planning, and resource use.
- The effects on school planning of parents' freedom to transfer their children between programs at any time during the school year.

- The effects of giving teachers (and principals) more control over basic instructional decisions and budget allocation.
- The ways in which teachers and principals respond to parent requests or demands—their perceptions of how their own freedom of decision may have changed under new ground rules.
- The character, extent, and comprehensiveness of communication between schools and parents—the kind of information parents receive, and its usefulness to them.
- The role of the newly created voucher staff.
- Changes brought about by the demonstration in district procedures for rule making and rule adjudication, and in district machinery for the distribution of resources.
- Changes, if any, in the distribution of authority and influence in the district that can be attributed to demonstration rules and procedures, as differentiated, for example, from preexisting trends or policies, such as the district's long-term commitment to decentralization.
- Effects that may be idiosyncratic—related to personalities, to accident, or to special characteristics of one district.

This list of issues illustrates the kinds of questions that guide Rand's data collection and analysis. They are more explicit and more demonstration-specific than the broad policy questions they are related to, and they must be answered before the broader implications of the voucher demonstration for public policy can be assessed. This report presents evidence on such demonstration-specific questions, but it would be premature to say that even these questions have been "answered." Such interim findings as this report conveys do serve the needs of decisionmakers for preliminary evidence to help guide their choices, and of the public for information about a new type of social intervention. The data collection and analysis is designed to yield useful short-run findings concerning these relatively detailed questions while, in the long run, contributing to the illumination of related broad public-policy questions.

DATA COLLECTION EFFORT

Evidence on the first year of the Alum Rock demonstration was gathered from numerous sources using a variety of data collection techniques. The use of multiple sources of information on each issue of interest in the demonstration is illustrated in Table 1.1. For example, information on diversity of educational options was derived from parent-community surveys, teacher surveys, personal interviews, visits to classrooms, meetings with mini-school faculties, and examination of budget and purchasing documents.

Much of our methodology in the first year can best be described as developmental and exploratory. Data collection instruments, such as survey questionnaires and classroom observation forms, had to be developed, tested, and in some instances revised on the basis of experience in the field. We experimented with various schemes for conducting achievement tests and with a variety of affective tests. In addition to the exploratory or developmental approach for each type of data collection, there was feedback among various research components. Thus, survey instruments were revised on the basis of site observation, and the interview program was developed in light of previous site reports and preliminary survey findings.

Discussions of data collection and associated issues are presented in the appro-

Table 1.1

INFORMATION SOURCES FOR ISSUES OF INTEREST IN THE DEMONSTRATION

Selected Issue of Interest	Parent/ Community Survey	Teacher Survey	Site Observation	Individual Interviews	Record Data	Visits to Mini-school Classrooms	Meetings and Group Interviews with Mini-school Faculties	Examination of Budget and Purchasing Documents	Achievement Tests	Affective Tests[a]
Diversity of educational options	x	x		x		x	x	x		
Exercise of parental choice	x	x		x	x		x			
Changes in school governance (including parental participation)	x	x	x	x						
Changed roles of teachers and administrators		x	x	x			x	x		
Student outcomes		x		x	x		x		x	x
Parental satisfaction	x			x						
Ethnic and SES distribution of students	x			x	x					
Resource-use and cost implications			x	x		x	x	x		

[a] Not used in analysis to date.

priate sections of this report. This section briefly describes the components of the data collection effort and then some general issues of data availability. Table 1.2 presents a chronology of the first year of the demonstration and corresponding data collection efforts.

DATA SOURCES

Parent/Community Surveys

Through its survey subcontractor, Field Research Corporation, Rand conducted extensive door-to-door interviews with both voucher and nonvoucher parents and nonparents in Alum Rock in the fall of 1972 and 1973. In addition, a small panel of voucher parents interviewed in the fall of 1972 was reinterviewed the following spring, and again in the fall of 1973. The survey probed general school-related attitudes as well as awareness of and specific attitudes toward the voucher demonstration.

Teacher Surveys

Rand conducted a survey of both voucher and nonvoucher school teachers, using self-administered questionnaires, in both fall and spring of the 1972-73 school year. Questions probed attitudes toward, expectations of, and experiences with the voucher demonstration and specific elements of the demonstration (e.g., parental choice), as well as opinions on general educational issues.

Site Observations

Rand maintains a site office in San Jose. During the 1972-73 school year, it was staffed by a full-time site director and three part-time staff members acting as community observers. Our site staff, reflecting the ethnic mix in Alum Rock, consisted of an Anglo man, a black woman, a Chicano man, and a Chicano woman. These staff members attended numerous public and private meetings in the schools and community, held both informal discussions and formal interviews with demonstration participants, collected documentary materials (memos, minutes of meetings, budget summaries), and recorded their observations in diaries for subsequent analysis.

Personal Interviews

Approximately forty individual interviews were conducted with demonstration participants (exclusive of teachers) in the first year. Rand interviewed all members of the Board of Trustees, eight members of the voucher staff, six voucher principals, and fourteen nonvoucher principals. Two interviews were conducted with leaders of teacher organizations and eight with administrative officials of the district. Permission to quote from these interviews was sought in advance.

Record Data

Record data for students include age, ethnicity, school and mini-school, transfer history, and attendance information. Teacher record data include demographic

Table 1.2

CHRONOLOGY OF DEMONSTRATION AND RAND STUDY

Summer 1970	-- Superintendent of the Alum Rock schools begins consideration of a "regulated-compensatory" voucher demonstration.
Spring 1971	-- The Alum Rock District conducts a "feasibility study" of vouchers that ends in an impasse.
Fall 1971	-- The District conducts "management training" for selected central office and school site administrators with the aid of an OEO grant.
January 1972	-- The Superintendent and OEO officials agree upon the major features of a transitional, public-schools-only, voucher demonstration.
March 1972	-- Transition model presented and developed with input of administrators, teachers, and parents.
April-May 1972	-- Faculties at six schools vote to participate in the demonstration.
	-- Alum Rock Board of Trustees approves transition model voucher proposal.
	-- OEO approves Alum Rock proposal.
	-- Faculties at six participating schools formulate "mini-school" options and begin instructional planning.
	-- Descriptions of the demonstration and of the 22 mini-schools are distributed to parents.
	-- The District contracts with the newly formed Sequoia Institute to provide administrative services to the demonstration. The selection of the Sequoia staff begins.
June 1972	-- Initial parents' selections of mini-schools are accepted and the assignment of students to mini-schools begins.
August 1972	-- Rand establishes a site office in Alum Rock and initiates continuing observation of demonstration processes both within the school organization and within the community. Interviews with participants are initiated.
September 1972	-- Instruction begins in the demonstration schools.
November 1972	-- At Rand's request, Metropolitan Achievement Test administered to demonstration students.
	-- First survey of teacher opinion by Rand.
	-- First Rand parent/community survey.
	-- Visits to mini-school classrooms begun by Rand.
January-March 1973	-- Nonvoucher schools in Alum Rock consider participation in the demonstration. Seven schools are added to the demonstration.
	-- A revised OEO-District agreement to conduct a third year of the demonstration is concluded.
April 1973	-- Descriptions of 45 mini-schools are distributed to parents.
	-- Sequoia Institute evaluation of each mini-school distributed to parents in that mini-school.
May 1973	-- At Rand's request, Metropolitan Achievement Test administered to demonstration school students.
	-- Affective tests administered to samples of demonstration school students at Rand's request.
	-- Surveys of teacher opinion and parent panel by Rand.
	-- Initial parent selections of mini-schools for the second year are accepted.
September 1973	-- Instruction within the expanded demonstration begins.
November-December 1973	-- Second-year Rand survey of parent and community opinion of the demonstration.
February 1974	-- Rand survey of teacher opinion (sampled by telephone).

characteristics, educational background, and employment history. Both types of record data are collected from the district by C. M. Leinwand Associates, the Data Management Contractor, which prepares computerized data files for dissemination to Rand and NIE.

Visits to Mini-school Classrooms

Rand observers visited 103 of the 126 classrooms in the 22 original voucher mini-schools in the first year. Their purpose was not to rate classrooms or teachers but to gather information necessary to document the available educational offerings.

Meetings and Group Interviews with Mini-school Faculties

Rand's classroom observation staff conducted a series of meetings with each mini-school faculty at which additional information needed for program descriptions was gathered. These meetings concentrated on the instructional and resource aspects of the program. Other Rand interviewers conducted group interviews with 20 of the 22 mini-school faculties, covering reactions to the demonstration in general, especially to changing teacher roles and responsibilities.

Examination of Budgeting and Purchasing Documents

To analyze resource use, Rand had access to the 1972-73 district budget, as well as to school and mini-school budgets. At the mini-school level, Rand reviewed 2000 requisitions, representing almost all of the first-year mini-school purchases from compensatory voucher funds, which accounted for almost all of the mini-schools' discretionary funds. For other expenditures at the district and school levels, we used budgeted data as a basis for analysis rather than expenditure data. The school district's accounting system did not provide a detailed enough breakdown to permit measurement of actual resource-use after the fact. The alternative would have been to review the 10,000-odd requisitions on file at the district offices, which represented an excessive workload in light of any probable benefits for the evaluation. It also would have raised questions in Alum Rock about whether Rand was performing the auditing functions that more properly belonged to OEO, NIE, and California state auditors.

Achievement Tests

At Rand's request, the Metropolitan Achievement Test was administered to all voucher school students in the fall of 1972, the spring of 1973, and again in the fall of 1973 and the spring of 1974. Within the overall testing program, Rand conducted several small side studies concerned with testing conditions and the assignment of appropriate test levels to students.

Affective Tests

In the first year, Rand arranged for the administration of a variety of affective tests to samples of voucher school students to select the most appropriate instruments for future testing. The basic purpose of the affective test battery is to identify student characteristics associated with success and failure in different types of educational programs.

DATA AVAILABILITY

We should alert the reader to the limitations of both predemonstration data and data from nondemonstration schools in Alum Rock. Once the demonstration received final approval from OEO in April 1972, the start-up phase was very short. By the end of May, parents had made their program selections for the following school year. Consequently, there was no lead-time in which to collect predemonstration baseline data for the specific purpose of demonstration analysis. OEO had decided not to collect data until agreement was reached to proceed with the demonstration. Many analyses therefore depend on whether preexisting data happened to be available in the district, and these data are of varying quality and comprehensiveness. For example, Rand has collected test score data by grade level for prevoucher years, as available through the state-mandated achievement testing program. Prevoucher financial data are available for the district as a whole, but not by school.

Similarly, while comparisons with nonvoucher schools could help us ascertain the extent of voucher-related effects, Rand has not collected much data in nonvoucher schools. We were able to carry out some survey work, including parent/community surveys and teacher surveys in both voucher and nonvoucher schools and communities. However, we recognized that nonvoucher schools, by choosing to remain outside the demonstration, also exempted themselves from the intrusive effects of the Rand evaluation. They cooperated in the conduct of teacher surveys and interviews with principals, but it seemed unwise to us to attempt to impose upon them further. Furthermore, both Rand and OEO were constrained to take seriously the district's reluctance to provide or collect certain types of data. Alum Rock was the only district in the country that was willing to try out a voucher demonstration during 1972-73, and any attempt to force the district's hand might have provoked confrontation and threatened the survival of the demonstration.

RELATIONS WITH THE DISTRICT

Every major facet of the data collection required cooperation from district personnel. Tests were administered by teachers; permission had to be secured to observe in classrooms; a variety of district personnel had to be willing to be interviewed; permission had to be secured from district administrators for Rand staff members to record events in closed meetings; and several types of district records had to be opened to our inspection.

District personnel were cooperative in all respects. To secure that cooperation, Rand had to explain why it was collecting the various types of information. The necessity for district cooperation made us especially sensitive to suggestions from school personnel on how we could avoid burdening them too much with our data collection efforts. Suggestions from teachers led to some changes in the content of the teacher questionnaire and in the ground rules for administering the standardized achievement tests. In retrospect, it appears that suggestions from district personnel improved the effectiveness of our data collection, although the modifications we agreed to in achievement testing created some problems for the analysis.

Rand guaranteed to district personnel that certain data bearing upon individual opinions or behavior would remain confidential. Data files from student testing, teacher questionnaires, and parent surveys are set up to ensure that there is no link between confidential information received and the identity of the people it refers to. Rand, with the assistance of NIE's independent data management contractor, has designed a complex system of identification numbering to break the link between data and the identity of individuals.

Rand's evaluation has been summative (assessing what happened after the fact) rather than formative (working with the district to improve the program as it develops). We have made special efforts to avoid exerting any effect whatever on the attitudes or behavior of participants in the demonstration. Until the release of this report, we have shared neither data nor analysis with the district or any participant in the demonstration, with the sole exception of student testing. Inasmuch as the district also needed data on student achievement, Rand agreed to share the results of the tests administered under our auspices with teachers and administrators, to avoid having students and teachers needlessly repeat batteries of tests. (The district did not release the test data to the public until the end of the 1973-74 school year.)

Rand's activities *may* have inadvertently altered the course of the demonstration. No instance of our having done so has been brought to our attention, however. It is far more likely that we influenced the expression of attitudes by our mere presence. The pervasive presence of Rand's data collection activities undoubtedly sensitized participants to the importance of the events and processes we recorded. For example, we suspect that the presence of Rand observers may have affected the tone of some policymaking meetings, though not the course of events.

Rand's strongest effect on the conduct of the demonstration is likely to arise from the publication of this report. While the protection of the demonstration from untoward influences remains an important consideration, we feel obliged to report what we now know.

ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT

Section II describes the Alum Rock Union Elementary School District and its community, the setting for the first education voucher demonstration in the United States.

Section III discusses the efforts of the federal government to launch a voucher demonstration, the initial stages of Alum Rock's involvement, and the features of the transition model adopted by Alum Rock.

Section IV reports on how the Alum Rock transition model was implemented in the first year of the demonstration, examining in detail developments in four key areas: budget issues; student transfers and flexibility of mini-school size; parent information; and creation of community-initiated educational alternatives. In addition, this section briefly discusses expansion of the demonstration for the second year; conflict management; organization development efforts; and collective parent participation.

Section V deals with the alternative educational programs offered to parents in the demonstration—the mini-schools. General features of instructional management in demonstration schools are discussed, as well as similarities and differences among the original 22 mini-schools in instructional emphasis, individualization of instruction, and resource use.

Section VI reports the results of Rand's initial Alum Rock parent/community survey, emphasizing parental satisfaction with the schools, attitudes about parental influence on the schools, and beliefs about the voucher demonstration, as well as parental awareness of and perceptions about demonstration-related information. The responses of Alum Rock citizens are compared with those of a representative national sample of adults, and preliminary analyses of second-year Alum Rock survey data are provided. The section also examines the extent to which parents participating in the demonstration exercised their option to transfer their children among programs and schools.

Section VII concerns the ways in which Alum Rock teachers have both influenced and been influenced by the first year of the demonstration. Their reactions to various aspects of the demonstration are discussed on the basis of survey and interview data.

Section VIII deals with measuring the impact of the demonstration on students, in terms of various outcomes—achievement test scores, attendance rates, vandalism, and affective development. The findings reported are highly tentative, because of data problems and the newness of the demonstration.

Section IX examines the distribution of Alum Rock students among schools by racial and ethnic group to see whether it has been affected by the voucher demonstration.

Section X reviews some of the main points of the report and discusses what can be learned from the first year of the demonstration.

II. THE SETTING

As the voucher demonstration is greatly influenced by its setting—East San Jose, California—this section provides some historical, social, and economic background on the city and the school district in which the demonstration is taking place.

THE PHYSICAL SETTING

The Alum Rock Union Elementary School District is one of eleven school districts serving San Jose, California. The city has a population of approximately 500,000 and is located south of San Francisco in the Santa Clara Valley. West and north of the city an unbroken urban sprawl stretches some fifty miles to San Francisco; to the south and east, suburbia gives way to farmlands and orchards. The Alum Rock area is located on the east side of San Jose, on a broad, heavily populated flatland between U.S. Highway 101 and the Mt. Hamilton range.

The rapid and relatively uncontrolled growth that took place in the Santa Clara Valley during the last two decades brought urbanization to East San Jose. Consequently, most of Alum Rock's farmlands and orchards have given way to commercial arteries and a seemingly endless chain of "fast food" franchises, large shopping centers, and hastily constructed apartments and houses. Today, among the gas stations, billboards, and small shops, there are only occasional patches of undeveloped land.

Cutting across the now-developed flatland is Alum Rock Avenue, once the area's main street. It contains the small shops and offices that form much of the commercial and cultural center of San Jose's Mexican-American community, but includes none of the major industrial employers whose arrival in the Santa Clara Valley spurred the urbanization process. Similarly, the major governmental, financial, and other white-collar employment centers are concentrated in downtown San Jose, several miles west of the Alum Rock School District.

Branching out from Alum Rock Avenue and the other commercial thoroughfares are the residential streets, marked by row upon row of modest single-family homes. Each has its own lawn, but very few have the swimming pools that adorn the backyards of more affluent areas in California. Although these tracts were recently built, many of them are already deteriorating. Many of the older sections of Alum Rock are characterized by tree-shaded neighborhoods lined with small, one-story frame structures built around 1920. In part because these areas of the district were unincorporated until recently, municipal improvements have been late in reaching them. Many streets lack sidewalks or adequate street lighting, particularly those in Mexican-American neighborhoods—the "barrios." In these poorer neighborhoods, life is often conducted out of doors. Families can be seen sitting on their porches, chatting with their neighbors; children and their dogs run and play in the quiet streets, dodging the parked cars (some of them abandoned) that dot the neighborhood.

In the eastern hills that look down on Alum Rock, a different atmosphere prevails. Here are the larger and more expensive homes of San Jose's more affluent residents, in the local lexicon the "hill people."

THE SCHOOL SETTING

The district was established in 1930. It was originally a rural district with one school, and as late as 1950 it had only three schools. Then, during the 1960s, as Alum Rock went through the period of rapid growth, about three schools a year were built for a number of years. In the 1972-1973 school year (the first year of the voucher demonstration) the Alum Rock School District operated nineteen elementary schools, five middle schools, and, on separate sites, two centers for preschool children. Five of the original six voucher schools are situated in neighborhoods within the lower-income, flatland areas of Alum Rock, and are within five miles of one another (four are within two miles of one another). Approximately 4000 students attended these six schools during the 1972-1973 school year out of a total elementary and middle-school enrollment of 14,428.[1]

During the past few years in the district, enrollment figures have leveled off and have even slightly declined (Fig. 2.1). While some school districts neighboring Alum Rock also experienced slight drops in enrollment at specific points in time, these surrounding districts, on the whole, continue to show some growth in enrollment[2] (Table 2.1).

During the same time period there has been a dramatic increase in the proportion of ethnic minority youngsters in the Alum Rock schools, with a particularly marked increase between 1968 and 1969 (Fig. 2.2). This pattern appeared in the six original voucher schools and in the district as a whole. The growth curve for both the district as a whole and the six original voucher schools (see Fig. 2.3) shows the largest increase in the proportion of minority ethnic group student population (especially those of Spanish surname) during the period of the greatest general growth in total school population. However, this reflects not only an increase in enrollment of those with Spanish surnames but also a marked decrease over the same time period in "other white" enrollment.[3] Although total enrollments have fallen off since 1971, this trend has increased. In other words, the decrease in total school enrollment is a function of "other white" students leaving the district at a rate that exceeds the entry rate for new students with Spanish surnames and black students. Thus, in the Alum Rock School District the proportion of minority ethnic group students has increased slightly.

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[1] Alum Rock School District Attendance Office (enrollment as of October 1972).

[2] County of Santa Clara, Office of Education, Department of Attendance and Juvenile Services, "District Enrollment Totals 1961-1972."

[3] The ethnic classifications used by the Alum Rock School District are based on those outlined by HEW's Office of Civil Rights for use by school districts, in "School Systems Summary Report Form OS-CR 101 (October 1973) Elementary and Secondary School Civil Rights Requirements Survey." Alum Rock's classifications are as follows:

> "Persons considered by themselves, by the community, or by the schools to be of these origins:
>
> American Indian
>
> Asian American: Persons of Chinese, Japanese, or other Asian origins
>
> Black: Persons of Black, African, or Negro origin
>
> Spanish Surname: Persons of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Central American, Cuban, Latin American, or other Spanish origin
>
> Other White: All persons not included in the above four classifications."



SOURCE: Alum Rock School District Attendance Office.

Fig. 2.1—Enrollment in the Alum Rock School District, month of October 1953-October 1973

Table 2.1

FALL ENROLLMENTS IN THE ALUM ROCK ELEMENTARY DISTRICT AND NEIGHBORING ELEMENTARY DISTRICTS: 1964-1973

	Fall Enrollment			Percent Change from Previous Year		
Year	Alum Rock	Berryessa	Evergreen	Alum Rock	Berryessa	Evergreen
1964	13,294	2,448	1,461	--	--	--
1965	13,524	2,949	1,962	+2	+20	+34
1966	14,245	3,421	2,376	+5	+16	+21
1967	15,217	3,860	2,773	+7	+13	+17
1968	15,461	4,589	3,232	+2	+19	+17
1969	15,666	5,194	3,754	+1	+13	+16
1970	15,950	5,537	4,175	+2	+7	+11
1971	15,735	6,223	4,564	-1	+12	+9
1972	15,428	7,476	5,071	-2	+20	+11
1973	15,127	8,389	5,228	-2	+12	+3

SOURCES: County of Santa Clara Office of Education: "District Enrollment Totals," 1961-1973, and the Alum Rock Union School District.



SOURCE: Alum Rock School District.

Fig. 2.2—Ethnic distribution of students in the Alum Rock School District, 1966-1972



SOURCE: Alum Rock School District.

Fig. 2.3—Ethnic distribution of students in voucher schools, Alum Rock School District, 1966-1972

THE PEOPLE

Although there are a number of well-established neighborhoods in the Alum Rock area, much of the population is transient. About 28 percent of the families surveyed in a special 1972 state census had lived at their current addresses less than one year.[4] Much of the movement is within the Alum Rock area; about 40 percent of the households that moved in the last year went from one location to another within the Alum Rock Union Elementary School District or the Eastside High School District, whose facilities Alum Rock students attend.

Socioeconomic Status

The socioeconomic status of many Alum Rock residents is low. For example, the median family income for the Alum Rock area in 1970 was $10,150, which is $2306 below the corresponding figure for San Jose and $582 below that for California. Moreover, 10.4 percent of the families in the Alum Rock area had incomes below the poverty level, compared with 5.6 percent in San Jose and 8.4 percent in California.[5] Family breadwinners are often employed in unskilled or semiskilled jobs, many of them in the construction trades.

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[4] Census of San Jose's East Side taken in fall 1972 by the Department of Finance, State of California.

One good indicator of a neighborhood's socioeconomic status is the education level among adults. Figure 2.4 shows, for each of the 12 census tracts within the Alum Rock District boundaries, the percentage of adults 25 years old or older who were high school graduates in 1970. The lowest percentages of high school graduates (16 and 23 percent) occur in tracts in the western portion of the district nearest downtown (the "flatland" area); the highest percentages (52 and 73 percent) occur in the northeast portion of the district (the "hill" area). For comparison purposes, 69 percent of the adults of 25 and older in Santa Clara County reported being high school graduates in 1970, as did 63 percent in California and 52 percent in the nation. In 10 of 12 Alum Rock census tracts fewer adults had completed high school in 1970 than the county, state, or national average.[6]

Alum Rock's student population shows one of the highest Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) rates in the county: in 1972-1973, 34.5 percent were eligible for AFDC, compared with 10.9 percent of all students in the county (Fig. 2.5). Also, during the 1972-1973 school year, Alum Rock students had one of California's highest participation rates in school free lunch and reduced price lunch programs: 74.4 percent, compared with 48.1 percent for California as a whole (Fig. 2.6). More students in voucher schools participated than did students in the rest of the district.

Ethnicity

About 70 percent of Alum Rock's population is made up of nationally recognized minority groups; approximately 50 percent are of Spanish surname, mostly Mexican-American.[7] Mexican-Americans are the largest minority in the San Jose Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), and make up nearly 18 percent of the entire metropolitan area population. This population is concentrated mostly in the east side of San Jose, including Alum Rock.[8]

Blacks constitute 2 percent of metropolitan San Jose's population and 12 percent of the Alum Rock population. There are no identifiable black ghettoes in Alum Rock.

Figure 2.7 shows the percentage of minority-student enrollment at each of the 24 Alum Rock schools in October 1972. The highest minority enrollments (82 percent) were at Mayfair and Mathson schools in the western "flatland" portion of the district. The lowest minority enrollments (33 and 47 percent) were at Linda Vista and George schools in the northeast "hill" portion of the district.

Relationship Between Socioeconomic Status and Ethnicity

Countywide, the economic disparity between Anglos and Mexican-Americans is apparent. Mexican-Americans tend to have disproportionately fewer years of education, lower family income, and lower occupational status. Of working males aged 35

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[5] U.S. Department of Commerce, *1970 Census of Population and Housing*.

[6] Idem, *1970 Census of Population, General Social and Economic Characteristics*, United States Summary, Table 88, and California, Table 51; *1970 Census of Population and Housing, Census Tracts*, San Jose, California, Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, Table P-2.

[7] These are people variously defined by the U.S. Census Bureau as "Spanish Heritage" or "Spanish Language or Surname."

[8] All population figures used in this section are drawn from the 1970 U.S. Census of Population.


TRACT 5038
52 % HS
TRACT 5042
73 % HS
SAN JOSE
TRACT 5039
50 % HS
TRACT 5041
39 % HS
TRACT 5037.01
39 % HS
TRACT 5040
44 % HS
TRACT 5037.02
23 % HS
TRACT 5035.02
51 % HS
TRACT 5037.03
33 % HS
TRACT 5036.02
16 % HS
TRACT 5035.01
41 % HS
TRACT 5034
42 % HS
KEY:
Tract = 1970 census tract number
% HS = Percent of adults age 25 yrs. or older who are high school graduates

Fig. 2.4—Education level of adults in the Alum Rock area



SOURCES: Santa Clara County Office of Education, Curriculum Office and Alum Rock School District.

NOTE: Data for 1968-1969 are not available.

Fig. 2.5—AFDC eligibility rates for Alum Rock and Santa Clara County

or less who have lived in Santa Clara County long enough to have finished school there, 37 percent of Anglos hold jobs in such higher-status categories as sales, administration, business, and the professions. The comparative figure for Mexican-Americans is only 9 percent. Conversely, 26 percent of Mexican-Americans are service workers, compared with 5 percent of Anglos.[9]

Alum Rock's blacks show a similar pattern of underrepresentation in the higher-income levels. Compared with blacks elsewhere in the United States, however, they are better educated and more affluent.

Citizen Organizations

Politically, the Alum Rock community is heavily Democratic but largely unorganized. There are no Anglo political organizations that concentrate on Alum Rock school issues, although the local Parent Teachers Association traditionally has provided Anglo leadership at the district level and is active in district decisionmaking.

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[9] These figures have been drawn from two sets of recent data: the Special Census cited in footnote 4, and a Rand Corporation study done in 1973, *Mexican-Americans in Santa Clara County*, R-1226-NSF (forthcoming).



SOURCES: Alum Rock School District and California Public Schools--Selected Statistics, State Department of Education, Sacramento, Calif., 1972 (annual publication).

Fig. 2.6—Participation rates in school free or reduced-price lunch programs, Alum Rock and California

Similarly, there has been little organized civic activity within the dispersed black population of Alum Rock, except that blacks controlled the OEO community action groups in the 1960s. There are several black women's organizations affiliated with the national Colored Women's Clubs, but these groups are rarely active in the school decisionmaking process. At the county level, the NAACP is somewhat active and there is also a Black Caucus, which attempts to serve as an umbrella organization for black concerns. At various times the Black Caucus or the NAACP has been active in Alum Rock educational issues, particularly with regard to the hiring of minority personnel.

By far the most intensive community organizing activity in recent years has been concentrated in the Chicano community. The major activist Chicano group is La Confederacion de la Raza Unida, an umbrella group. One of the Confederacion's constituent groups, the Parents and Students of Alum Rock, has been active on issues affecting the Alum Rock schools, especially those concerning Chicano hiring, bilingual instruction, and parent and student participation in decisionmaking.

A major objective of the Confederacion and other politically active Chicano groups has been to increase the number of elected Chicano officials in local government. This effort contributed to the appointment of a Chicano city councilman in


McCollam (1)
57% M
Painter (3)
64% M
Linda Vista (3)
33% M
Sheppard (2)
70% M
George (3)
47% M
Shields (3)
60% M
Pala (1)
55% M
Cureton (3)
56% M
Conniff (2)
74% M
Lyndale (3)
59% M
Mathson (3)
82% M
San Antonio (3)
77% M
Goss (1)
80% M
Ryan (3)
49% M
Mayfair (2)
82% M
Cassell (1)
65% M
Rogers (3)
52% M
Arbuckle (2)
77% M
Dorsa (2)
70% M
Miller (1)
79% M
Fischer (2)
62% M
Meyer (1)
64% M
Hubbard (2)
74% M
Slonaker (3)
81% M
KEY:
1 = Original voucher school
2 = Expansion voucher school
3 = Nonvoucher school
M = Minority enrollment, fall 1972

Fig. 2.7—Minority enrollment in individual Alum Rock schools

San Jose and his subsequent election in 1973. Their preoccupation with these electoral efforts and other civic issues may have diverted organized Chicano attention from issues in the Alum Rock School District, including the 1973 election for the Alum Rock Board of Trustees (the local school board). Several Chicano activist candidates were defeated in that election, marked by an extremely light voter turnout—10.4 percent, a thirteen-year low (see Table 2.2).

Poor and minority citizens have also been represented in the elective assemblies that form part of the governing structure of local Model Cities Programs. Although one of these assemblies is drawn from an area within the Alum Rock School District, and maintains a Youth and Education Committee, it has devoted its energies largely to internal problems and cutbacks in federal support of Model Cities and poverty programs, rather than issues affecting the Alum Rock schools.

Table 2.2

SAMPLE OF ALUM ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT ELECTIONS
AND VOTER TURNOUT: 1960-1973

Type of Election	Date	Percentage Turnout	Outcome
Bonds ($1,750,000)	2/9/60	31	Passed
Tax rate increase	2/14/61	26	Passed
Bonds ($3,475,000)	2/5/63	26	Passed
Tax rate continuation	1/25/66	22	Passed
Bonds ($4,579,473)	9/19/72	15	Passed
Governing Board	4/20/71	18	
Governing Board	4/17/73	10.4	

SOURCE: Santa Clara County Registrar of Voters.

INFORMATION MEDIA

San Jose has several radio and television stations and also receives San Francisco radio and television broadcasts. The major San Jose newspaper is the *San Jose Mercury.* The east side is served by the biweekly *East San Jose Sun,* which offers the most intensive coverage of Alum Rock schools. In 1972-1973 it ran stories on the more innovative voucher mini-school programs and occasionally published photographs of school activities and field trips, as well as progress reports on the voucher demonstration's first year. However, since none of these local media assigned an investigative reporter to cover the Alum Rock schools, most of their reporting has been confined to controversial issues up for resolution at meetings of the Board of Trustees. In fact, several national news organs, such as the *Wall Street Journal, New York Times,* and *Los Angeles Times,* have carried as much in-depth reporting about the voucher demonstration as has the local press. However, there has been a definite increase in the publicity and visibility given the district since the inception of the education voucher demonstration. As one board member put it. "The voucher demonstration has put Alum Rock on the map."

SCHOOL DISTRICT FINANCES

Alum Rock has one of the lowest assessed valuations per student among California school districts of its size. When Alum Rock entered the voucher demonstration in the fall of 1972, the assessed per-student valuation was under $6000 while the state average was over $18,000 (see Fig. 2.8). The district's assessed valuation is almost entirely dependent on residential property.[10]

During fiscal year 1971-1972, the district received almost 51 percent of its operating revenues from the state while the average for all districts in California was only 33 percent. In general, in the last ten years Alum Rock has been more dependent on revenues from the state than are other districts in California. However, revenue from state sources declined over the years in *percentage*, though not in dollar amounts, which increased, particularly in 1972-1973. Finally, the percentage of revenues from federal sources has increased steadily since 1965-1966, and took a considerable jump in 1972-1973 with the influx of voucher money into the district (Tables 2.3 and 2.4). Federal and state contributions have allowed the Alum Rock School district to spend slightly more per child than does the average school district in California. However, the district has had continuing difficulty in meeting its financial obligations from local resources. For example, during the summer of 1970, the Alum Rock Superintendent was forced to petition the legislature for special legislation to make a loan available so that Alum Rock could meet its payroll.

At the inception of the voucher demonstration, Alum Rock had one of the highest property tax rates in the county and state. For elementary school districts, the median county tax rate was $4.09 per $100 of assessed valuation, and the median state tax rate was $2.42, while the Alum Rock tax rate was $4.82.[11] All the district's schools have been built under a State of California School Building Aid Program. To do something about its inadequate finances, the district has been instrumental in forming a State Coalition of Low Wealth School Districts, which lobbies for fiscal aid in Sacramento.

Of the 1972-1973 school district budget, 76.4 percent went into instruction, and 4.1 percent into administration.[12] While the percentage of the budget spent on instruction has remained fairly constant over the last few years, there has been a marked increase in teachers' salaries. Between 1961 and 1971, Alum Rock's median teacher salary was generally slightly below or on the same level as that for Santa Clara County and slightly above that for the State of California (Fig. 2.9). This changed during the 1971-1972 school year when, because of a new contract, Alum Rock's median teacher salary rose above the county's median by $579 and above the state median by $1383.

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[10] Department of Education, State of California, *California Public Schools Selected Statistics*, Sacramento, 1972 (annual publication).

[11] These figures were calculated from data provided for the year 1971-1972 by the California State Department of Education. Only those data from elementary districts with an Average Daily Attendance (ADA) greater than 1000 were used. Property in California is assessed at 25 percent of market value. As a result of SB 90, the California tax reform-school finance act passed in 1972, the estimated Alum Rock tax rate for 1973-1974 has been reduced to $4.30.

[12] Alum Rock School District, *A Community Guide to School Finance: A Handbook to Citizen Participation in the Alum Rock School District Budget, 1973.*



SOURCES: Santa Clara County Office of Education, "A Report on Certificated Salaries and Related Information on Santa Clara City School Districts," and California State Department of Education, California Public School Selected Statistics, 1963-1973.

Fig. 2.8—Assessed valuation per student: Alum Rock, Santa Clara County, and California, 1963-1973

Table 2.3

PERCENT OF ALL SCHOOL REVENUES BY SOURCE

Fiscal Year	Local Sources		State Sources		Federal Sources	
	All Dist. in State	Alum Rock	All Dist. in State	Alum Rock	All Dist. in State	Alum Rock
1964-65	56.79	32.0	38.13	64.6	2.65	0.9
1965-66	55.63	32.3	37.86	62.3	3.89	0.8
1966-67	56.02	33.4	34.94	55.8	6.64	6.3
1967-68	54.96	28.6	36.14	60.7	6.47	4.8
1968-69	56.32	25.8	34.77	60.2	6.16	7.4
1969-70	55.06	30.1	36.64	61.7	5.62	6.8
1970-71	55.22	35.8	35.78	57.1	6.24	6.8
1971-72	59.71	38.8	32.92	50.7	7.37	7.8
1972-73	N.A.[a]	38.3	N.A.	46.6	N.A.	13.6

SOURCE: Alum Rock School District, *A Community Guide to School Finance: A Handbook to Citizen Participation in the Alum Rock School District Budget*, 1973.

[a] N.A. = not available.

Table 2.4

SOURCES OF SCHOOL REVENUES IN ALUM ROCK

(In $)

Year	Federal	State	Local
1969-70	803,379	6,694,915	3,137,555
1970-71	1,019,818	7,136,967	4,066,062
1971-72	1,440,341	7,085,351	4,847,184
1972-73	2,718,422	8,465,220	5,449,776

SOURCE: J-41, the State Budget Document of California.

NOTE: These are revenues from the General Fund only, and do not include revenues from Bond Interest and the Redemption Fund, Building Fund, State School Building Fund, Public School Building Fund, Cafeteria Account, or Children's Center.



SOURCES: Santa Clara County Office of Education, A Report of Certificated Salaries and Related Information for Santa Clara County School Districts, (annual publication) and Bureau of Administrative Research and District Organization, California State Department of Education, Salaries of Certificated Employees in California Public Schools 1971-72.

Fig. 2.9—Median teacher salaries—Alum Rock, Santa Clara County, and California, 1960-1973

TEACHER HIRING PATTERNS

Since enrollment started to level off and then to show a slight decline, Alum Rock has hired considerably fewer new teachers. The number of minority teachers has increased, however, because of the growing pressure from minority groups for more minority teachers, and strong support for affirmative action by the Board of Trustees and top school administrators in recent years. In the fall of 1972, among teachers and other certificated employees at Alum Rock Schools, approximately 11 percent were Spanish-surnamed and 8 percent were black.[13]

That increase has been accompanied by the growth of a Chicano Educators Association and a Black Educators Association. Each of these groups meets regularly and is consulted by the Superintendent on policy matters of special interest to them.

LOW LEVELS OF COMMUNITY ACTIVISM AND PARENTAL PRESSURE

Political activity centering on the schools has always been limited in Alum Rock. Voter turnout in elections tends to be low, election outcomes tend to mirror district policies on bond issues, and incumbent members of the Board of Trustees are usually reelected. Board meetings are rarely attended by more than a handful of parents and attendance is similarly sparse at school citizen advisory groups.

While there are few active pressure groups in the district, those which exist have been influential. In the past three or four years, significant pressure has been applied to the district by Chicano community groups advocating affirmative action in employment and the expansion of bilingual instruction. These groups by no means constitute a broadly based community movement even within the Chicano community. Nonetheless, their pressure concerning affirmative action and bilingual instruction has been persistent and has been taken seriously by the Board of Trustees, the administrative staff, and teachers.

SUMMARY

The Alum Rock School District is characterized by a rising proportion of minority student enrollment, a transient and relatively poor community, and a low level of community political activity regarding school issues. The district has one of the lowest assessed valuations per student among school districts of its size in California, and has had difficulty in meeting its financial obligations in recent years. Partially as a response to community requests and to administrative commitments to affirmative action, the proportion of minority teachers hired by the district has steadily increased.

As will be discussed in Sec. III, all these factors probably contributed to Alum Rock's willingness to enter into a voucher demonstration.

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[13] Alum Rock Union School District, *October 1972 Racial and Ethnic Data,* revised December 13, 1972. See Sec. VII for further discussion of demographic characteristics of Alum Rock staff.

III. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: THE DESIGN OF THE VOUCHER DEMONSTRATION

INTRODUCTION

An education voucher system is one in which parents receive a certificate—or voucher—from a governing agency and spend it to buy their child's education at the school of their choice. The agency redeems the vouchers for cash upon receiving them from the schools, and schools survive only if they receive enough income through enrollments to pay their expenses. Because funding "follows" the child, schools compete with each other to attract students, and it is predicted that schools will become more responsive to consumer demand as a result of this competition.

In the late 1960s the federal Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) began investigating vouchers as a possible mechanism for improving the educational opportunities of poor families, and retained The Center for the Study of Public Policy (CSPP) of Cambridge, Massachusetts, to study the voucher concept. In March 1970, CSPP submitted its report on education voucher models for elementary and secondary schools to OEO's Division of Experimental Research.[1] In this report, CSPP staff examined seven possible voucher models and recommended the one they called the "regulated compensatory" model.

The main features of the regulated compensatory model (also known as the CSPP model or the Jencks model, after Professor Christopher Jencks, principal author of the CSPP report) were as follows:

- Public and private schools would be eligible to participate.
- All students would receive a "basic voucher," equal in value to current per pupil spending at local public schools.
- An extra "compensatory" voucher would be provided for poor children, providing financial incentives for schools to respond to the needs of the disadvantaged, as well as encouraging race and class integration.
- School revenue would be limited to voucher income.
- For schools whose applications exceeded vacancies, one half of the places would be filled by lottery.
- Free transportation would be provided for children enrolled at schools distant from their homes.
- Students would be able to transfer from one school to another at any time, and carry with them the unused portion of their voucher.
- An autonomous public agency, the Education Voucher Agency (EVA), would manage the demonstration, handle fiscal arrangements and start-up activities, and allocate funds for providing information to parents. An existing school board could serve as the EVA.
- There would be no guarantee of survival for public or private schools, whether new or preexisting, unless voucher income covered expenses.

The CSPP plan called for a five-to-eight year demonstration in an area with a heterogeneous population and a number of private schools.

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[1] *Education Vouchers: A Report on Financing Elementary Education by Grants to Parents,* Cambridge, Mass., December 1970.

FEDERAL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A VOUCHER DEMONSTRATION

OEO contracted with CSPP to begin a field program to interest local school districts in conducting a voucher demonstration. This assignment plunged CSPP into the politics of local school districts, a novel area for most of its staff.

In the summer of 1970, acting on behalf of OEO, CSPP sent letters to major school districts throughout the country, explaining the regulated compensatory voucher system and inviting applications for federal grants to do local feasibility studies. CSPP would provide technical assistance for the studies. As a condition of such grants, the local school board would have to select an advisory committee, representative of the community, to participate in the study and advise the school board. At the conclusion of the feasibility study, the school board would decide whether or not to apply for a planning grant.

A number of school districts showed some interest in OEO's proposal. During 1971, OEO funded feasibility studies in Seattle, Washington; Gary, Indiana; San Francisco, California; and Alum Rock, a school district in San Jose, California. All but Alum Rock finally rejected the idea.

OEO reports and interviews with OEO and CSPP staff members suggest several major reasons that the voucher concept was turned down in the other cases. First, there was general reluctance to try an untested concept. Several of the districts had recently experienced severe conflict over school desegregation plans and were anxious to avoid the additional conflict that a controversial new experiment might stir up. The parental choice mechanism sounded to some like a way of avoiding school desegration, as it had been used in the establishment of "white academies" in the South.

Important national and local organizations had adopted strong positions against vouchers. The two major national teachers' organizations, the National Education Association, and the American Federation of Teachers, charged that vouchers could lead to the demise of the public school system. In every case but Alum Rock, the local teachers' organizations opposed a voucher demonstration. The NAACP was concerned that a voucher system would increase racial imbalance in schools and undermine the public schools. And a number of groups, including several prestigious Jewish organizations, saw vouchers as a threat to Constitutional guarantees of separation of church and state.

In contrast, vouchers had found no political constituency. The parochial school lobby failed to rally in support of vouchers because they were wary of the restrictions of the regulated compensatory model. Poor and minority parents, to the surprise and disappointment of CSPP and OEO staff, were generally either indifferent or hostile to the voucher concept, and by 1970 many OEO programs were being cut back, and the agency had lost much of the popular appeal it once enjoyed in poor communities. The limited political experience of the CSPP staff, and the lack of minority staff members among them, also may have contributed to their failure to mobilize the support OEO had expected.

CPSS had, however, found one responsive district—Alum Rock.

THE ALUM ROCK FEASIBILITY STUDY

During the summer of 1970, Dr. William Jefferds, Superintendent of the Alum Rock School District, heard a CSPP field representative present the voucher concept at an executive committee meeting of the California PTA. The concept appealed to

Jefferds because it would bring federal dollars into the financially strapped district, and could further two key policies he was already attempting to implement in the district: decentralization and parental participation in the schools.

Decentralization has been a key part of Jefferds' program since he became Superintendent in 1968. When the rapid expansion that took place in Alum Rock from the middle 1950s to the late 1960s began, many of the district's principals were young and inexperienced. Consequently, the Superintendent at that time established a highly centralized system of authority. By the time Jefferds took over in the late 1960s, however, those same principals had acquired considerable expertise and were eager to assume greater authority and independence; but their opportunities for advancement in the administrative hierarchies of both Alum Rock and outlying districts were limited because of the general leveling off of enrollments. Thus the answer seemed to be to enhance the administrative role of the building principal, and this is what Jefferds set out to do.

Decentralization became the rubric under which Jefferds promoted a multifaceted plan for educational reform in the district. He sought to enlarge the pattern of decisionmaking in the district to include not only principals, but also parents, community groups, and employee organizations. This would require training school personnel in techniques of interpersonal communication, to enable them to work more effectively together and with the community. Other elements of this program included creation of an advisory mechanism to detect and resolve conflicts likely to accompany change in the schools and community; an "out-reach" program to federal and state agencies and universities for new educational ideas; and the search for extra money with which to hire new personnel and train existing personnel. (Jefferds was instrumental in forming an organization of poor school districts to lobby for school finance reform in the California legislature.)

Jefferds presented the voucher concept to the Alum Rock Board of Trustees, which authorized him to apply for a feasibility study. In February 1971, the district received a $19,230 feasibility grant from OEO. To conduct the study, the Superintendent and the board selected an "Education Voucher Committee" (EVC), a broad-based citizens group representing ethnic minorities, teachers, industry, and parents. The district contracted for staff work with the Center for Planning and Evaluation (CPE), the research arm of the Santa Clara County Department of Education. The CPE was charged with (1) conducting surveys and forums to gauge staff and community opinion, (2) exploring the interest of parochial schools in participating, (3) locating nondenominational private schools within the area that would be interested in the voucher experiment, (4) exploring potential interest in creating new private schools, (5) investigating the availability of space for Alum Rock students in neighboring school districts, if parents decided to use their vouchers outside the Alum Rock district, and (6) investigating legal and technical questions posed by the voucher experiment.

Few of CPE's inquiries yielded promising results. The public hearings sponsored by the EVC drew large audiences, but comments addressed to them were overwhelmingly negative. Local parochial schools were interested in voucher participation but feared it would curtail their authority over curriculum and admissions. There were no nondenominational private schools within ten miles of Alum Rock, and most of the ones farther away had tuition charges greater than the combination of the then-proposed basic and compensatory vouchers. Of six neighboring school districts queried by CPE on the availability of slots for voucher students, four refused because of increasing enrollments and two offered only faint hopes of openings.

CPE wrote an article for the county school superintendent's newsletter, which is generally read by local school administrators, soliciting interest in the creation of private schools for the voucher demonstration. Over 50 responses were received, but none were from community organizations. Most came from public school teachers, but two private firms also responded.

Fearing that its best hope for a voucher demonstration was going down the drain, CSPP dispatched a field agent, Dr. Joel Levin, to Alum Rock. Dr. Levin attempted to obtain minority-group support for vouchers, especially from Chicanos, but his efforts met with indifference and resistance.

At the same time, the CPE continued its public pulse-taking by conducting staff and community surveys. The surveys revealed a more promising picture than had been reflected in the public forums. A parent survey conducted by CPE during the spring of 1971 revealed that many parents in Alum Rock were uninformed about vouchers, but of those with opinions, as many favored it as opposed it (see Table 3.1). A survey of the staff yielded similar results (Table 3.2). A majority of teachers favored further exploration of the idea.

Table 3.1

SPRING 1971 SURVEY OF ALUM ROCK PARENTS

(In percent)

Question	Yes	Undecided	No	Number of Respondents
I am well informed about the voucher plan (Q1)	32	17	51	368
I would want my children to participate in this program (Q2)	26	51	23	356
The voucher plan is a good idea for the district to explore (Q3)	40	43	16	354
Parents should be the ones to decide what types of elementary school education their children should receive (Q5)	57	24	20	351
The schools should try new ideas (Q7)	76	18	6	355
The schools are not doing as well as they can (Q8)	37	38	24	348

SOURCE: Center for Planning and Evaluation, *Voucher Feasibility Study, Final Report, Alum Rock*, April 1971.

These survey results were enough to keep Superintendent Jefferds encouraged. He and other proponents of the voucher plan used the results to bargain for more time. Proposed state legislation to permit state funds to be spent on private schools in the demonstration was pending. Fearing that the EVC would recommend that the board not authorize vouchers, voucher advocates urged the committee instead to recommend that the board not take a stand until the legislature had acted. This

Table 3.2

SPRING 1971 SURVEY OF ALUM ROCK TEACHERS

(In percent)

Question	Agree or Strongly Agree	No Opinion	Disagree or Strongly Disagree	Number[a] of Respondents
I am well informed about the voucher plan (Q1)	67	7	26	400
The voucher plan has potential for enhancing education (Q2)	53	10	36	403
Educational changes as a result of vouchers could be positive (Q3)	57	12	32	404
Parents should decide the type of elementary school education their children should receive (Q5)	44	8	48	405
New alternatives are needed in the public and private schools (Q7)	86	6	9	374
The Alum Rock School District should continue to explore the voucher plan as a possible course of action (Q12)	59	6	35	377

SOURCE: Center for Planning and Evaluation, *Voucher Feasibility Study, Final Report, Alum Rock*, April 1971.

[a] 417 teachers returned the questionnaire, making the response rate about 65 percent.

strategy of delay was successful. The board declared a moratorium on further discussion of the voucher plan. As it turned out, the legislature did not pass the proposed legislation during the first year of the demonstration.[2]

ENTRY OF CENTER FOR HUMAN RESOURCES AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (HRC)

At the initiative of Superintendent Jefferds, the Alum Rock District had begun late in 1970 to employ the services of a Santa Cruz-based firm devoted to organization development, the Center for Human Resources and Organizational Development (HRC). At that time, its primary duty was to help familiarize various school district officials with the decentralization process. In June 1971, two months after the voucher feasibility study had been completed, Superintendent Jefferds asked OEO to support a program of "organization development and managerial training" for the district, and to employ HRC for the purpose. He argued that the voucher demonstration and its attendent decentralization process would require principals and school staffs to undertake professional risks, and would be served by the development of better communication and problem-solving skills. OEO provided the grant money, stipulating that the HRC training relate to the district's interest in implementing a voucher project. HRC began its work in the fall of 1971 with a handful of principals and school staffs who wanted to participate in the decentralization process; the district did not require participants in the HRC training to make any formal commitment to vouchers, though the schools which joined the demonstration the following year had all been involved in HRC training. (See Sec. IV for a fuller description of the HRC training.)

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[2] The California legislature defeated voucher bills in 1970, 1971, and 1972, before passing Senate Bill 600 in 1973. See Sec. IV for further discussion of the legal aspects of including nonpublic schools in the Alum Rock demonstration. Senate Bill 600, the so-called "Demonstration Scholarship Act," appears in the Documentary Appendix to this series of Rand reports.

THE TRANSITION VOUCHER MODEL—A COMPROMISE

By the winter of 1972, the California legislature still had not enacted legislation permitting private school participation in vouchers, and OEO was under considerable Congressional pressure to produce a voucher demonstration or lose further planning monies. These two problems combined to create a unique solution, the transition voucher model.

In January 1972, Jeffry Schiller, Director of Experimental Research for OEO, and Dr. Jefferds met and developed the concept of a "public schools only" voucher demonstration. Under that program, parents would choose among public schools only and no legislative action would be required. The program was termed a "transition" model since it was viewed as an intermediate step between current public school practices and a full voucher model involving both public and private schools.

Reaction to the compromise, particularly from the school staff, was positive. From the district's standpoint, it effectively embodied the best features of the voucher plan and avoided the more controversial ones. The district would receive federal funds to mount innovations, and the process would be consistent with the movement for decentralization within the system. The compromise also eliminated the controversy over church-state separation because private and parochial schools were barred. Some CSPP and OEO staff were disappointed, however, that the transition model did not more closely resemble the CSPP regulated-compensatory voucher model. On March 8, 1972, the Alum Rock Board of Trustees unanimously authorized the Superintendent to develop a formal proposal to OEO.

THE SANTA CLARA CONFERENCE: HAMMERING OUT THE AGREEMENT

Dr. Levin, the CSPP field representative, organized a three-day conference at the University of Santa Clara attended by 55 representatives of the various voucher-community and school interest groups. Parents, teachers, and principals from the six prospective voucher schools as well as district central staff, PTA members, representatives of teacher organizations, and OEO staff hammered out the compromises and agreements necessary for implementing the Alum Rock voucher demonstration.

The major concerns of the attendees were: placement for children in neighborhood schools, the role of the principals, management of the demonstration, job security for teachers, and how far the Alum Rock plan would depart from the original CSPP model. Although positions were often shared by more than one group, they are discussed here according to the constituencies that provided their prime support. The outlines of future controversies in the demonstration are in many instances foreshadowed in these early debates.

Parents

Contrary to the expectations of voucher proponents, parents were not generally anxious to secure the widest possible range of program choices or opportunities of participation for themselves. Their main desire was to insure the right of their children to attend their neighborhood school. They feared that their children would be forced to attend a school outside their neighborhood by either the lottery system originally proposed by CSPP to safeguard against discrimination, or by the absence of an acceptable program in their neighborhood school. The parents successfully insisted on a "squatters' rights provision," which said that all children currently attending a given school, and their brothers and sisters not yet in school, would be guaranteed a place in that school. Jeffry Schiller, the OEO Experimental Research Director, suggested that each voucher school be required to offer at least two distinct programs so that parents could still have a choice within the neighborhood school. This idea was supported by parents, adopted, and led to the creation of the 22 separate programs called "mini-schools" within the six voucher schools. As it turned out, the mini-school was one of the key innovations of the demonstration. (See Sec. V for a discussion of the mini-schools.)

Principals

The principals attending the Santa Clara Conference were concerned about possible inroads on their role and authority. They were apprehensive about unsympathetic outsiders who might manage the voucher demonstration, strong parent control of a voucher advisory board, and increased workloads.

The principals' first move was to urge that no new central staff unit be created to manage the demonstration, but that the demonstration be directly supervised by the Superintendent, possibly with a token enlargement of his personal staff. The Superintendent argued that there would be so much start-up work that he would need a separate central staff unit under his general supervision. OEO representatives also resisted the principals, fearing that without a separate new staff unit, the functions of evaluation and parent information would not be independent of the competing demonstration schools. After considerable debate, it was decided to create a new central voucher staff unit. Conference planners also provided for an Education Voucher Advisory Committee—or EVAC—composed of equal numbers of parents and school staff members, to oversee the demonstration and advise the Board of Trustees on policies governing it.

The principals had apprehensions about the possible power that parents could wield in this advisory committee. Principals—and some teachers—believed that parent committees had already acquired too much power in the district as a result of the Parent Advisory Committees required by the Federal Title I compensatory education program. As stipulated by federal law, these Title I parent advisory committees had veto power over budgets for Title I funds at individual schools. The Santa Clara Conference partially allayed the principals' concerns over parent power by describing the EVAC's functions and authority in only the vaguest terms.

The principals insisted that some of the federal voucher demonstration funds be earmarked for hiring additional administrative assistance at the school sites. This proposal was accepted by OEO; in most cases, the money was used to hire full-time assistant principals.

The principals were opposed to suggestions for "cross-management" of the schools. Under that concept, a business manager would be responsible for the general administration of each school building; and each mini-school (or set of similar mini-schools at different buildings) would have a program manager, responsible for curriculum and instructional supervision. Although the existing principals would have been free to assume either of these new roles, they saw new difficulties, uncertainties, and risks in such an arrangement. They succeeded in winning a moratorium on discussion of the "cross-management" concept for the first year of the demonstration.

Teachers

In addition to sharing an interest in some of the issues already mentioned, teachers' representatives were determined to protect teacher job security. Responding to their concerns, the OEO grant finally included a $35,000 teacher contract "buy-up" fund, intended to be used as a last resort to pay the salaries of any teachers displaced by the voucher demonstration and unable to find employment elsewhere within the district.

OEO Representatives

OEO representatives at the conference sought to make the guidelines for the Alum Rock demonstration correspond as closely as possible to the original CSPP proposal. As already noted, they joined the Superintendent in pressing for the creation of a new voucher staff unit to conduct independent evaluations of the mini-schools and to inform parents of their educational options. The OEO representatives also supported a strong role for EVAC.

In the hope that community-initiated alternative schools might be organized in Alum Rock during the first year of the demonstration, OEO provided a $15,000 fund to aid in the planning of such initiatives. (See Sec. IV for an examination of the fate of one "community-initiated" school.)

OEO also wanted the district to decentralize the purchase of a number of services that were currently provided to all schools by the district, regardless of the individual school's own priorities. The Alum Rock proposal to OEO finally provided for new purchasing arrangements, at the discretion of the individual school, for three such services: psychologists, curriculum coordinators, and audiovisual services.

Superintendent

For his part, the Superintendent, as already noted, insisted on the creation of a separate voucher staff unit. He and OEO also agreed on a two-year federal funding commitment. If either the district or OEO decided to terminate the demonstration at the end of the first year, the district would use the second year's federal funds to phase out the demonstration.

The broad outlines of the demonstration, agreed upon at the Santa Clara Conference, were stated as follows in the district's Transition Model Voucher Proposal, submitted to OEO in April 1972 (Documentary Appendix A):

1. The parents of each participating child will receive a voucher (or certificate) which will be worth the current average cost of educating a child in the Alum Rock School District.

2. Each participating public school will develop two or more alternative, distinct educational programs. These alternatives will be developed with the active cooperation of the participating community. During the course of the experiment, we will cooperate in the development of programs sponsored by groups not currently in the public school system, and these programs, through individual contracts with the School Board, will be governed by the same rules as the public schools.

3. Each parent will select for his child an educational *program* and school building in accordance with his evaluation of the educational needs of his child, and each child will be assured of placement in the first choice program. Students currently enrolled, and their incoming siblings also will be guaranteed the right to remain in the school building they are presently attending.

4. Admissions to each program and building will be made in a way that will maximize the satisfaction of each participant. Each new enrollee will have equal access to every program and building in the demonstration. If a *building* is over-applied, additional capacity will be created, whenever possible. If a *program* is over-applied, additional capacity will be created somewhere in the system so that each child will be accommodated in his or her first choice program.

5. The vouchers of disadvantaged children will be enhanced by a "compensatory" voucher both to help the schools meet the special needs of these children, and to encourage schools to develop programs to meet these needs.

6. The budget of each program will be determined by the voucher money brought by the children who enroll in that program. In the event of transfers, a child's voucher money will be divided equitably between the two programs that he has attended.

7. Each program will be required to provide information about its philosophy, practices and finances, and this information will be made available to all participating parents. In addition, community counselors will be provided to consult with parents about program offerings and their children's needs.

8. A representative advisory board will be formed to advise the School Board and Administration on decisions relating to the demonstration.

9. The community will participate actively in the operation and governance of the transitional voucher demonstration. Individual schools and programs will encourage parental participation at a meaningful level in their respective decisionmaking processes.

10. An on-going evaluation of the transitional voucher demonstration project will be conducted.

Teacher Organizations

Given the public opposition to vouchers of the National Education Association (NEA), its California branch, the California Teachers Association (CTA), and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), the Alum Rock teachers might have been expected to oppose vouchers. However, Alum Rock's teacher organizations—the Alum Rock Educators Association (AREA), an NEA and CTA affiliate, and the local chapter of the AFT—were mildly supportive of the demonstration, provided that certain noxious elements of vouchers were removed. This support was partly the result of excellent relations with Dr. Jefferds, who had made special efforts to consult with teacher group leaders (both AREA and AFT) and had been willing to negotiate a wide variety of issues with certificated employee organizations in the district's "meet-and-confer" process. During Dr. Jefferds' tenure as superintendent, teacher's salaries had risen sharply and teacher suggestions had been taken seriously. As one teachers' organization official declared to a Rand interviewer, "We support the Superintendent because he supports us."

In addition, the leadership of AREA was basically reformist and independent. It seemed convinced that the needs of children in Alum Rock had not been fully met in the schools and that the community had not been adequately represented in the school decisionmaking process.

The following provisions of the voucher demonstration model as adopted at the Santa Clara Conference were, it would appear, particularly attractive to teachers:

1. Guarantees of job security
2. The right of a teacher to transfer to a nondemonstration school
3. No private school competition
4. Inservice training money
5. Funds for supplies and equipment
6. The potential for increased teacher autonomy, especially in curriculum decisions.

ACCEPTANCE OF THE ALUM ROCK PROPOSAL

The proposal was presented to the Alum Rock Board of Trustees on April 12, 1972 and won unanimous approval. Formal approval came from OEO during the same month.

In light of the community opposition to vouchers just one year before, the emergence of such a coherent proposal from the Santa Clara Conference was in itself an accomplishment. It came about partly because, in selecting parent representatives to the Santa Clara Conference, the principals of the potential voucher schools had paid special attention to inviting minority group community members. This had helped make the demonstration more acceptable. Some district personnel argue that increased support for vouchers was a result of the HRC training, that HRC had in fact been "selling" the demonstration in the district ever since the Superintendent retained it in June 1971.

In any case, the speed of the decisionmaking process in the spring of 1972 made it difficult for opposition to form. Only five weeks elapsed between the Board's instructions to prepare a proposal and the date of final approval. As we shall note later, this very speed caused some difficulty for the subsequent implementation. For example, there was little time for teachers to prepare mini-school programs. But, as the Superintendent has noted, additional planning time would have given the opposition more time to mobilize.

In March and April 1972, faculties at the six prospective voucher schools were asked to vote on their own participation in the demonstration, scheduled to begin in September 1972. The response varied from school to school, but in each case the principal's strong support of the demonstration was an important influence. Some teachers interpreted the principal's stand as coercion and reacted adversely. In at least one case, the principal called for repeated votes by the teachers until they approved participation in the demonstration. Many teachers were uncertain about launching into a new form of instructional organization. In the end, however, the six faculties did commit themselves to the demonstration.

FORMATION OF THE VOUCHER STAFF

In the late spring of 1972, the Superintendent announced the appointment of Dr. Joel Levin as director of the voucher project. Levin became a staff assistant to the Superintendent with direct responsibility for the creation and supervision of a voucher project staff.

Levin holds a Ph.D. in physics, and was the director of a private school in Pittsburgh before joining the Center for the Study of Public Policy. Superintendent Jefferds chose him for several reasons. First, Levin, as the CSPP field representative in Alum Rock, understood the details of the voucher concept and the proposed Alum Rock demonstration. Second, throughout the trials and tribulations of mounting the demonstration, he had remained a staunch advocate of the voucher concept. Third, he was willing to accept the job and move to Alum Rock.

Levin's major liability was that he was an outsider, and possibly was suspected by the six pilot voucher principals and others of owing his first loyalty to OEO instead of the Alum Rock School District.

Rather than make the voucher staff part of the district administration, Jefferds contracted for the services of Sequoia Institute, a nonprofit corporation organized by Levin and some of his associates for this purpose. In this way, Jefferds hoped to emphasize the temporary nature of the voucher staff, thereby easing the concerns of many district staff members, especially principals, who feared the creation of a powerful new central staff unit in a period of decentralization.

Under the school district's decentralization plan, only the superintendent and deputy superintendent had direct-line authority over principals and the assistant superintendents. The director of the voucher staff was responsible to the superintendent and had authority over his own staff but not over the principals or the schools. (See the organization chart, Fig. 3.1.)

The OEO contract specified six functions for the voucher staff:

1. Information collection and dissemination.
2. Counseling parents to help them understand the nature of the demonstration and the educational options available to them.
3. Fiscal and pupil accounting—keeping track of student enrollment and entitlement of various schools and mini-schools to the funds allocated to the demonstration.
4. An in-house evaluation of the demonstration to help provide information to the parents and the district and to serve as liaison with the separate Rand evaluation.
5. Establishing fair, impartial hearing procedures for transfers, dismissals, suspensions, and expulsions.
6. Coordination of the foregoing functions with other aspects of the district administration.

To perform these functions, the contract specified that the voucher project director hire staff coordinators for parent counseling, information, research, and evaluation.

Staff selection was crucially important to Levin, the new project director. In addition to considerations of professional competence, he had to consider two important political problems: bridging the confidence gap that had developed between him and the principals during the negotiation process, and building support for vouchers within the large minority community of Alum Rock. The large ethnic minorities in Alum Rock had shown little enthusiasm for the demonstration, and Levin had been chosen as project director over a Chicano administrator. With the Superintendent's approval, therefore, Levin hired professionals selected from the minority community.


Board of Trustees
Superintendent
Deputy Superintendent
Educational Voucher Advisory Committee
Director Voucher Staff
Sequoia Institute
Assistant Superintendent Business
Director Community Relations
Assistant Superintendent State and Federal Projects
Assistant Superintendent Special Services
Director of Classified Personnel
Assistant Superintendent Personnel
All Principals
Assistant Principals
Building Staff
Coordinator of Public Information
Coordinator of Parent Counseling
Coordinator of Evaluation
Professional and Para-professional Parent Counselors

Fig. 3.1—Alum Rock School District organization

As coordinator of research and evaluation, he appointed a Chicano who was an assistant professor of educational research methods at San Jose State and a doctoral candidate in educational administration at Stanford University. Another Chicano, a community college counselor and former teacher who was active in Chicano organizations, was appointed coordinator of parent information.

After appointing these two coordinators, Levin was approached by the local black caucus, which requested that he also include a black staff member, to be paid at the same rate as the other two coordinators. This request reflected a long-standing local competition between the Chicano and black communities. Levin accepted the request and hired a black former teacher as coordinator of public information at the requested salary. All three men were minority group members; they were all new to the district, unacquainted with each other, and unfamiliar with the voucher concept. These factors, and the fact that they were not known to the voucher principals, were to play an important role in the politics of the voucher demonstration during the first year.

FEDERAL GRANT FOR THE VOUCHER DEMONSTRATION

The federal grant for the voucher demonstration in Alum Rock for 1972-73 represented approximately 10 percent of the district's general expenditure budget for the year. The initial grant and supplemental grant total of $1,585,756 was about 45 percent more than the combined district funding from other federal programs: ESEA Title I and Title VII and HUD Model Cities. Almost half of the grant was earmarked for the voucher schools and their mini-school programs. The compensatory voucher fund of $509,100 was allocated among the mini-schools according to the number of their students eligible for the free lunch program. As will be discussed further in Secs. IV and V, the compensatory vouchers were the chief source of discretionary funds with which teachers planned and implemented their new programs. The mini-schools were not, however, constrained to spend the compensatory voucher funds exclusively on those children who had qualified for them. Rather, those funds were available for extra instructional materials, equipment, supplies and aides needed for the program. The general costs of instruction were covered by the basic voucher allocation for all students.

Table 3.3 and Fig. 3.2 show the allocation of the federal grant among various demonstration-related activities. About 37 percent (or $583,000) of the grant budget was earmarked for administration of the voucher demonstration. This included the activities of the Sequoia Institute's central voucher staff (parent counseling, evaluation, information dissemination); the added workload and additional staff of the district's own central staff; additional operating expenses (printing, travel, supplies) at the district level; and the cost of the HRC organization development training. This 37 percent also included the contingency funds reserved for meeting the teacher salary guarantee (not needed in the first year) and central staff salary guarantee (about two-thirds of the funds were used in the first year), and the money set aside for grants to community-initiated schools (only a fraction of which was used in the first year).

Direct school support—including compensatory voucher funds for each mini-school, temporary classroom space (trailers), and a student space voucher fund (to allow for expansion of overcrowed programs)—made up another 33 percent of the federal grant budget. The remaining 30 percent of the budget was allocated to indirect school support, including administrative assistance allowances to the schools (generally used to hire assistant principals); bussing for students attending

Table 3.3

ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED BY FEDERAL VOUCHER GRANTS, 1972-73

Category	Amount	Percent of Total Grant
Administration		
District--additional activities	56,963	
District--added staff	196,438	
Added operating expenses	62,803	
Sequoia Institute	117,140	
Organization development training	69,000	
Professional Development Center	---	
Total, administration	502,344	31.7
Contingency funding		
Central staff salary guarantee	30,000	
Teacher salary guarantee	36,000	
Grants to new schools, community	15,000	
Grants to new schools, public	---	
Total, contingency funding	81,000	5.1
Direct school-site support		
Compensatory vouchers	509,100	
Classroom and space vouchers	15,000	
Total, direct support	524,100	33.0
Indirect school-site support		
Administrative assistance	128,500[a]	
Substitute teacher salaries	58,812	
Inservice for teachers	280,000	
Transportation	11,000	
Total, indirect support	478,312	30.2
Total grant	1,585,756	100.0

SOURCE: The federal grant and related correspondence as of march 1973.

[a] Includes $100,000 for the expansion schools of the 1973-74 school year.

schools other than their neighborhood school; inservice training for school staff; and salaries of substitute teachers to cover for teachers engaged in voucher-related functions away from the classroom (training sessions, planning meetings, etc.). There was a $232,000, or 28 percent, carry-over of unspent voucher school-controlled funds from the federal grant into the second year of the demonstration. Voucher-school-controlled funds include the inservice training allowances of $30,000 for each of the original six voucher schools as well as compensatory voucher funds and the administrative allowances. Some possible reasons for the schools' failure to spend all the federal funds are discussed in Sec. V.

Details of the first-year federal grant and comparisons with second and proposed third year funding of the demonstration may be found in Technical Appendix III. That discussion also addresses the question of which costs covered by the federal grant may be considered start-up costs rather than continuing costs associated with a voucher system.



Fig. 3.2—Breakdown of voucher demonstration grant budget by area of support, 1972-73 school year

CONCLUSION

Table 3.4 shows the essential differences between an unregulated market voucher model (also known as the Friedman model, after economist Milton Friedman, perhaps its best-known proponent); the regulated compensatory or CSPP model (also known as the Jencks model after Christopher Jencks, principal author of the CSPP report to OEO); and the transition voucher model on which the Alum Rock demonstration is based. Although the transition model differed in major respects from the model the CSPP had proposed to OEO, it still carried with it a host of notions different from the usual operation of American schools:

- The embodiment of different curricular approaches in separate instructional subunits of the schools (mini-schools).
- The call for competition between these instructional sub-units for the patronage of parents and students.
- The allocation of substantial discretionary funds to the individual schools and mini-schools.
- The determination of school budgets as a function of the school's success in attracting clients—a so-called "enrollment economy."

Table 3.4

THREE VOUCHER MODELS

Feature	Unregulated Market Model (Friedman Model)	Regulated Compensatory Model (CSPP) (Jencks Model)	Transition Voucher Model (Alum Rock Model)
Type of schools included	all	all	public schools only
Regulating agency	unregulated	EVA[a]	Board of Trustees
Basic voucher equal for all children?	yes	yes	yes
Additional compensatory voucher for disadvantaged children?	no	yes	yes
School tuition can exceed value of basic voucher?	yes	no	no
Teacher employment depends on school income?	yes	yes	no
Admission regulations to prevent segregation?	no	yes	yes

[a] Independent Education Voucher Agency, which might be either an existing school board or a specially-created agency.

- The development of an evaluation process intended not only to examine school performance closely, but to report "objectively" on the findings to parents.
- The initiation of a parent counseling function employing parent paraprofessionals rather than school professionals to inform parents about the available options.
- The development of mechanisms to give a combined voice to parents and teachers in the management of the demonstration system.

The Alum Rock transition voucher plan had something to offer to all parties involved. OEO got an operational demonstration of voucher-like mechanisms, which was crucial to its campaign to keep the voucher concept alive and conduct further research on the subject. The Superintendent was able to reinforce trends towards decentralization in the district while adding substantial new funds to its budget. Parents retained their right to send their children to neighborhood schools, with the promise of increased diversity and innovation in these schools. Teachers gained independence and resources with which to try out new ideas in the classroom, without loss of job security. And principals received greater management autonomy, without having their schools subject to the regulation of a strong independent voucher agency.

As a consequence of the negotiation process in setting up the demonstration, a number of controversial issues had been resolved. However, others awaited resolution in the implementation process. First, the concept of cross-management of schools had been laid aside for a year. Second, the functions of evaluation, information dissemination, and parent counseling were largely unspecified, leaving open the possibility of conflict between the schools and the central voucher staff over the rules of the game in each of these areas. On the technical side, the procedures for budgeting, attendance, and pupil accounting were as yet untried. In the schools, the precise powers of the mini-school staffs and the new managerial roles of principals had yet to be defined. Finally, it was still unclear how and to what extent parents would participate in the demonstration.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION

KEY FINDINGS

In its first year, the Alum Rock demonstration introduced significant changes in school operations, but not the more far-reaching changes envisioned for a "regulated compensatory" voucher system. The Alum Rock model was constrained in the following ways:

- The budgeting system protected the jobs of all existing personnel. As a result, discretionary funds at the mini-school level were available only as a result of the federal voucher grant.
- Technical and organizational problems prevented voucher funds from "following the child."
- The central voucher staff responsible for internal evaluation and parent counseling ran into conflict with school staffs, especially the voucher principals. The principals emerged with considerable control over the nature of internal evaluation and parent counseling activities that were undertaken.
- Expansion of mini-school enrollment to meet increased demand during the year was constrained by several factors: lack of classroom space; the fact that mini-school staffs saw little need for additional compensatory voucher income; teachers' apprehensions that expansion might degrade instructional quality; and the reluctance of some mini-school staffs to admit new teachers into their groups.
- An effort to begin a "community-initiated" school, outside the framework of existing schools, was frustrated during the first year. Apathy among parents, opposition from teacher organizations, and ambiguities about state education code requirements contributed to the delay of this initiative. Controversy over this issue continued throughout the second year of the demonstration, and it is still uncertain whether the "community-initiated" school will open as part of the demonstration in the fall of 1974.

While many "market" aspects of the model were largely absent during implementation, the demonstration did help to accelerate the decentralization of authority within the school district. In the main, the new authority accrues to principals and teachers. Organized parent participation in school policymaking has not increased significantly as a result of the demonstration.

The demonstration was implemented without disruptive conflict, despite the persistent differences of view between the central voucher staff and the principals. This lack of conflict is largely attributable to the absence of organized opposition to the demonstration among administrators, teachers, or parents.

The demonstration, as implemented, has been shaped by the needs of various constituencies within the district. Federal officials were not in a position to require adherence to various features of the voucher model.

INTRODUCTION

Voucher theory envisions—and a voucher demonstration is supposed to test the accuracy of that vision in reality—an education market in which individuals and organizations act and interact in certain ways in response to the incentives and choices the system creates. Before we can judge whether such a system has worked, we must ask whether and to what extent the planned elements of the market model were in fact implemented, and whether the system actually afforded the expected incentives and choices. As we have seen in the previous section, the Alum Rock transition voucher model already placed important constraints on the type of regulated market envisioned in the CSPP model, especially by the exclusion of private schools from the marketplace and the elimination of direct wage incentives for school staffs.

This section examines how various features of the Alum Rock model itself fared in the course of the first year. As it is impossible to cover the implementation story in its entirety in this report,[1] we have selected four key elements of the transition voucher model for examination: budget issues (each school's income was to be based on the number of students enrolled and the percentage of students eligible for compensatory vouchers); student transfers and flexibility of mini-school size; parent information; and creation of community-initiated educational alternatives.

The district's transition voucher proposal had included general statements on each of these subjects, but turning them into detailed specifications for operation proved to be a difficult and sometimes conflict-ridden process.

First, there were a variety of technical problems. For example, implementing the new budget depended on the creation of new budgetary and student attendance accounting systems. That demanded technical expertise not already available in the district. The technical problems of implementation were made more serious in some cases because only a portion of the district participated in the demonstration. The district had to devise new rules for the demonstration schools while running the rest of the district in the old way. The district had to maintain two different purchasing procedures; two types of budgeting procedures; different personnel practices for voucher and nonvoucher schools; and two different systems for allocating the services of certain central office personnel. Dualism had its advantages, however. Any attempt to include all the schools in the demonstration would have aroused powerful resistance; and by implementing new voucher administrative systems in a six-school demonstration, some errors could be detected and corrected before the demonstration expanded for the second year.

In addition, the very short planning and "start-up" time created some difficulties for the demonstration. OEO awarded the first-year grant on April 26, 1972. Since the first deadline for parent applications to mini-schools was June 9, 1972, that left only six weeks to accomplish a number of new administrative tasks. Some planning had preceded the formal OEO approval, and the schools had the summer vacation period in which to plan. Many problems could be identified and dealt with only after school reopened in September, of course.

Second, there were political problems in implementing some features of the model as originally conceived. Ambiguities in the provisions of the district-OEO agreement left room for differing interpretation by different parties, reflecting both conflicting self-interests and different educational philosophies. The rules under which the new system would operate had implications for the roles and authority of various actors in the system. The six voucher principals, notably, asserted their influence over parent information and program evaluation mechanisms.

A third set of constraints on implementation were legal. Provisions of the California education code about class size and prior district agreements with teachers' organizations prevented implementation of certain market features of the model.

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[1] Implementation in the first year is covered in greater detail in a forthcoming Rand report. In addition, the voucher staff's final report on the first year of the demonstration is contained in the Documentary Appendix to the present series.

In each of the four implementation areas that we examine—budget issues; student transfers and mini-school expansion; parent information; and community-initiated educational alternatives—we will see that, while the district has made noteworthy innovations, it has in some ways modified or restricted the market aspects of the model. This is not surprising, given the well-known tendency of organizations to develop compromises between an innovative model and prior practice. The technical problems and interpersonal stresses involved in change are sometimes resolved by returning to familiar ways of doing things. Also, where an innovation implies power shifts in the system, as the voucher innovation does, the more powerful figures in the old system are likely to dominate the implementation process and therefore be able to modify the innovation to minimize transfer of their power. And, as we have seen, Alum Rock was not exempted from certain obligations under state law. Thus, the organization (and the environment in which it continues to operate) shapes the innovation in unique ways as it attempts to adjust to it.

Before considering the implementation process in each of the four specified areas, we briefly describe the early stages of implementation in the spring, summer, and early fall of 1972.

Then, after examining implementation in these four areas, we describe the process by which seven additional schools joined the demonstration for the second year. Finally, we discuss two aspects of implementation that are not directly related to the voucher market model but are important features of the demonstration in Alum Rock: the district's use of an organization development consultant to facilitate change within its professional staff, and first-year developments in collective parental participation.

FIRST STEPS IN IMPLEMENTATION

In the late spring of 1972, after the Alum Rock Board of Trustees approved the demonstration, the staffs of the six voucher schools designed the mini-schools that would make up the marketplace of educational choices for parents. They also decided which teachers would be associated with each mini-school. This planning process was done under considerable time pressure. Within six weeks, program descriptions were developed and distributed to parents and parents made their program selections for the following year.

Mini-school formation was done by the principals and teachers of each school, with little participation by other district administrators or by parents. In a few cases parents were asked to indicate their preferences from among a list of mini-school options, and the staff then developed the ones receiving the most votes. In the other schools, teachers individually or in small groups presented candidate mini-schools to their colleagues, and through a process of discussion, negotiation, and voting, the choices were narrowed down to the three or four most promising in each school. At the six schools 22 mini-schools emerged.

The teacher assignment process was informal. Teachers joined together in the same mini-school either because they subscribed to the same educational approach or because they wanted to work together. These initial assignments were tentative, of course, because there was no way of knowing the enrollment level of each mini-school until parents made their choices. Each voucher school received $30,000 to cover planning costs. The money was used mostly to pay teachers for extra time worked during the hectic spring planning period and, in some cases, during the summer.

Information packets, consisting of descriptions of the 22 programs and an illustrated bilingual booklet, *What is a Voucher?*, describing the demonstration were distributed to the approximately 3000 families in the demonstration area. (These booklets are contained in the Documentary Appendix.) Each of the 22 program descriptions was limited to one page in length, and covered such issues as educational philosophy, objectives, governance, class size, evaluation, and plans for parent participation. The statements on each subject were necessarily somewhat general, partly because of the space limitation, partly because teachers had not yet had an opportunity to work out the specifics themselves, and perhaps partly because of the inherent difficulty of describing educational programs in operational terms.

To supplement the written materials, most schools held open house meetings for parents at which teachers explained the various options. In addition, more than a dozen bilingual paraprofessional parent counselors, under the supervision of the central voucher staff, personally contacted as many parents as possible to inform them further about the demonstration. The counselors were under strict instructions *not* to assist parents in making choices, but rather to help them become informed so they could make their own choices. Both teachers and parent counselors have reported to Rand interviewers that many parents found it difficult to understand the differences between programs and wanted recommendations on which programs to choose. (For survey results concerning parents' use of various information sources, see Sec. VI.)

Some teachers and parent counselors have also remarked that program titles strongly influenced parents' choices and that these titles were sometimes misunderstood. Teachers in the Fine Arts mini-school later discovered that some parents believed their program would teach only fine arts and not the 3 R's; at the demonstration's one middle school, a rumor began circulating that only the basic skills program would satisfy high school entrance requirements. Many teachers have commented that the teaching staff itself was an important factor in some parents' mini-school selections. While teacher assignments were not publicized, parents could learn about them by visiting the school.

June 9 was the deadline for parents to submit application forms with first, second, and third choices of programs. By July, about 80 percent had enrolled their children. Enrollment applications continued to come in during the summer and, in addition, several hundred unregistered voucher-eligible children appeared on the first day of school. Mini-schools, initially forbidden to set limits on enrollment, found themselves confronted with shifting enrollment patterns in September 1972. In some cases this meant that teachers who had considered their classes full had to accept additional students. Some classrooms grew to as large as 40 students, before the overcrowding could be relieved by shifting teachers among mini-schools, or hiring additional teachers. Shifting teachers among mini-schools meant that some teachers who had worked on designing and planning one mini-school ended up teaching in another—a cause of considerable unhappiness for the teachers so affected. When surveyed by Rand in November, 79 percent of the teachers said they regarded the process of teacher assignments as fair and 76 percent reported that they were teaching in the program they had wanted most (see Sec. VII for further discussion of teacher survey results).

Virtually all students began the school year in the mini-school their parents had listed as first choice. For about 95 percent of the children this program was housed in their neighborhood school (see Sec. VI for survey results concerning parents' choice of schools).

BUDGET ISSUES

Voucher theory assumes that the suppliers of schooling will respond to client preferences only if the suppliers' income directly depends on the number of clients they attract.

In Alum Rock one could say that the mini-schools were the suppliers; voucher theory would then call for all income from student vouchers to be paid directly to the mini-schools, which would use it to buy goods and services. In the Alum Rock context, strict adherence to voucher theory would have given the teachers, who jointly managed the mini-schools, total budgetary authority.

So startling an innovation of course would have contravened the entire weight of traditional practice. In American school districts, Alum Rock included, the revenue from tax sources accrues initially to the district as a whole. Boards of Education, composed of citizens, draw up budgets specifying the amounts allowed for personnel, maintenance, construction, and the like. Within the broad budget guidelines set by the Board, the Superintendent and his staff exercise their discretion in allocating funds between the activities of the central office and the school site. Central administrators often establish formulas specifying how the money will be spent at the school site. Finally, what little discretion over expenditures remains is exercised by the building principal. Usually, the classroom teacher's only spending authority is over petty cash.

Put simply, traditional school district budgeting practice is "top-down." Decisions are made at the top of the administrative hierarchy and executed at the lower levels. In contrast, a pure voucher approach, based on mini-school units, would put full purchasing power in the hands of the teachers. The voucher principle in this context, if carried to an unlikely extreme, would mean that every school district employee, including the Superintendent, would have to depend on mini-school budgets to fund his or her salary.

The following pages describe the general features of the budget system that has emerged in Alum Rock. As one might expect, it embodies features of both traditional budget practice and voucher theory, with the emphasis on the former. Mini-schools have gained substantial new budgetary authority but, as we shall see, that new authority is rooted in the temporary foundation of federal support, not in the longer-lasting base of established district budgetary practice.

We will address four broad categories of issues: allocation of revenue between the central office and school sites; allocation of funds among the school sites; allocation of funds within the school; and finally, the technical and political problems that beset the development of "income-outgo" budgets in the first year. It is vital to note that most "budget" issues are in fact political issues. That is, the right to spend money is inextricably tied to the right to govern the school district. One cannot understand the budgeting process without asking the question, "Who is in charge here?"

Basic and Compensatory Vouchers

The basic voucher for a child equals the amount of money expended by the district in the most recent fiscal year divided by total enrollment. Put another way, if every child in the district paid an amount of money for his or her education equal to the basic voucher, the district's revenue would be identical to what it received in the most recent fiscal year.[2] In Alum Rock it was assumed that each voucher school would receive a budget allocation composed, in part, of the basic voucher value multiplied by the school's current enrollment, and this entitlement would vary as total student enrollment varied. Since per-student spending was traditionally higher in the middle schools (grades 7 and 8) than in the elementary grades (kindergarten through grade 6), two basic voucher values were computed: the basic voucher for the 7th and 8th grade students was worth $1041 and the elementary basic voucher was worth $788 per student. These funds were drawn solely from local and state sources. (The fact that the middle school basic voucher was larger than the elementary voucher provided an incentive for voucher elementary schools to begin to serve 7th and 8th grade students. Several schools did so.)

The CSPP "regulated compensatory" voucher model had prescribed that extra money—"compensatory vouchers"—be provided to parents of poor children, to give those children added attractiveness as potential students for competing schools. Otherwise, it was feared that schools would systematically discriminate against poor children, who are often considered to have special learning problems. The result might be socioeconomic segregation, with poor children relegated to a few schools of "last resort."

Such an outcome was unlikely in Alum Rock schools, which were obligated by law to continue to educate all children within their jurisdiction. Further, parents were given "squatters' rights," entitling their children to attend the same school they had attended before the demonstration. Nevertheless, compensatory vouchers were provided by the federal grant.

After lengthy and often acrimonious bargaining between OEO and the district, the total amount provided for compensatory vouchers was set at $509,100 or approximately $238 for eligible elementary students and $302 for each eligible middle school student. These vouchers were far and away the main source of discretionary spending: about $20,000 for the average mini-school staff.

During the design of the Alum Rock demonstration it was decided that compensatory vouchers would be awarded to children who were eligible for the federal free-lunch program, whether they actually participated or not. (It was necessary only that the child's parents file the appropriate form declaring eligibility for free lunch under the current federal income eligibility guidelines.) With school income partially dependent on how many children qualified for free lunches, school staffs tried vigorously to see that every eligible child was put on record. Several schools passed out application forms on more than one occasion and laid considerable stress on returning them. Although the campaign was not coercive, it would be hard to imagine a more thorough-going drive. More than 50 percent of the children in the demonstration qualified, and in a few schools eligibility reached 70 percent.

The $500,000 in compensatory voucher funds was placed into individual mini-school accounts, based on the number of eligible children in the mini-school. As a result, this portion of the federal grant directly funded discretionary expenditures by teachers at the classroom level. Although there was some confusion in the communication of information about mini-school accounts to teachers, teachers seemed to know that money was available in these compensatory voucher accounts and that its expenditure was largely up to them. The course followed by the basic voucher was much more complex, revealing the intricacies of the budget process.

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[2] This explanation does not delve into the complexities raised by various special categorical aid programs such as state aid for special education. We omit these considerations in the interests of simplicity and brevity. Further details on these specialized problems are contained in a forthcoming Rand technical report.

Allocation Between Central Office and School Site

If the full basic voucher had been allocated to the schools and mini-schools, then all central office budgets would have depended upon receiving support from school site budgets. Such a drastic change was never seriously considered. After all, it was obvious that certain central office functions such as those of the Superintendent, personnel office, business office, and others would have to continue. However, it was theoretically possible that the continuation of certain central office functions could be made contingent upon their "purchase" by mini-school staffs. The OEO pressed the district in 1972 to identify central services that could be "voucherized"—that is, their budgets would be allocated to the school site and these central services would continue only if school site staff thought they were sufficiently useful to support them from school site funds.

Three candidates for "voucherization" were identified: psychological services, curriculum coordination, and audiovisual services. On a per-student basis it was determined that the six voucher schools' collective share of the cost of these central services was approximately $73,000. That amount of money was divided and placed in the accounts of the six schools. But what if, for example, the six schools decided not to purchase the services of the district's school psychologists? The district would either have to begin to terminate the services of one or more psychologists, or it would have to subsidize the psychologists from other central office funds. Both prospects were distinctly unpalatable to the district. The district requested, and OEO granted, a $30,000 reserve fund to insure against the possibility of such a distasteful situation. But $30,000 fell short of the theoretical risk—$73,000. The solution was simple. The district required the six schools to purchase $43,000 of the "voucherized" services, thus totally eliminating any financial risk to the district.

Thus, budgetary provision for central office services proceeded in exactly the opposite direction to that called for by voucher theory. Rather than assume that every central office position was in doubt, it was assumed that every central office position was to be continued. These central office salaries and associated program obligations were added together and, when divided by the student enrollment, a "central office payback" of $260 per student resulted. These funds were removed from the basic voucher funds before the voucher money ever reached the school site.

Allocation Among Schools

After deduction of the "central office payback," the "site basic voucher" (the basic voucher value available at the school site) was $782 at the middle school level and $528 at the elementary level.

Some interesting complications arise when one considers how school-site expenses are to be charged against these budget allotments. Theoretically, instructional units should be required to pay the actual cost (including fringe benefits) of personnel employed to carry out the educational offering. This would force staffs to consider the most cost-effective patterns of staffing, the value of technological substitutes for personnel, and the relative contributions of lower and higher salaried teachers.

Under the voucher demonstration, however, instructional units have been charged the district-wide average salary for principals, assistant principals, teachers, secretaries, and custodians. This procedure was adopted because there was significant variation among mini-schools in the salary levels of personnel, so that some mini-schools would have had insufficient income from their basic vouchers to pay for even a minimum complement of instructional personnel, while other mini-schools would have large funds left over for curriculum materials and equipment. (Average teacher salary ranges from $10,000 to $15,000 in the mini-schools.) The district could not accept such an outcome, because even if one were willing to "penalize" students for attending schools with experienced, high-salaried teachers, the school staffs themselves are incapable of adjusting to the situation by transferring out or firing expensive personnel.

To equalize the cost of personnel to the mini-schools, a system of subsidies and contributions has been installed. Mini-schools with salary obligations below average cost must give up the difference (taken from their site basic voucher income) to subsidize mini-schools with salary levels above the average. The amount of the subsidy to or contribution by a mini-school is displayed on the monthly mini-school budget reports.

A similar possible inequity surfaced during the attempt to voucherize the district. It was revealed that the cost *per pupil* for building administrative personnel (principals, assistant principals, secretaries, and custodians) for mini-schools in schools with small enrollments (usually schools with relatively small physical plants) was much greater, of course, than it was in school buildings with large enrollments. Even after the inequalities of salary level for the administrative personnel are removed (by using average salaries), mini-schools in large buildings still have a distinct financial advantage over mini-schools in small buildings.

After deduction of the "central office payback" and school site cost for personnel, maintenance, and other necessary expenses, what is left of the basic voucher for discretionary spending by mini-schools? On the average, the answer is $8.50 per student, approximately 1 percent of the original basic voucher. It should now be clear why the compensatory voucher, supported entirely by federal funds, is the only significant source of support for discretionary spending at the mini-school level.

Allocation Within Schools

Some readers may point out that the foregoing analysis neglects the possibility that mini-schools could "save" basic voucher dollars and increase discretionary funds by increasing class size and voluntarily forgoing the services of some of their certificated staff. But financial, legal, and organizational constraints have limited the freedom of mini-school staffs to "trade teachers for dollars."

First of all, the district has guaranteed continued employment to all of its tenured teachers according to negotiated salary schedules. Even if a mini-school gave up one of its teachers, the district would still have to pay the teacher.

Secondly, provisions of both the California Education Code and the district's agreements with teachers limit the freedom to increase class size. In California, districts in which average class size in the primary grades (1 to 3) exceeds 30 students for every teacher are penalized financially. Also, agreements between teachers and administrators in Alum Rock stipulate that the pupil-to-teacher ratio of an elementary school *as a whole* (composed of several mini-schools) be maintained at 29 to 1 when all teachers (including categorically funded teachers) are counted. Within these constraints, individual mini-schools have secured significant amounts (several thousand dollars in one case) of discretionary monies by having relatively high pupil-to-teacher ratios. Since the district-wide pupil-to-teacher ratio must be maintained at 29 to 1 in the elementary schools, however, mini-schools that exceed this ratio can gain unencumbered funds only so long as other mini-schools and nonvoucher schools have ratios lower than 29 to 1.

Step by step, then, the apparent flexibility inherent in the idea of the basic voucher proved largely illusory in Alum Rock owing to the constraints of the obligation to pay present personnel, state law, and agreements with teacher organizations. Unless and until the district can find ways of providing them from its own budget resources, mini-school discretionary budgets will depend solely on special federal funding.

Income-Outgo Budget

Both the basic and compensatory voucher were to "follow the child." That is, the appropriate vouchers were to be credited to the budgets of the school and mini-school enrolling each child. If the child transferred, the remaining voucher amounts were to be deleted from the budget of the previously attended school and credited to the accounts of the newly selected school and mini-school. To achieve these transfers of funds, the district needed, and OEO required the district to develop, an "income-outgo" budgeting system that would treat schools and mini-schools as independent accounting entities with self-balancing budgets.

Such a budgeting system was not achieved during the first year, and voucher funds therefore did not follow the child. However, teachers and administrators operated throughout the first year under the assumption that initial budget allocations would be adjusted to reflect actual student enrollment in each mini-school during the year. Both technical and policy problems lie behind the delay of the "income-outgo" budget.

First, with regard to policy problems, the district staff who worked on development of the income-outgo budget had to face many of the allocation questions already cited. Further, they had to confront questions of whether income to the school should be reflected in accounts for the entire school (and, therefore, be implicitly under the control of the principals) or in mini-school accounts (and, therefore, be implicitly under the control of teachers). This issue is not yet fully resolved.

Technically, the district's budgeting reforms had to be carried forward under constraints of lack of time and lack of staff. OEO supplementary grants helped to alleviate the latter problem.

Further, the operation of the income-outgo budget depended on the accurate and reliable functioning of a new computerized student attendance accounting system, which ran into a number of difficulties. One consequence was that school staff and the computer arrived at different counts of compensatory voucher students. In June 1973, OEO and the district decided simply to rely on the October 1972 allocation of compensatory voucher funds based on school-site counts of student eligibility for free lunches, and to abandon further attempts to provide budget adjustments based on subsequent student transfers among mini-schools. Since transfer activity was low in the first year, the financial consequences of this failure were small for the mini-schools.

The district has worked diligently to overcome the technical problems encountered in the student attendance accounting and budgeting systems. By the end of the demonstration's first year, detailed allocation rules had been developed and applied to the projected enrollments to determine the initial income of each school and mini-school for the next school year.[3] Largely as a result of the financial infor-

[3] These allocation rules are summarized in Technical Appendix Table IV-2. They show that while Alum Rock has gone a long way toward "voucherizing" resources on a per pupil basis, so that the income of an instructional unit from basic and compensatory vouchers fluctuates with enrollment during the school year, voucher schools still receive significant amounts of fixed income that are not adjusted as enrollment changes. In the 1973-74 school year, inservice allowances and budgets for psychological services, curriculum coordination, and audiovisual services are determined on a per pupil basis, but are fixed at start-of-the-year enrollments. The administrative allowance is a flat grant given to each school ($25,000 for first-year schools; $20,000 for second-year schools) regardless of size. A "curriculum voucher"

mation requirements of the voucher demonstration, Alum Rock has now progressed beyond most American school districts in its ability to trace funds to the school level, and, via the mini-school budgets, to a particular set of classrooms. The voucher financial information system is discussed at greater length in Technical Appendix IV.

MINI-SCHOOL INCENTIVES TO EXPAND

The voucher demonstration, even under the modified Alum Rock model, was designed to create a market in education within a school system. As we have seen, mini-schools, instead of schools, became the suppliers in this market. Mini-schools were supposed to develop differentiated products and compete for students, especially poor (compensatory voucher) students. If mini-schools were not interested in attracting more students, the competitive mechanism would be undercut. As it turned out, the incentives for mini-schools to expand their enrollment during the course of the year were limited. As noted above, at the beginning of the school year, mini-school sizes were adjusted to accommodate nearly all students in their first choice programs. During the school year, however, teachers won the right to close their mini-schools to new students; consequently, parents wishing to transfer their children among mini-schools, and parents new to the system, faced a limited range of choices during the course of the year.

The Alum Rock-OEO agreement provided that financial adjustments based on student transfers would be made quarterly; that is, at the end of the quarter in which a child transferred, the remaining three-fourths, half, or one-fourth of his voucher would be credited to his new mini-school (this plan was never carried out in the first year). This rule was established for administrative convenience, so that planning and budgeting decisions would not be subject to constant reevaluation. While the rule did not say that students—as distinguished from their vouchers—could transfer only at the end of each quarter, this is how it was generally interpreted in the district.

Early in the school year the voucher principals, who did not want to refuse parents seeking transfers, sought to change the quarterly transfer policy. They proposed that parents be allowed to transfer their children whenever and as often as they wished. This proposal was accepted by four of the voucher school faculties, but was strongly opposed by two others. The opposing teachers argued that constant student transfers would disrupt both teaching and planning. One of these two schools had had a large number of students transfer out in the summer of 1972, and faced the possible loss of two teachers as a result. They were anxious to forestall further transfers.[4]

The voucher principals met with the Superintendent to reconsider the new policy. By then it was apparent that unlimited transfers would require some mini-schools to expand substantially, a prospect also unpopular with many teachers. The majority of principals, despite teachers' objections, once again approved unlimited

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(unrelated to the voucher demonstration) of $30 per teacher is granted directly to individual teachers. Schools also receive income from several categorical programs, including Model Cities, the district's Community School Program, Title I, and SB 90, which do not change to reflect student transfers during the school year.

[4] This large number of transfers probably did not reflect directly on this school. In the year prior to the voucher demonstration, there had been a revision in school attendance areas through which this school received a large number of students accustomed to attending a different school. When the demonstration began, many of these parents transferred their children back to what had previously been their neighborhood school.

transfer rights; but they added an important proviso: that any mini-school could close itself to further enrollment if it lacked physical capacity.

The Superintendent urged the principals to declare that such program closings would be temporary and subject to the Superintendent's approval, and that closed mini-schools would reopen for enrollment when more facilities became available. The principals agreed and the Superintendent ratified their decision. At the same time, EVAC, the parent-teacher advisory committee, had appointed a subcommittee to report on transfer policy, but it was bypassed entirely in the decisionmaking process. While the rule provided limited grounds for closing mini-schools to further enrollment, it was interpreted by school staff as providing broad authority to cut off enrollment if teachers and administrators wished to do so. Even though it was well known within the central voucher staff that the authorization for temporary enrollment limits was being broadly interpreted at the school sites to provide a rationale for semi-permanent enrollment limits, the central staff did not vigoriously seek to enforce the "letter of the law." The lack of central monitoring of the implementation of the enrollment limit rule is an example of the very weak role played by the central voucher staff in pressing the school site staffs to abide by the ground rules of the demonstration as perceived from the voucher staff perspective.

For a number of reasons, many teachers were not anxious to increase the enrollment of their mini-schools. For one thing, the financial incentives to do so proved less than compelling. Theoretically, mini-schools could enlarge their discretionary income by enrolling more students, but it would be worthwhile to do so only if the new students were compensatory voucher students transferring from another mini-school. Again, we stress, even this practice did not materialize in the first year, as compensatory voucher allocations were eventually frozen at their October 20 level—but teachers did not know they would be until the school year was over. In addition, there were no compensatory vouchers for students who enrolled in the demonstration after October 20, even if they would otherwise have qualified.

State laws, which limit the average pupil-teacher ratio for certain grades in a school building to 30:1 (on penalty of loss of a portion of state aid), meant that in school buildings already at this limit, mini-schools could expand only by adding an extra classroom and teacher. But since no formal waiting lists were kept in the demonstration, a mini-school that opened an additional classroom could not be sure what additional enrollment would result nor how many students would bring partially unused compensatory vouchers. Thus after considering salaries and other instructional costs, it was often unclear whether a given mini-school could make a "profit" by expanding. Perhaps even more important, many mini-schools already had more discretionary money than they could effectively plan to spend.

Given the limited financial incentives, adding classrooms to a mini-school was not an attractive prospect. To begin with, classroom space was a problem. Both OEO and CSPP had understood that excess physical capacity in school buildings was critical to making a voucher demonstration work, and during the initial negotiation period, Alum Rock had said it had such space in the prospective voucher schools. However, because of changes in school attendance areas and the entry of some students from outside the six-voucher school subdistrict, the excess capacity proved nonexistent. In many cases instructional space could be obtained only through the use of trailers. Some mini-school expansion was accomplished in this way, financed by a grant supplement from OEO, but trailers were not a popular solution. They involved additional expense and administrative work, and there were sometimes delays of several weeks in obtaining them. Trailers did not add to the availability of certain common facilities such as cafeterias, libraries, playgrounds, and bathrooms, so they contributed to general crowding at the schools where they were used.

Other possible solutions to the space problem were considered, but each was rejected. Shifting the attendance boundaries of the six voucher schools was foreclosed by prior agreement with OEO. Double sessions were considered unpopular with parents and harmful to the educational process. Creating a "satellite" in unused classrooms outside of the demonstration was rejected because parents might believe their choice of schools was being negated; besides, it would be difficult to maintain educational programs at two separate sites, and it would create uncertainty as to which principal would be responsible for the satellite.[5]

Even where classroom space was not a problem, teachers had other reasons for opposing expansion. Mini-school faculties were social as well as professional groups. Prospective new teachers had to be screened by mini-school staffs for professional competence and personal compatibility. In some instances, fearing that a comfortable social group might be disrupted by a new member, mini-schools resisted expansion.

Also, unlike an assembly line where the quality of the product is largely insensitive to the volume of output, many mini-school faculties believed that the quality of instruction would decrease with growth. New teachers might be unfamiliar with the philosophy and techniques of the mini-school; and the larger each mini-school faculty became, the more difficult joint planning and sharing of ideas might become.

Professional norms also militated against expanding one mini-school at the expense of others. Many teachers in the demonstration would have viewed overt competition between mini-schools as undesirable and unprofessional, and one school's forthright criticism of another as downright unethical. Positive promotion of one's own mini-school was viewed as somewhat more acceptable; a few mini-schools took the modest step of printing simple circulars to send home to parents. No use was made of radio, TV, the newspapers, or direct mail to solicit parents. Once, when a mini-school received attention in a local newspaper, some teachers viewed the event as subtle and unfair advertising.

In summary, while some popular mini-schools added facilities and expanded, a number of others closed themselves to further enrollment and did not expand. At one point during the year, only one voucher school was accepting newly enrolling children.

At the end of the first year, then, although governed by a formal policy providing parents unlimited transfer rights, the demonstration was moving toward strong de facto limitations on transfers. After the second year's round of parental selection in May 1973, in which students were guaranteed their first choice if their applications were submitted by the deadline, mini-schools were given the authority to set ceilings on mini-school enrollment. Such ceilings were part of neither the CSPP model nor the OEO-District agreement in April 1972. Given a tradeoff between teacher desires for stable and predictable enrollments and the right of parents to enroll their children in the mini-school of their choice, the demonstration seems to be moving toward the satisfaction of teacher preferences. Of course, this is not unlike the situation in the private school marketplace, where many popular schools turn away applicants each year.

PARENTAL INFORMATION

A vital element in making an educational marketplace work effectively is giving parents good information about schools. Critics of voucher schemes have predicted that "hucksterism" might become a problem under a voucher system; that unsophisticated parents might fall prey to the inflated advertising claims of educational suppliers and lack adequate objective information on which to base their school selections.

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[5] In the fall of 1973, some such satellite programs were established, and difficulties surrounding relations with the host school and administrative jurisdiction did, in fact, ensue. In the 1973-74 school

To prevent such a possibility, the CSPP model provided for the establishment of an independent Education Voucher Agency, among whose responsibilities would be the evaluation of participating schools and the distribution of evaluation results and other information about schools to parents. Under the Alum Rock transition voucher model, there was no Education Voucher Agency, but the functions of information distribution, parent counseling, and internal evaluation were vested in the central voucher staff. As the reader will recall, the central voucher staff consisted of Dr. Levin, the project director; three coordinators of parent information, research and evaluation, and public information (employees of the Sequoia Institute, with which the district had contracted for administration of the demonstration); and the parent counselors (employees of the district but supervised by the Sequoia Institute).

The internal evaluation staff (as distinguished from Rand's external evaluation) was charged with evaluating the demonstration for the district, and was to provide evaluative information about mini-schools to parents. The parent counseling staff was to distribute and explain information about programs and the demonstration to parents. While these functions were established by the district's proposal to OEO, the proposal provided no operational guidelines for staff activities. Developing ground rules for these two functions—parent counseling and internal evaluation—proved to be the battleground for the major organizational conflict in the first year of the demonstration. The antagonists were the central voucher staff on one side and the six voucher principals on the other.

The voucher principals had opposed the creation of a central voucher staff during the original negotiations with OEO in the spring of 1972. They claimed that vesting evaluative and counseling functions in a central staff was inconsistent with decentralization. They objected to creating a "buffer" unit between themselves and the Superintendent, and begrudged the OEO grant money being spent on central staff.

Dr. Levin and the three coordinators had been hired without consultation with principals and school staffs. The principals considered them "outsiders"—only one had previously worked in the district. As noted earlier, Dr. Levin, who was ideologically committed to vouchers and clearly in Alum Rock only on a temporary basis, was sometimes suspected by the principals of owing his first allegiance to OEO. The three coordinators were perceived as having been selected according to racial/ethnic criteria. That was partly true. The effort to hire minority candidates was intended to build minority support for the demonstration—but each man was certainly qualified for his position. Given the pressure exerted on the district in recent years by minority community organizations, Anglo administrators and teachers tended to consider the voucher staff as a potential source of more pressure on the schools.[6]

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year, a Student Space Voucher Fund of $36,000 ($4 per participanting student) was set up for use by oversubscribed mini-schools. These vouchers are pooled and redistributed as additional space needs for program expansion arise.

[6] Racism is another possible explanation for the conflict between the principals, all of them Anglos, and the voucher staff, largely minority. Assertions of latent racism in the district have come not only from some voucher staff members and some minority observers of district affairs, but also from Anglo administrators. On the basis of hundreds of hours of observation and interviews of members of the district staff, however, we tentatively conclude that while racial and ethnic bias may well have played some part in the events and tensions of the first year of the demonstration, they were not a central driving force and were less significant than other elements discussed in this report.

To some extent, the apprehensions of principals and school staffs about pressure from the central voucher staff were justifiable. Many of the voucher staff believed deeply in the necessity of substantially increasing parental participation in school decisionmaking. This was particularly true of the parent counseling staff—which included two Anglo professional counselors and Anglo, Chicano, and black paraprofessionals from the community (whose number fluctuated from as few as six to as many as twenty-four during the year, as the workload varied). Some parent counselors thought their role should be to organize the parents and serve as their advocates, and, in the words of one counselor, "to help parents to be dissatisfied with the schools." They felt that, particularly in a community with many poor Mexican-American parents, who traditionally were reluctant to assert themselves with school authorities, a basic educating and "consciousness raising" function was necessary before parents could effectively exercise their new rights under the voucher demonstration.

Relations between the central voucher staff and the principals reached their first crisis at a meeting in September 1972. The six principals had become a highly cohesive group, partly as a result of their HRC training (discussed later in this section). They had common problems, common anxieties, and common adversaries. As a consequence, they exhibited a strong group norm enforcing unanimity. While they felt free to air their differences in private, they felt compelled to present a highly unified front in their dealings with all elements of the central staff, including the Superintendent. The coordinators, on the other hand, were new to the district and strangers to each other. At this first key meeting, the principals forcefully pressed the cause of school autonomy and demanded a strong measure of control over the voucher staff. The project director and the coordinators, stunned and caught off guard by this united action, retreated in disarray.

By the end of the meeting, the principals had won the authority to order any parent counselor in a given school community to cease any activity that a principal found unacceptable. The only recourse open to the voucher staff in such an event would be to appeal to the Superintendent to override the principal. Further, the coordinator of evaluation was stripped of any authority to impose an evaluation design upon the schools. Instead, his role became that of a consultant to any school or mini-school that wished to request his services. The basic pattern of the principals' domination had been established, and, as described in the next several pages, the voucher staff chafed under these constraints for the rest of the year and overcame them in only a few instances.

Internal Evaluation

In its proposal to OEO (see the Documentary Appendix), the district enumerated an ambitious set of objectives for its internal evaluation:

> . . . We have a number of questions which we as a district want to be answered during the demonstration for the purposes of our own assessment of the project. The questions to be answered are:
>
> (a) To what extent will parents exercise choice if it is made available to them?
>
> (b) What effects, if any, will the availability of choice have on the attitudes and achievement of children?
>
> (c) Will new programs emerge which are more effective than the present ones for children?
>
> (d) Will parent involvement and contact with the schools increase as a consequence of the increased financial power that parents will have towards their children's schools.

According to the proposal, internal evaluation would cover the following program aspects: inservice and planning, counseling, management, admissions procedure, material utilization, personnel, transportation, finance, and the relative costs of operating the voucher system and the traditional system. The original design for internal evaluation emphasized measures of student opinion, teacher opinion, ethnic makeup of the mini-schools, pre- and post-achievement tests, and affective tests to detect changes in students. The hope was to provide program-by-program comparisons to help parents make program choices during enrollment in the spring of 1973.

As already noted, the evaluation design ran into several problems in the fall of 1972. Principals and staffs felt the coordinator of evaluation had developed the design unilaterally, with only token consultation with school staffs; the coordinator believed he had done his utmost to include school staffs in evaluation planning but had been greeted with indifference.

To begin with, the notion of program-by-program comparisons was totally unacceptable to the school staffs. The teachers and principals had no objections to distributing individual program descriptions, as they had already done the previous spring. But they had no intention of allowing the voucher staff to establish criteria for mini-school performance and then distribute the results of their evaluations to parents.

The staffs strongly opposed the use of standardized achievement tests for the comparative evaluation of mini-schools. For years Alum Rock students had scored poorly on such tests, and the scores had been a recurring source of embarrassment and annoyance for the district. They were regarded as virtually useless in diagnosing specific learning problems, and many teachers and parents considered the tests culturally biased against poor and minority children.

Acting upon these considerations, the principals pressed the Superintendent for a change in the original evaluation plan. They secured a compromise in which achievement test scores would not be made public, on a program-by-program basis, until June 1974. The principals appeared to be genuinely concerned that the use of standardized test scores for comparisons would force the various mini-schools into conformity with one another in a contest for better test scores. They urged that each mini-school be allowed to develop individual measures of its own performance, tailored to the goals and objectives that had been conveyed to parents in the program descriptions.

The coordinator of evaluation accepted this compromise. In December, a revised evaluation plan was circulated to the voucher school staffs. It emphasized that each mini-school was responsible for developing and carrying out its own first-year evaluation and that assistance to the mini-schools in their evaluation efforts would be available. The assistance offered included: surveys, provision of trained observers, photographic observations, construction of new evaluation measures, and consultation on tests.

Only survey assistance was requested by a significant number of the mini-schools. Beginning in early 1973, the voucher staff, using parent counselors as interviewers, conducted parent surveys for several mini-schools. In addition, the coordinator of evaluation and the coordinator of parent information tried to initiate surveys of those parents who had decided to transfer from one program to another during the school year. The principals quickly rejected that idea and insisted that such surveys be conducted only upon the request of a mini-school. Programs at two of the six voucher schools subsequently participated in such surveys of "changer" parents.

In early 1973 the coordinators of both evaluation and parent information grew more restive with the concessions that had been made. Having sought a change in procedure through the project director and having failed, they took their case directly to the Superintendent. They demanded, in effect, that minimum standards of reporting be imposed on the mini-schools and that the responsibility for disseminating the resulting information be placed in the hands of the voucher staff. Their position was firm and they laid their jobs on the line in support of it.

After a series of discussions between the Superintendent and the principals, including a bitter confrontation in early April, it was agreed that the coordinator of evaluation could circulate the following information to parents in each mini-school about that mini-school: the results of the parent survey (if one had been conducted); analysis of how compensatory voucher funds had been spent; a report on class size and student attendance; a brief profile of teacher experience and parent involvement.

These reports were sent to parents prior to the spring round of program selections. As each family received only the report on its own children's mini-school(s), there was no basis for making comparisons. Parent survey results generally showed high levels of enthusiasm by parents for their children's mini-schools. Parents were entitled to obtain reports for other than their own mini-school by requesting them from the voucher staff office, but this fact was not publicized and very few parents made such requests.

For the coordinators, however, the immediate issue was not the quality or quantity of evaluative data or even the data's direct usefulness to parents. The issue was where the authority resided to set the evaluation requirements for the demonstration and disseminate the results. They regarded the first year's outcome as at least a minor victory for them, in that it furnished a precedent for central dissemination and standard information requirements for all mini-schools. Nonetheless, it seems fair to say that the balance of control over parent information rested, and still rests, largely with the individual schools and their principals.

It is interesting to note that, in the first year, the mini-schools made little progress in developing new evaluation techniques adapted to their individual objectives, as the principals had proposed. Given the problems involved in implementing a new educational program, however, it is perhaps not surprising that evaluation received a somewhat lower priority among teachers in the first year.

Parent Counseling

Parent counseling was a new function, like other jobs on the voucher staff, and there was considerable uncertainty as to the work that should be done. During the summer of 1972, and even thereafter, the duties of the parent counselors and their coordinator were vague and ill defined. Counseling work, which at first appeared to be glamorous and exciting, turned out to be rather dull, repetitive, and filled with clerical detail. Professional and paraprofessional parent counselors had expected that they would be included in the demonstration's decisionmaking process as peers, and felt resentment when those expectations were disappointed. The counselors felt they were receiving neither direction nor recognition from the project director.

By September 1972, the counseling staff had decided that it could not rely on the project director to negotiate an appropriate role for them with the principals. They demanded to meet with the principals directly. The director did his best to arrange such a meeting but it was delayed until the following month. By that time the principals had already won veto power over the activities of the counselors. In two subsequent meetings with the principals, the counselors failed to make any significant headway in expanding their role or in gaining greater acceptance by the principals.

A few counselors, but only a few, established constructive working relationships at individual schools. In the fall of 1972 one of the ablest counselors resigned from the staff in frustration. The others stayed on but became, in the words of one who remained, "flexible." That is, they perceived they were not going to achieve authority and autonomy and gave up fighting for it. Staff morale remained low throughout the year and the sense of disorganization and aimlessness persisted.

In their contacts with parents, the counselors often ran into indifference. They concluded that they had underestimated the difficulty of informing and activating parents. As the coordinator of parent counseling commented, "Realistically, all that we may be able to do in the next five years is to get parents to understand their options in the voucher system."

The counselors found it difficult to become well informed themselves. Confronted with 22 different mini-schools and some teachers' indifference or resistance to their efforts, the counseling staff found it hard to grasp program differences clearly enough to explain them easily to parents.

At the root of the counselors' malaise was a fundamental contradiction in their role. On the one hand, the voucher model demanded that they be independent and even critical of the schools. But to do their jobs, they had to work in close harmony with the schools. They had to have access to teachers and classrooms to see what the various mini-schools were like. They needed the cooperation of the principals and the school staffs, because the school system was the only medium through which they could reach any significant number of parents.

Even if the schools had cooperated enthusiastically, however, the counselors still would have been at a loss, because they were unsure what information the parents wanted—perhaps because the parents themselves were unsure. Nor did they have any means to communicate quickly and effectively with large numbers of parents. (The voucher staff began a newsletter to all parents but it was discontinued after a few issues.) They also lacked knowledge of the needs of individual children. In this respect, teachers were far more knowledgeable and, potentially more useful counselors to the parents, though the usefulness of teachers in this regard is probably tempered, in some instances, by their self-interest in retaining students in their mini-schools.

In the second year, in an effort to create a clearer role for them, counselors were each assigned to serve specific school communities. While this step may improve cooperation between counselors and school staffs, and increase the visibility of counselors in the community, it also makes it more likely that counselors will perceive themselves as acting on behalf of specific schools. Their ultimate independence within the demonstration is still in doubt, but at this time their activities remain largely under the de facto control of the principals.

There may be an underlying conflict between the goals generally held by the voucher principals (and many teachers) for the demonstration and those held by the central voucher staff. The Superintendent, in encouraging schools to join the demonstration, had presented vouchers as a way to advance administrative decentralization. That, along with the extra funds, was perhaps the demonstration's chief appeal to principals and teachers, and they have liked the considerably increased autonomy of schools and mini-schools that the demonstration engendered (see Sec. VII for a discussion of teachers and decisionmaking autonomy). But while the transition voucher model is consistent with administrative decentralization, indeed requires it, it also implies a devolution of power beyond the level of the individual school, namely to the consumers in the system, the parents. Ironically, while the principals opposed the central voucher staff on the grounds that it represented a recentralizing influence in the district, the central voucher staff saw their function as preserving the interests of parents in the demonstration and thus, in effect, advocated an even greater degree of decentralization (to the level of the consumer) than the principals desired.

The struggle over parent counseling and internal evaluation reflected this tension between school/mini-school authority and the interests of consumers as perceived by the central staff. As we have seen, by the end of the first year, a number of steps had been taken toward limiting the prerogatives of the central voucher staff vis-à-vis the individual schools and programs. It seems that both the Superintendent and the project director, committed to the "success" (continuation) of the demonstration, were convinced that the demonstration could not survive an open break with the principals, and so avoided confrontations that might have precipitated such a break.

A COMMUNITY-INITIATED SCHOOL

In its agreement with OEO, Alum Rock had stated, "We explicitly agree to cooperate with groups trying to establish new schools. In the absence of legislation, however, these schools can participate only if the School Board contracts with them to provide services." In its 1970, 1971, and 1972 sessions, the California legislature had defeated bills that would have allowed participation of private schools in a voucher system.

The first-year OEO grant included a $15,000 fund to assist in the planning of new schools initiated by groups outside of the formal school structure. Federal staff concerned with the voucher demonstration have been very anxious to see such alternatives developed, as the inclusion of even such quasi-private schools in the marketplace would represent a closer approximation to the CSPP voucher model than the Alum Rock public-schools-only transition version. The first attempt to make use of this provision came in March 1973. It involved a group of young unemployed teachers from the San Jose suburb of Los Gatos, who had organized themselves under the name, "Greater Resources Organized with Kids" (GRO-Kids). The four major participants had prior teaching experience in Illinois, and had been living in the San Jose area for about two years. GRO-Kids proposed an alternative school for grades 6 to 8 with 50 to 100 students. Their educational philosophy stressed creation of

> . . . an environment which allows a maximum amount of choices from which each individual makes his decisions and then is able to respond to the consequences of his decisions. GRO-Kids School will be a place where people can learn things they want to learn as well as things they need to learn in order to do what they want to do. . . . The process will encourage growth which allows for maximum curiosity, adaptability, sensitivity, trust, and creativity.

Three to four full-time teachers and three to four full-time teacher aides were proposed. The staff would be drawn from diverse racial, cultural, and educational backgrounds. There were to be two adults for every 25 pupils, and high school students would be encouraged to work with the GRO-Kids pupils.

GRO-Kids, Inc., a nonprofit corporation, would serve as the administering agency and would be responsible to the Board of Trustees of the Alum Rock District. Under contract to the Board, the corporation would provide administrative services to the school, and would adhere to all relevant provisions of the State Education Code.

After preliminary discussions with the voucher staff, GRO-Kids attempted to arouse parental interest in their venture. Coming from outside the community and having no available organizational mechanism to reach parents, they found this a difficult task. A partial solution was to reach parents by distributing leaflets and talking to Alum Rock students in the vicinity of the school grounds.

At a Board meeting in May, the Trustees expressed concern about the physical safety of a prospective GRO-Kids facility, the certification of its personnel (they were assured that all GRO-Kids teachers had or would get California teaching certificates), and the Board's own legal authority to contract for a new alternative school. Board members appeared unenthusiastic, perhaps even hostile, to the GRO-Kids proposal. Subsequent interviews with Board members revealed that, in addition to their publicly stated concerns, some were worried about the character of the applicants and the absence of minorities on the GRO-Kids staff.

At the same Board meeting, the President of the Alum Rock unit of the American Federation of Teachers said that his group feared that GRO-Kids might discriminate against certain racial and ethnic groups. He announced that AFT was "prepared to block" the GRO-Kids proposal. The Board asked for further study of the new proposal by the Superintendent and EVAC. An EVAC spokesman reported that his group had met with GRO-Kids representatives, had positive feelings toward the proposal, and had voted to support GRO-Kids "in the continuance of the development of their program."

GRO-Kids returned to EVAC on May 29. In the preceding three weeks the legality of the GRO-Kids proposal had been referred to the County Counsel (the legal office for Santa Clara County, and attorneys for the school district). At that point only 18 promises to enroll their children had been secured from parents. This number fell short of the minimum of 50 that had been set as a goal by GRO-Kids in their initial planning. A GRO-Kids spokesman complained that lack of formal approval from the district had inhibited further efforts to recruit parents.

GRO-Kids asked EVAC to recommend that the Board of Trustees grant them formal approval and that $500 from the $15,000 planning fund be allocated to them for development costs. Members of the voucher staff supported the GRO-Kids request. EVAC approved the request, conditional upon GRO-Kids' ability to demonstrate a potential enrollment of at least 50 students and a favorable ruling by the County Counsel on the Board's authority to enter into a contract with the group.

Armed with EVAC approval, GRO-Kids returned to the Board the next day. The Superintendent presented the proposal for a $500 planning grant, and reported that OEO had given tentative approval for the concept and that the County Counsel, without ruling on the legality of a contract, had ruled that the $500 planning grant was permissible. The Board President appeared favorable to the proposal. However, other Board members expressed discomfort over awarding funds to a "private group," especially in view of the fact that no final ruling had come from the County Counsel. Rejecting the recommendation of EVAC and the Superintendent, the Board voted to deny the planning grant to GRO-Kids until a final approval was received from the County Counsel.

As a consequence of the Board action on May 30, full attention was directed to the legal issues under consideration by the County Counsel. Although they did not express their views publicly, OEO and CSPP officials strongly supported the GRO-Kids proposal. The federal officials had hoped for the creation of a "community alternative" since the negotiation of the original agreement with the district one year earlier. Anxious to help, CSPP officials asked two attorneys from the University of California at Berkeley to assist GRO-Kids. The basic legal problem at issue was the degree of autonomy that could be granted to a community-initiated school under a contract with a public school district.

In late June, the attorneys advanced three possible models under which community-initiated alternatives could participate in the Alum Rock demonstration. Alternative I was incorporation into the public school system. Under this alternative GRO-Kids would function in a manner similar to the existing mini-schools. They would be supervised by a certificated principal; the site used by the GRO-Kids school would be owned or leased by the district and would be maintained by the district; GRO-Kids' income would be computed in a fashion identical to that of other mini-schools; and all employees working for GRO-Kids would have to qualify for and obtain employment with the district. Further, the GRO-Kids "mini-school" would have to adhere to all Board policies including safety regulations, curriculum, and personnel procedure.

The second alternative would involve full federal funding of GRO-Kids, including a payment for overhead costs to the district. Under this plan, no state or local funds would be used to support GRO-Kids, and the local Board would be free to enter into a contract with GRO-Kids without adhering to the State Constitutional provisions that forbid expenditure of state funds for schools not under the "exclusive control" of the Board.

The third alternative assumed passage of SB 600, a bill pending in the state legislature (it subsequently passed; see Documentary Appendix). Under SB 600, Boards in districts trying "demonstration scholarship" (voucher) programs could grant funds to schools under their "exclusive control." The bill defines "exclusive control" as requiring the Board to retain the power to:

1. Promulgate general rules and regulations regarding the use of demonstration scholarships.
2. Establish the amount of the scholarship.
3. Prescribe rules and regulations that are binding upon participating schools.
4. Establish standards for teachers, instructors, and textbooks.
5. Review and approve the suspension or expulsion of a pupil from a particpating school.

In late June 1973, GRO-Kids submitted a revised prospectus partly based on the attorneys' memorandum. Under this new proposal, GRO-Kids abandoned earlier plans to begin operation in the fall of 1973, and instead proposed a planning effort to culminate in the enrollment of students in January 1974. They requested $5362.50 to engage in further program planning in conjunction with the community; to search for and develop a site for their activities; to identify community resources; and to "continue consultation with administration and voucher personnel to select an administrative structure." Although the revised prospectus expressed no preference among the three alternatives, it seems that GRO-Kids did not wish to be supervised by one of the existing principals, as Alternative I would require. The revised proposal still envisioned a school without an administrative hierarchy. It stated that all issues requiring "policymaking decisions will be presented to the entire GRO community during a monthly evening open house."

EVAC endorsed the new proposal for a planning grant and the request came before the Board of Trustees in July. The Board approved the planning grant. The Board made it clear that they were not approving initiation of GRO-Kids and retained the right to reject the final arrangements, including those relating to administrative structure, that would be proposed by GRO-Kids in the fall of 1973. GRO-Kids promised a final proposal on administrative structure by November 1, 1973. During the summer of 1973 GRO-Kids proceeded to rent temporary space and planned for the initiation of an after-school program to be conducted in the fall semester as a first step toward full operation.

Negotiations on the GRO-Kids initiative continued throughout the second year of the demonstration. Late in 1973, Senate Bill 600, the voucher-enabling legislation, was passed by the California legislature and signed into law, including a provision that any decision related to a voucher demonstration program is a "proper subject" for meeting and conferring with the district's Certificated Employees Council (CEC). Under this provision, Superintendent Jefferds has given the CEC substantial authority in establishing the ground rules for participation by private schools. During meetings with the Superintendent in December 1973, the CEC presented a list of conditions to which any private school entering the demonstration would have to adhere. These conditions, which the district accepted, would make the private schools operate under essentially the same conditions as public schools: private school salaries and staffing ratios would be the same as in the Alum Rock district; private schools would be required to provide the same fringe benefits as public schools; private school teachers would have to be certified by the State of California. In addition, the CEC would have to approve all waivers (of State Education Code provisions) sought by private schools and a limit would be set on the total number of students who could enroll in the private schools.

Under these terms, the Alum Rock Board of Trustees voted on January 29, 1974 to allow GRO-Kids to enter the voucher demonstration. GRO-Kids, which has been operating a full-time "freedom" school for a handful of children, hopes to open for regular enrollment in the fall of 1974. A description of the GRO-Kids program will be included in the information packet to be given to voucher parents in the spring of 1974.

A number of problems still stand in the way of GRO-Kids' opening a school as part of the demonstration, however. While the district has applied to become an SB 600 district, there are a number of unresolved legal questions surrounding implementation of SB 600. GRO-Kids is also having difficulty obtaining funds for rent and renovation of classroom space.

Thus GRO-Kids' future in Alum Rock is still up in the air. Even if it does become part of the demonstration, it is clear that the restrictions placed upon its operation will make it less of a "nonpublic" alternative than its originators had hoped it would be.

EXPANSION OF THE DEMONSTRATION

Alum Rock's first-year agreement with OEO had included a commitment "to expand the program to include approximately 8,000 to 10,000 students during the second year, if the demonstration is successful." Thus, for both district management and federal officials, a crucial test of the success of the first year of the demonstration was the willingness of additional schools to join. As in the first year of the demonstration, school faculties would vote on the question of participation. Although the Superintendent strongly favored expansion, he refrained from pressuring specific schools to join.

Between December 1972 and March 1973, at a time when the original participants were still grappling with first-year implementation problems, the effort to obtain additional voucher schools was under way. The district's major teacher organization, the Alum Rock Educators Association, although somewhat concerned about the problems and extra work that the demonstration had caused for teachers, maintained an official neutrality. The group's president, however, was personally favorable toward the Alum Rock voucher model and sought (unsuccessfully) to persuade the school at which he taught to join the demonstration.

Although the six voucher principals had strong private reservations about the desirability of expansion (partly because it would probably dilute the effectiveness of their own group in determining demonstration policy), they cooperated in the effort to inform nonvoucher schools about the benefits and potential difficulties of participation. Their public presentations to other schools tended to be provoucher. Along with the central voucher staff, principals and teachers from the demonstration schools devoted considerable energy to talking with staff members from nonvoucher schools that were considering joining the demonstration.

As had been the case with the entrance into the demonstration of the first six schools, the principals in nonvoucher schools were prime movers in the expansion process. Because of the attention the voucher schools had received from both district staff and news media, some nonvoucher principals and teachers were beginning to feel like "second-class citizens" in the district. Some nonvoucher principals were attracted to the demonstration by the prospect of membership in the voucher principals' group, which projected an image of strength, independence, and innovativeness, and which met frequently with the Superintendent and central staff. To many nonvoucher principals, the demonstration represented a new challenge, a chance for their schools to become truly "decentralized," which is considered a mark of managerial excellence in Alum Rock.

There was also the attraction of voucher funds. With the almost certain prospect of severe reductions in Title I funding in 1973, the district's five Title I schools were actively searching for replacement funds. And unlike Title I funds, voucher funds did not require parent advisory committee approval of budgets. Each of the five Title I schools gave vouchers serious consideration and all but one applied for the demonstration.

For a variety of reasons, then, most nonvoucher principals urged their staffs to join the demonstration. Our estimate is that 12 of 16 principals did so. (There were 18 nonvoucher schools in the spring of 1973, but one principal was retiring and another was on medical leave.)

As it turned out, the monetary incentive for schools to join the demonstration was greatly diminished at the end of the first year. The California legislature had passed a new tax-relief and school financing act, Senate Bill 90, which, among other provisions, allocated additional funds for school districts with large numbers of poor, migrant, or bilingual children. Alum Rock qualified for $1,162,000 of these so-called SB 90 "disadvantaged" funds. A number of possible schemes for intradistrict allocation of thse funds were considered, and it was finally decided (in large part at the Superintendent's urging) to concentrate them in schools that do not receive voucher or other federal funds. This policy of keeping so-called "extra" funds in balance among schools effectively removes the strictly monetary incentive for schools to join the demonstration.[7] It was also decided that students eligible for compensatory vouchers in the Title I schools which joined the demonstration would receive "discounted" vouchers, worth the difference between their per-student Title I allocation and the standard compensatory voucher.

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[7] While this policy was not officially determined until the end of the 1972-73 school year, it appears that it may have been in effect during that year. Per pupil allocations to voucher schools from regular district funds during 1972-73 were generally lower than those to nonvoucher schools. When all school funds (including compensatory voucher funds and funds from other federal programs) are used to calculate per student expenditures by school for 1972-73, however, voucher schools generally rank slightly below Title I nonvoucher schools in expenditures but above the other nonvoucher schools. (See Technical Appendix V-C for details on per student expenditures by school.)

The district's policy of keeping funds in balance among schools has advantages for the evaluation of the voucher demonstration, in that it largely eliminates the confounding factor of expenditures. That is, if voucher and nonvoucher schools spent roughly the same amount per student, one could have greater confidence in attributing differences in their performance to some aspect of the voucher mechanism, than if voucher schools spent considerably more per student than nonvoucher schools.

Nonvoucher teachers were attracted to the demonstration by the extra money, the increased autonomy for teachers, and the attention and publicity received by the voucher staffs. They also had their apprehensions: the prospects of considerable additional work, organization development (HRC) training, conflict and competition among mini-schools, requirements for greater teamwork among teachers within a mini-school, classroom crowding, and lessened job security.

Nonvoucher faculties held lengthy meetings, at which HRC representatives were present as facilitators, to discuss all the pros and cons of joining the demonstration. Since many teachers simply did not have well-formed opinions on vouchers, those discussions probably aided the expansion process. They gave teachers a chance to clarify their understanding of their colleagues' concerns and to develop confidence that, as a team, they could overcome potential problems. (The teachers' role in expanding the demonstration is discussed at greater length in Sec. VII.)

While most school decisions on joining the demonstration were made solely within the professional staff, there were a few exceptions. At one school, an active PTA successfully opposed joining the demonstration on the grounds that it was of doubtful value to the education of children. A leader of that school's PTA was subsequently elected to the district's Board of Trustees, but vouchers were apparently not a key issue in the campaign. At two other schools, groups of parents, drawn in part from the leadership of Title I parent advisory committees, successfully applied pressure on school faculties to join the demonstration. At one of those schools it appeared that the principal had privately urged the provoucher parental pressure.

Parents were also active in the complex fight over vouchers at the largest middle school in the district. A majority of the faculty at that school had voted for vouchers but had failed to achieve the two-thirds majority vote they had decided upon as needed for passage. Subsequently, a delegation of a dozen parents from a voucher elementary school visited a faculty meeting and declared that they wanted to be able to send their children to a voucher middle school. The faculty reconsidered and turned in a two-thirds vote in favor of vouchers.

The most massive expression of provoucher parent opinion in the expansion process was a petition signed by four hundred parents asking that the district's newly constructed middle school, scheduled to open in the fall of 1973, be declared a voucher school. Most of these signatures came from parents in the original six voucher schools. That petition was opposed by a smaller group of antivoucher parents from two nonvoucher elementary schools. In a compromise fashioned by the Superintendent, the new middle school was excluded from the demonstration but another middle school joined instead.

Thus, in five nonvoucher schools parent participation significantly affected decisions concerning expansion. At the 13 other nonvoucher schools there was little, if any, parent participation in such decisions.

When all the votes had been taken, seven more schools had decided to join the demonstration, increasing the total number of schools from 6 to 13, and of mini-schools from 22 to 45.

The schools that did not join the demonstration can be roughly divided into three categories:

- Schools where the principal was provoucher but staff dissension was so severe that teachers did not want to attempt to work more closely with their colleagues, as the mini-school system requires.
- Schools where the principal was provoucher but there was parent resistance to the proposal.

- Schools where the principal and staff felt they already "had a good thing going" without vouchers or where other sources of outside funding were readily at hand.

In addition, one school with a small faculty applied to join the demonstration as a one-program building, but was turned down after EVAC recommended that each participating school be required to offer a minimum of two programs.

FACTORS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION

Conflict Management

During the first year of the voucher demonstration, the Alum Rock District implemented a major innovation quite quickly, and without chaos or unmanageable conflict. Although there was persistent and even bitter divisiveness between voucher principals and voucher staff, the conflict never became an issue in the larger community of participants. Nor was it ever openly raised before the Board of Trustees. Aside from this conflict, the demonstration survived the first year with little more than sporadic complaints of parents and teachers.

The relative peace that settled on the demonstration may seem a trifle surprising, since as recently as the spring of 1971 the proposed demonstration had stirred considerable opposition among both community groups and school professionals. The factors that accounted for the lack of public controversy during the first year are therefore of considerable interest.

First, the voucher demonstration did not become a target for groups within the community. The lack of intervention by "outside" parent groups is not surprising, because there are few of them and they tend to be small and not highly organized. Further, groups in the minority community were largely reassured at the beginning of the demonstration when Chicanos and blacks were selected for positions on the voucher staff. And subsequently it became clear that parents were viewing the demonstration either indifferently or in a modestly supportive way.

The removal from the demonstration of a potentially explosive element—the possible participation of private and religious schools—also helped avoid controversy. So did the absence of racial and ethnic segregation, which had been an issue of considerable interest to groups such as the NAACP.

The lack of aggressive local media coverage meant that conflicts that did arise, as in the case of internal evaluation and parent counseling, were not given wide public exposure. Moreover, the news media's attention was largely positive, perhaps partly because of the virtual absence of local critics. In turn, national attention aroused local pride in the demonstration.

Parents and teachers also sensed that, regardless of problems of implementation, the district had nothing to lose and much to gain. Student achievement scores were already low, and the extra federal money being awarded for vouchers "could do no harm and might do some good."

Also, unlike teacher organizations in other districts where voucher demonstrations have been proposed, the Alum Rock Educators Association has not opposed the transition model nor has it sought to focus special attention upon problems of implementation. Rather, AREA has relied on the collective negotiation process, and the cooperative relationship between the Superintendent and AREA leadership, as their safeguard against any adverse consequence for their membership. The much smaller local AFT unit has adopted a similarly noncombative posture toward the demonstration.

In general, the absence of other major controversies in Alum Rock has meant that adversaries in other struggles have not been tempted to seize upon and enlarge conflict within the demonstration as a means of bringing pressure against the Board of Trustees and the Superintendent.

Particular credit for conflict management belongs to Superintendent Jefferds. Strongly committed to the need for organizational change, he deftly met and defused a number of pressures that might have engendered broad conflict. Minority people were hired for the voucher staff; policies on evaluation and student transfers were worked out in conjunction with principals; a compromise was engineered between OEO and the principals concerning the value of compensatory vouchers; when nonvoucher school sentiment ran high against HRC training as a prerequisite for joining the demonstration, the requirement was relaxed; when voucher staff members forcefully protested their lack of control over evaluation, the Superintendent quietly took up their cause with the principals. His ability to manage and contain controversies was unquestionably central to the successful conflict management witnessed in the district during the first year of the demonstration.

Organization Development Efforts

A key technique in the Superintendent's management of the demonstration has been the use of the Center for Human Resources and Organizational Development (HRC), a private organization development consulting firm, to facilitate change among the district's staff. The Superintendent considered HRC not only a valuable tool for improving staff communication and cooperation, but a valuable source of information for himself concerning emerging issues and intergroup tensions within the district.

Organization development stresses the desirability of participative decisionmaking and honest communication within an organization. It attempts to create a climate in which employees can reveal their attitudes about organizational change and contribute to the decisionmaking process. The goal of participative decisionmaking is to develop in employees a sense of "ownership" of the goals of the intended organizational change, so that they will support, rather than subvert, decisions for change. The techniques of organization development are not dissimilar to, and are sometimes borrowed from, the fields of personal counseling and group therapy.

HRC consultants have worked extensively with all levels of the professional staff in Alum Rock. Before entering the demonstration, school staffs have been required to undergo HRC training. HRC representatives consult with the Superintendent, and participate in two different types of meetings in the district.

First, HRC conducts special workshops that bring school personnel together for training in interpersonal communication. These sessions are often long (two or three days) and are sometimes held at resort locations outside of the district. Second, HRC consultants also attend a wide variety of meetings involving school professionals in the district (e.g., administrative staff meetings, school faculty meetings) that are convened to consider normal school district business.

In both types of meetings, HRC aims at "bringing things into the open," the airing of personal feelings and opinions on issues and personalities. Specific techniques for listening and agenda-building are taught. HRC consultants lead the groups in interpersonal "games" at sessions in which, for example, colleagues may openly express and explain their likes and dislikes, trust or mistrust, of each other. If the participants are sufficiently open and candid, the presumption is that the combination of catharsis and the rare experience of finding out what their peers truly think of them will enhance both individual and organizational well-being.

HRC proved to be a significant source of controversy. Its activities were viewed with enthusiasm by most administrators, especially the Superintendent and voucher principals, but with mixed feelings by the voucher teachers. As already noted, the prospect of HRC training made some nonvoucher teachers wary about joining the demonstration.

HRC apparently helped to excite the professional staff about the demonstration, and thereby helped generate the energy necessary for implementation. For some veteran central office administrators and for some teachers, HRC proved helpful in building acceptance for organizational change and in fostering cooperative personal relations. In part, HRC's effect was due to the unprecedented opportunity it gave staff to escape their everyday routine and discuss common problems and anxieties. The mere designation of certain staff members to receive training identified them as potential change agents, and may have motivated them to attempt to live up to that role.

The theory and techniques of organization development have both numerous advocates and critics. It seems reasonable to believe that HRC intervention helped "facilitate" the demonstration, at least for the first six schools, by aiding in the development of staff acceptance and excitement. However, HRC did this at the possible cost of some questionable consequences for individual participants and the organization as a whole. For example, questions arose over the degree to which people should be urged to expose their innermost views and feelings within the context of and for the sake of organization development. Further, there is no clear dividing line between group persuasion and group coercion of dissident or undecided members.

Whether or not the HRC process invades privacy is a matter of interpretation. Theoretically it does not, because participants in meetings are free to leave or to withhold thoughts and feelings. In reality, however, the group often places heavy pressure on people to "open up."

One of the more discussed issues in organization development concerns the "depth" or intensiveness of intervention that is desirable or necessary to solve organizational problems. Practitioners of organization development techniques appear to reject such emotionally charged devices as "encounter groups" and "sensitivity training." HRC representatives have maintained that their training is oriented to the solution of organizational problems, not personal therapy. Yet it must be reported that, on occasion, HRC consultants either promoted highly emotional interpersonal encounters or failed to intervene when groups moved in such directions even when the issues involved were only remotely related to the organization. The tendency to urge or countenance such confrontation varied considerably among the handful of HRC consultants who were active within the demonstration.

Some district staff, including some mini-school faculties, thought that HRC training helped them to overcome interpersonal barriers to change, to reach more honest decisions in their groups, and in general to work more effectively together. Other district staff, especially some teachers, regarded the training as manipulative, in that it was required for participation in the demonstration and caused them to do things they would not have done if HRC had not been present. They felt that, in many instances, HRC sessions exacerbated, rather than alleviated, interpersonal problems.

In some sense all organizational management can be regarded as a form of manipulation. The HRC process can be used to stifle dissent because it places so high a premium on group cohesion and generates a climate in which those accepted in the group have a high emotional stake in not dissenting from group consensus. Thus, while the process, as advertised, facilitates initial expression of divergent opinion, it makes it hard for people to stick with those opinions if the group, or the most vocal faction of the group, disagrees. Furthermore, it is at least possible that outside consultants might report people's candidly expressed opinions to their superiors. There is no evidence of that happening in Alum Rock, but the possibility of abuse raises the question of control over the process.

Although the President of HRC always maintained that his firm's client was the entire "client system" (the total district staff), it seems likely that HRC had incentives to be more responsive to some segments of the client system than to others. For example, HRC reported to, and was subject to direction from, the Superintendent. Further, because principals were in a position to purchase HRC services for their own schools and to charge such services to a centralized federal fund that supported HRC services, it was very much in HRC's financial interest to remain on good terms with the principals. On the other hand, teachers generally lacked effective control over the extent of their involvement in HRC's activities. When the Superintendent advocated placing HRC support funds in school site budgets so that teachers would be able to exercise discretion over the nature and extent of the training services they receive, HRC representatives objected and argued that, given an option, teachers would "under-purchase" HRC services. In short, the level of HRC activities has been controlled largely by the Superintendent and the principals. No one was charged with providing district management with an independent assessment concerning the impact of HRC's intervention upon the central staff, voucher staff, site administrators, and teachers. HRC therefore retained considerable autonomy in conducting and evaluating its own work.

Because of his strong and persistent work with the voucher principals, one HRC consultant became identified with their views, to the point that he began to champion their point of view in meetings where disagreements were aired. In part, this led to the rejection of HRC training by the voucher staff. In effect, this consultant had become an active part of the organization's political system. Members of the central staff recognized the problem, and steps were taken later to correct it.

HRC's intervention appeared to contribute to the conflict between voucher staff and principals. As the principals drew closer together, in part through their joint HRC training, the communication gap between them and the voucher staff grew. Previous research on organization development in schools suggests that such polarization often occurs when the training is not closely tied to a task-oriented product, as sometimes appeared to be the case in Alum Rock.

Collective Parent Participation

The transition model voucher proposal provided that: "The community will participate actively in the operation and governance of the transitional voucher demonstration. Individual schools and programs will encourage parental participation at a meaningful level in their respective decisionmaking processes." This commitment to community participation was in keeping with previous district moves to involve parents in decisionmaking even before the demonstration, and echoed OEO's traditional emphasis on community involvement in poverty programs. Collective parent participation, however, is not a crucial element of voucher theory.

According to voucher theory, parental control over schools would derive from each parent's right to choose his or her child's school. Parents would have the option of "voting with their feet"—of removing their children and their tuition vouchers from any school with which they were dissatisfied. It is predicted that schools would therefore become more responsive to parent's wishes. Collective rights to influence a school's decisions—through the voting or advisory process—might be considered less crucial to parents in a voucher situation than in one where they have no choice about which school their child will attend.

While not directly derived from voucher theory, however, rights of collective parent participation are certainly consistent with the voucher model. In fact, the voucher marketplace model would predict their development, if a substantial number of parents desired them. If no parents in the system desired significant levels of participation or control, no school (or mini-school, in the case of Alum Rock) would need offer them, to attract voucher income, though some might develop them as a matter of educational philosophy. On the other hand, if some parents sought greater levels of participation and control, at least some schools or mini-schools could be expected to offer them, in order to gain a competitive advantage with those parents. If all parents in the system required them as a condition of enrolling their children, each school or mini-school would have to offer them in order to survive economically. All schools, of course, could probably be expected to encourage some level of parental inputs (if only the traditional parent-teacher contacts—open houses and PTA meetings) in order to continually monitor the satisfaction of their clientele. From the parents' standpoint, there would probably be considerable incentive to try to influence a child's school in desired directions, rather than seek a new school at each dissatisfaction, since transfers may be time-consuming and disruptive to the child.

As we noted, though, the Alum Rock transition voucher model specifically chose to require community participation in the operation and governance of the demonstration, rather than leave this question to the natural marketplace forces that might develop. As it turned out, however, the realization of this provision depended largely on those factors we have been discussing: the interest of mini-schools in providing such opportunities and, perhaps most important, the interest of parents in exercising them.

In keeping with the provision of the proposal, a variety of mechanisms were established at the mini-school, school, and demonstration levels, to allow for community participation. A number of mini-schools organized parent advisory groups, but in most cases these groups played virtually no role in school decisions. Some teachers complained that they had established such boards for their mini-schools but later dissolved them for want of parental interest. Some parent counselors charged that many teachers' invitations for parental participation were pro forma, not sincere, but they too recognized the lack of interest on the part of parents as a problem. They felt, however, that teachers should work harder to develop the parental interest and confidence required for participation. It does seem that the few instances where parent advisory boards did play an active role were in those mini-schools which valued parental participation as a part of their educational philosophy and made special efforts to facilitate it. Of course, it may be that the parents who were attracted to these programs were the ones who were more likely to be active in the first place.

Our observations and discussions with demonstration and school staff indicate that the first year of the voucher demonstration brought no marked increase in parent participation in school governance.[*] This would seem to be attributable both to the school staffs and the parents themselves. Many school personnel seemed ambivalent at best about empowering parents to make decisions on curriculum, personnel, and budgets. Alum Rock parents, on the other hand, for the most part did not push for such power. This seeming apathy probably resulted from a variety

[*] It should be noted that many mini-schools used some of their discretionary funds to hire aides from the community, which represents another form of increased parental involvement in the schools.

of factors, including many parents' own lack of education, time, organizational experience, and their traditional pattern of leaving educational matters to the professionals. A federal voucher official has likened the relationship between most Alum Rock parents and the schools under the demonstration to that between patient and doctor or client and attorney: the consumer chooses someone he feels is capable to serve him, and then leaves the actual conduct of the work to the professional.

Given the number of obstacles in a poor community like Alum Rock, development of parental participation is likely to be a slow process, if it occurs at all. We observed that those parents who successfully applied pressure to nonvoucher school faculties to join the demonstration were drawn in part from the leadership of Title I parent advisory committees. Federal regulations governing Title I funds require that local parent committees approve school budgets. Over the years, Title I parents have learned of their rights and have developed organizational skills.

Similarly, parent participation in voucher schools may develop over time. For example, at the end of the first year, there were notable efforts by parents of elementary school children in the demonstration to assure inclusion of additional middle schools, so that their children could continue in the demonstration. In the second year of the demonstration the Alum Rock Board of Trustees has mandated the establishment of parent advisory boards at all schools in the district (voucher and nonvoucher), and there do appear to be signs of increasing parental activity within voucher schools and mini-schools.

At the demonstration level, the Education Voucher Advisory Committee (EVAC), which consisted of one parent and one teacher representative appointed (usually by the principal) from each voucher school, was created to advise the Superintendent and Board on matters concerning the demonstration. Yet, for a variety of reasons, EVAC proved to be largely ineffective in resolving voucher-related issues. It met only once a month and its members' grasp of the issues was limited. The principals had succeeded in persuading the project director (who presided over EVAC meetings for the first year) not to "stimulate" EVAC activity, because they regarded it as a threat to decentralization of authority in the district, and were dubious about empowering a group half made up of parents to decide school policy. Consequently, EVAC was not privy to much of the debate that led to important compromises on such issues as parent counseling and evaluation.

Procedures affecting EVAC have been revised in the second year. Its teacher and parent representatives are now elected by school staffs and parents, respectively. It has been given authority over the allocation of additional funds for temporary instructional space and a budget to finance workshops on improving school-community relations. These steps have been taken with the avowed aim of giving EVAC a substantive role to play.

CONCLUSION

The "market" aspects of the voucher demonstration were substantially modified and compromised during implementation to make it acceptable to local administrators, teachers, and parents. OEO voucher officials were dismayed by many of these compromises, but since Alum Rock was the only district in the nation willing to undertake a demonstration, federal officials were able to exert only weak influence upon the process of implementation.

Weakness also characterized the position of the central voucher staff in Alum Rock, an organizational unit whose views on the appropriate rules for the demonstration closely paralleled those of OEO. One source of difficulty in this respect may have been the vesting within the central voucher staff of both the responsibility for operational questions (such as public information, on-going relations with the Federal Government, and creation of new administrative procedures) and the responsibility for conducting an "independent" evaluation. With respect to operational questions, the voucher staff must maintain close cooperation with voucher school staffs, and even serve as their spokesmen on occasion. With respect to evaluation, they are expected to maintain an arms-length and even critical stance regarding the schools. The combination of such responsibilities in one staff unit has created internal contradictions and has hindered both operations and evaluation.

Implementation has caused no serious disruption within the local school district organization. One reason may be that the changes in resource allocation and in other aspects of school operation have been less than revolutionary. The changes are nonetheless real. The next section explores the implications of one of the most important of these innovations, the mini-school.

V. THE MINI-SCHOOL EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS

This section describes the educational programs offered by the 22 mini-schools in the 1972-73 school year.

KEY FINDINGS

1. Mini-schools offered parents choices both as to academic emphasis and instructional strategy. Mini-schools departed from pre-demonstration instructional practice to varying degrees: some continued traditional approaches, supplemented by new materials; others sought to implement more innovative approaches, such as ungraded classrooms or open classrooms.
2. Teachers in the voucher demonstration were largely responsible for setting their own goals and organizing their mini-schools, for deciding how to spend money and plan future expenditures, and for implementing their own programs.
3. We classified the programs into five types, reflecting academic emphases: Basic Skills—General, Basic Skills—Specific, Fine Arts, Multicultural, and Activity Centered. Fifty-one percent of the students were enrolled in 11 Basic Skills—General programs; 21 percent in 4 Activity-Centered programs; 13 percent in 3 Basic Skills—Specific programs; 9 percent in 2 Multicultural programs; and 6 percent in 2 Fine Arts programs.
4. Of the 126 classrooms in the voucher demonstration, 85 had some combination of grade levels. In 9 mini-schools all classes were multiple-grade. A natural consequence was that individualized instruction became an important instructional strategy.
5. Fifteen of the 22 programs emphasized individualized instruction. In general, greater individualization was associated with the Basic Skills programs.
6. On the average, mini-schools budgeted about 60 percent of their compensatory voucher funds for instructional materials and about 15 percent for classroom aides. Patterns of planned expenditures varied considerably among the mini-schools, however.
7. Although changes were made in many programs during the course of the school year, in no case was the basic program changed from that described to parents in the spring of 1972.

INTRODUCTION

During the formative stages of the voucher demonstration, Alum Rock parents were more concerned with their children's right to attend their neighborhood school than with increased choice (see Sec. III). To preserve that right and yet assure that there would be options, the Alum Rock voucher design required each school to offer alternative programs. Because the 6 voucher schools reorganized into 22 mini-schools, it would seem on the surface that parents did in fact have more choices available. But number of programs should not necessarily be equated with diversity of educational choices. All 22 programs could, for example, have offered the same curriculum, implemented in the same way, in which case the only choices available to parents would be either some school they preferred or some teacher they knew about. However, the Alum Rock voucher demonstration did offer distinct choices to parents. This section delineates the nature and extent of those choices.

In 1971-72 there were 19 elementary schools and 6 middle schools in the Alum Rock Union Elementary School District. Students had little choice of school and virtually no choice within schools. Almost all students attended the school serving their residential area. Special programs such as Title I (compensatory education) or Title VII (bilingual education) of the federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) were carried out as part of the schools' existing administrative structure, under the principals' supervision.

Before the voucher demonstration started, most schools apparently followed the state-mandated curriculum. Voucher teachers often said that they now had freedom to choose instructional materials with which to implement their programs, and frequently referred to their new need to find out what instructional materials were available. We can say little about the 1972-73 nonvoucher schools because we did not monitor them during the school year. But we have no reason to believe that the nonvoucher schools were qualitatively different from the district as a whole before the voucher system was implemented.

In contrast, in 1972-73 we found parents of the 6 voucher schools choosing educational programs from among 22 mini-schools. Each mini-school was a separate organizational entity, with its own leader or coordinator and its own educational perspective. Table 5.1 shows the available choices by grade within mini-schools. Not every mini-school was open to children of every grade level. One mini-school, for example, was kindergarten only and one was seventh grade only. Depending on a child's grade level, parents could choose from as few as 4 to as many as 16 mini-schools. Children in grades three through five had 16 options, whereas eighth-grade children had only 4 mini-schools to choose from.

To document the voucher demonstration's educational offerings for 1972-73, we gathered information in several ways. Meetings were held in the spring with each mini-school faculty to discuss instructional aspects of the program. In conjunction with the spring meetings, each mini-school faculty completed Rand-provided forms which requested information (see Technical Appendix V-A for a copy of these forms). In addition, two Rand staff members conducted classroom observation, spending half a day in most classrooms and one class period in a few others.

Although classroom observation is generally used to relate teacher or student behavior to educational outcomes, this was not our aim. We were only trying to document the educational offerings available in the voucher demonstration. The observation was primarily carried out to insure that the descriptions parents received were congruent with the programs as actually implemented, and to gather data about the degree of diversity existing among the voucher programs. We did this by observing briefly in almost all classrooms rather than observing extensively in some of them. A checklist was used to record information about observed classroom activities, instructional strategies, grouping practices, and use of materials. (A copy of the checklist used is provided in Technical Appendix V-B). Information gathered from informal discussions with teachers during observation was also recorded. Since there are 175 instructional days in the school year, half a day spent in a classroom cannot tell us very much; it can only support information gained from other sources. Nevertheless, it is a practical way to capture the flavor of a program.

Classroom visits were never a surprise; they were scheduled in advance, and teachers could refuse permission to visit their classrooms. If a teacher was absent, the substitute was never observed. Of the 126 classrooms in the voucher demonstration, 103 were observed. Only four teachers refused us permission to observe. As for the other 19 classrooms, either the regular classroom teacher was not present when the Rand observers visited the mini-school or the class was away on a field trip.

Table 5.1

EDUCATIONAL CHOICES AVAILABLE, BY GRADE AT MINI-SCHOOLS, 1972-73

School and Mini-school	Grade									Grades Available	Number of Classrooms
	K	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8		
Cassell											
Cultural Arts		x	x	x	x	x	x			1-6	5
Daily Living		x	x	x	x	x	x			1-6	6
Traditional Plus		x	x	x	x	x	x			1-6	7
Kindergarten	x									K	4
Goss											
Activity-Centered	x	x	x	x	x	x	x			K-6	10
7th Grade School								x		7	3
Developmental Reading	x	x	x	x	x	x	x			K-6	9
McCollam											
Traditional	x	x	x	x	x	x				K-5	6
Enrichment				x	x	x				3-5	3
Continuous Progress	x	x	x	x	x	x				K-5	6
Individualized	x	x	x	x	x	x				K-5	6
Meyer											
Basic Skills	x	x	x	x	x	x	x			K-6	12
Sullivan BRL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x			K-6	5
Fine Arts	x	x	x	x	x	x	x			K-6	4
School 2000	x	x	x	x	x	x	x			K-6	4
Miller											
Individualized	x	x	x	x	x	x	x			K-6	6
Multicultural	x	x	x	x	x	x	x			K-6	7
Academic	x	x	x	x	x	x	x			K-6	5
Pala											
Three R's Plus							x	x	x	6-8	6
Creative Arts							x	x	x	6-8	7
Fine Arts							x	x	x	6-8	3
Math/Science							x	x	x	6-8	2
Total	13	15	15	16	16	16	16	5	4		126

After each program had been observed, a preliminary description of the program was written. Program goals were taken from the mini-schools' own descriptions that had been sent to parents in the spring of 1972. The rest of the descriptions were developed from the checklists used during observation, and from informal discussions with teachers during the days of classroom observation. Copies of the preliminary descriptions of their programs were sent to mini-school faculty members, together with forms requesting additional information.

The series of meetings held with mini-school faculties in the spring provided an opportunity to review these preliminary descriptions with the teachers and update them where necessary. We raised some general factual questions with all mini-schools, (e.g., the number of aides used in the program and the program's use of community resources). Other questions were specific to a program, touching on such areas as individualized instruction, use of "contracts," or other strategies adopted to meet instructional objectives. Mini-school faculties did not know in advance what topics would be covered. We felt that responses were frank and honest in these informal group discussions in which teacher responses were sharpened by the contributions of their colleagues; and we believe that the information obtained was reasonably accurate.

After the spring meeting we wrote a second program description, incorporating changes and including documentation of field trips, major instructional materials used in reading and arithmetic, special projects, allocation of instructional time by subject, and major program changes between September 1972 and June 1973. A third and final description was then written for each mini-school program to provide a summary record of major program characteristics for the first year of the voucher demonstration in Alum Rock. Three examples of these summary descriptions are presented below.

WHAT ARE MINI-SCHOOLS LIKE?

Before discussing the results of our analysis—describing similarities and differences among programs—we will describe how a few mini-schools operated, to give a more concrete picture of what happened. Since we did not observe prevoucher or nonvoucher schools, we cannot compare them with the mini-schools. These are simply our impressions based on some classroom observation and discussions with school faculties.

Many teachers were excited by the opportunity to plan and implement their own programs and to try things they had always wanted to try. They admitted that the price was high—long hours ferreting out new material and devising new classroom lessons, plus coordinating their activities with those of the other teachers in the mini-school. Nevertheless, they felt it was worth the effort and they enjoyed their new responsibilities. But others gave us the impression that they were completely untouched by the voucher experience. Although they were doing the same things they had always done, they now had to devote extra hours to meetings, which they resented. Our impressions of teacher attitudes were consistent with the results of the teacher surveys reported in Sec. VII.

Most of the classrooms seemed to be relatively free, the atmosphere being perhaps best described as conducive to work. Students were often working individually on their own assignments or contracts and moved freely about the room to consult references or get help. Teachers often circulated among the students, helping them as needed or checking their work. All classrooms were not alike of course; teachers have different tolerances for bustle and activity. But, by and large, the atmosphere in the classrooms was pleasant, and the students were friendly and tolerant of our visits. Many would come talk to us while we were in the classrooms, and when we returned to the school on another occasion, they waved and said hello. They were not constantly aware of participating in an educational demonstration, but went about the business of going to school like any other group of children.

The following summary descriptions of three representative mini-schools were developed through the process of classroom observation and discussions with teachers described above. Each program has its own special features, and these three were not selected because of special superiority or inferiority to others, but only to give some indication of the range of program characteristics. The program goals cited in the first paragraph of each description are drawn from the mini-schools' self-descriptions, distributed to parents in the spring of 1972.

Fine Arts: Meyer School

The program aims at promoting self-understanding, basic learning skills, awareness of likes and differences, creative expression, and the concept of aesthetic values as integral parts of students' lives.

Arts and crafts activities are a major feature of the Fine Arts program. During the first part of each month, students choose projects to work on; for the rest of the month they develop the particular art or dramatic project they have chosen. Some of the projects that have been included are weaving, sculpture, collage, decoupage, puppetry, drama (plays), dance, candlemaking, model houses, papier mache, watercolor paintings, and making Christmas ornaments and replicas of tree houses. Students had fall and spring sales to sell some of their products and gain additional funds for other program activities. The arts and crafts periods have been interwoven with academic instruction to some extent. For example, students have written stories about the projects they are working on.

Part-time instructional aides assist with reading and math in each classroom. Parents have helped with arts and crafts activities, field trips, and math. A speech therapist is available to the program for 5-6 hours each week and an EH teacher works with some students. A psychologist worked with some classes for several days; in addition to testing, the psychologist assisted students with group meetings and role playing. A reading specialist was also available to the program. In addition to working with groups of students, this teacher supervises and coordinates reading tutors. A number of cross-grade tutors assist students with reading and art.

The program uses Sullivan materials, and in the primary grades DISTAR. In math Sullivan materials are supplemented by Neufeld blocks.

All children in the program went to the Oakland Museum, to Marine World, and to the beach. In addition, the second and third grades went to the fire station and the fourth grade to San Juan Bautista.

Individualized Learning: Miller School

The program encourages development of individual creativity and the improvement of self-image; it is based on the view that teachers' acceptance of students and of individual and group activities will decrease students' fear of failure, thereby enhancing respect for self and others. The program also attempts to help students learn to use and care for materials.

Students work primarily on an individual basis in the upper grades. In the lower grades students are given more guidance by the teacher so that they can be prepared for the additional responsibility and tasks they will need to perform in later grades. Staggered arrival times are used in reading and math classes in the lower grades (K-3) to promote more individualized instruction.

Contracts are used extensively in the upper grades. Teachers have assembled individual work packets based on observation and tests administered at the beginning of the year. Students work at their own pace on the contracts and are allowed to sequence the order in which they will do their work each day. If they wish, students can also use equipment in the learning centers or activity centers in each room (games, filmstrips, phonograph, art supplies). An environment wherein the teacher acts as a manager of learning experience is created. In most classes, students receive some form of recognition or reward when they complete a contract and are encouraged toward self-recognition for their accomplishments.

An aide spends an hour in each classroom daily, working with students who need help with reading. Student tutors from a local high school come to the school twice a week for twenty-minute tutoring sessions with students. Cross-grade tutoring is also used. In addition, a student teacher assisted in the kindergarten classroom.

A large variety of instructional materials is used in reading, including most of the state texts, DISTAR, the Lippincott series, and the SRA materials. Math also makes use of many materials in addition to state texts, including SRA, Sullivan Programmed Math, and Scott Foresman Math Games.

All classes went on an all-day school picnic, bowling, and to the San Francisco Zoo. Field trips for the lower grades included the Junior Museum of Science, the post office, and the fire station. Students in the upper grades went to the Pinnacles National Monument and on an overnight camping trip. Special projects included multicultural activities such as a black-history assembly and Mexican and Indian weaving as well as a kite day, a magic show, a puppet show, and a reading contest.

Traditional: McCollam School

The aim is to help students develop a good self-image, self-discipline, and respect for one another, teachers, and the total school community. They will also learn to tolerate individual differences and will develop a love of learning and willingness to achieve.

The program concentrates on developing an academic curriculum in the basic subjects. Group activity experience along with a highly structured traditional approach to education is provided.

Two part-time instructional aides rotate among the classrooms, spending one hour in each classroom daily. A work-study student from a local college assists with bilingual education several hours each week, and a graduate student presents math logic classes to fifth-graders several days a week; this is part of Project SEED developed at Berkeley. A music teacher is available to the program on a rotating basis and a speech therapist works as necessary with students in the program. A high school tutor and a Share student have worked in the program, and several parents have assisted in a number of classrooms.

On Fridays students participated in an Interest Day that lasted for one period. They signed up for one of the activities offered: grooming, tumbling, boys' sports, girls' sports, small tools, art projects, folk dancing, puppet making, and stitchery. Every four weeks they signed up for a new activity. Interest Day was a joint undertaking with the Individualized Learning School.

In addition to state texts, SRA materials were used extensively in reading, and Economy Co. lessons supplemented the math program.

Major field trips included the Japanese Tea Garden, planetarium, aquarium, San Francisco Zoo, Mission San Juan Bautista, Oakland Zoo, and BART.

COMMON CHARACTERISTICS AMONG MOST MINI-SCHOOL PROGRAMS

To implement the mini-school concept, teachers needed to expand their planning and decisionmaking activities from the individual classroom to the mini-school.

New Patterns of Planning and Decisionmaking

As noted earlier, the teachers organizing each mini-school were required to write a description of the program. This was distributed to all parents participating in the demonstration before 1972-73 enrollment was opened up. It included statements about the program's educational philosophy, objectives, and governance, as well as information about planned class size, evaluation, communication with parents, and the extent to which parents were expected to participate in the educational process (a copy of the program description booklet is provided in Volume IV of this series, *Documentary Appendix*). This represents a departure from traditional public school procedures. To a great extent, the principal had been the focal point for decisionmaking, and teachers had greater or lesser degrees of autonomy in their own classrooms, depending largely on the principal's administrative style. The voucher demonstration has provided teachers with more responsibility for setting their own goals and organizing their mini-school: they generally decide how to spend money and plan future expenditures; and they also implement their own programs, with the consequent need for information about new educational materials.

By decentralizing decisionmaking, the demonstration led to conditions that supported an increased acceptance of principal and teacher accountability. Although accountability was not explicitly mentioned and obviously could not be observed, some teachers indicated that they felt more responsible for educational outcomes because they were implementing their own program. Many teachers, in fact, said that they felt like managers both of instruction and of the mini-school. They appeared to have assumed some managerial responsibilities, and looked to the principal for guidance rather than for direction.

To operate more autonomously, teachers spent more time on planning and also planned differently. They were most immediately aware of the increase in planning time, but the changes in planning style are more interesting because of their impact on instruction.

The nature of the planning changed from an emphasis on, say, third-grade reading and arithmetic to a concern with reading and arithmetic over all grades for the students in a specific mini-school. For the most part, mini-school planning takes advantage of teacher familiarity with a particular group of students. The teacher does not have to rely solely on last year's report and the student's cumulative record with its brief, often cryptic, comments. In the future, teachers are likely to know more about their students, at least those who remain in the same mini-school. For now, however, the advantage appears to lie in the teachers' ability to plan curricula that are tailored to the objectives of the mini-school and the achievement level of the students. If parents become aware of the benefits of an integrated curriculum sequence, the holding power of a mini-school may be increased.

As teachers became more actively involved in the planning process, they became aware of their need for new kinds of information, particularly about materials used in other schools, in Alum Rock or outside the district. Teachers did try to find out more, but often felt they needed additional help. One mini-school, for example, wanted to individualize instruction. In the early program planning stages it used as consultants teachers from a nonvoucher school who had considerable experience in individualizing instruction. By the end of the school year, the equipment and materials salesmen were seen with increasing frequency in the faculty rooms of the schools. Their appearance may have represented a combination of teacher requests for information and salesmen's awareness of teachers' new responsibilities and purchasing power. For the second year of the demonstration, the federal voucher grant included $35,000 to initiate a Professional Development Center, to help train teachers and familiarize them with new materials. This idea had been supported by both the Superintendent and the Alum Rock Educators Association.

The change in teacher roles was mirrored by the changing functions of principals. There was naturally some variation among schools, but a general trend emerged both in principals' relationships with the central staff and with the school staffs. These changes were stressful and involved both extra work for principals and a change in the nature of their work. As one voucher principal commented, the principals were no longer "autocrats" within their own schools; they had become "facilitators." Staff meetings in the schools, which in prior years had been formal briefings on announcements and new policies, turned into gatherings where principals and teachers jointly wrestled with defining and implementing new directions for the schools, sometimes in an emotional atmosphere. Rather than dealing with the problems of one faculty, principals found themselves confronted by the problems of three or four mini-school faculties. Each mini-school tended to call upon its principal and assistant principal for help with curriculum problems, purchasing problems, problems of community relations and relations among mini-schools.

Classroom Organization

The voucher demonstration brought about a major change in the way elementary schools allocated numbers of classrooms to grade levels. A traditional elementary school is considered an organizational unit, and adjusts to differences in the grade-level composition of its student body by adding or deleting classrooms as necessary. When the voucher demonstration made it necessary to house several mini-schools at a single site, it was not always possible to adhere to standard practice and assign only children from the same grade to a classroom. Furthermore, many mini-schools deliberately chose to combine grade levels in a classroom, even when there were enough children per grade to avoid multiple-grade classes.

Of the 126 classrooms in the voucher demonstration, 85 had some combination of grade levels, and in 9 mini-schools all classes were multiple-grade.

Individualized Instruction

Perhaps partly because of enforced multiple-grade classrooms, the demonstration gave rise to a good deal of individualized instruction, catering to the particular needs of individual students. A more important element probably was the fact that more resources and more freedom of action gave teachers a chance to tailor programs to the diversity of student needs. Individualization of instruction is a very broad idea, however, and we describe below how its application varied among programs.

DIFFERENTIATING CHARACTERISTICS AMONG MINI-SCHOOL PROGRAMS

Instructional Orientation

To highlight differences and similarities among them, we grouped the 22 mini-schools by instructional orientation. Five such groupings were identified:

1. Basic Skills—General
2. Basic Skills—Specific
3. Fine Arts
4. Multicultural
5. Activity-Centered

These groupings were developed by reviewing our program observation notes and records supplemented by information gained through discussion with teachers. The criterion for the Rand classification scheme was the *instructional orientation*, which we define as the overall emphasis of the program. Eleven mini-schools emphasized general basic academic skills and 3 emphasized a specific basic skill. The other 8, while not neglecting the academic subjects, had different main interests. Two schools offered curricula emphasizing the fine arts, 2 emphasized learning about different cultures that contribute to American culture, and 4 were activity-centered —i.e., they emphasized using basic academic skills in practical ways. Table 5.2 gives synopses of the 22 programs, grouped by program orientation.

The Sequoia Institute (Alum Rock 1972) also developed a typology of programs which differs from that chosen by Rand. Their classifications reflect both *academic emphasis and instructional strategy,* whereas our classifications place less emphasis on differences in instructional strategy when the academic emphasis is basically the same. Table 5.3 shows the classifications assigned to each program according to both schemes.

For 7 of 21 programs (Sequoia did not classify the Cassell Kindergarten program) the Rand and Sequoia assignments to groupings are different. The Rand categories of Basic Skills—General and Basic Skills—Specific overlap four Sequoia categories: Traditional/Academic, Individualized Learning, Innovative/Open Classroom, and Gifted. Rand considered traditional classroom techniques, individualized learning, and open classrooms to be instructional strategies designed to achieve the objectives of the Basic Skills program orientations. If a program stressed acquisition of general basic skills or some specific basic skill, we included it in the Basic Skills—General or Basic Skills—Specific category, respectively, whether its classroom style was traditional or innovative. Also, we did not form a separate category for the McCollam Enrichment program, as did Sequoia; though this program is directed towards gifted youngsters, its orientation is still Basic Skills. The last discrepancy between the Rand and Sequoia classifications is the Pala Creative Arts program. We classified this program with Activity-Centered rather than Fine Arts programs because we observed that the program emphasized shop and home economics, taught through activities such as woodworking, printing, sewing, and cooking.

Neither the Rand nor the Sequoia classification seems a satisfactory typology for describing the first year's mini-school programs. Further work will be done using clusters of variables for the 45 programs of the second year. The objective will be to develop a classification with better explanatory power, to support analysis of voucher educational impacts.

Program Size

Programs range in size from 2 to 12 classrooms. There are only 3 relatively large programs: Developmental Reading School (9 classrooms) and Activity-Centered (10) at Goss, and Basic Skills (12) at Meyer. Half the programs have fewer than 6 classrooms. Information about program size appears in Fig. 5.1 and is shown by program type in Table 5.4.

Of the approximately 3900 students in the voucher demonstration, 51 percent were enrolled in programs in the Basic Skills—General grouping. The next largest number, 21 percent, were in Activity-Centered programs, followed by 13 percent in Basic Skills—Specific, and 9 percent in Multicultural programs. The smallest number of students, 6 percent, were enrolled in Fine Arts programs. The percentage enrollments by program type depend, of course, on the classification scheme used. Table 5.4 allows the reader to compare enrollment by program type for both the Rand and Sequoia Institute classifications. The high percentage of students enrolled in Basic Skills—General programs (51 percent), for example, reflects the large number of programs (11) included by Rand in this category. These same students, according to the Sequoia Institute classification, are spread among Traditional/Academic, Individualized Learning, Innovative/Open Classroom, and Gifted categories.

Table 5.2

SYNOPSES OF THE 22 MINI-SCHOOL PROGRAMS

Rand Program Orientation and School	Mini-School and Program Features
Basic Skills--General Cassell	Traditional Plus. Contracts, learning centers, tutoring, audiovisual materials and field trips are used to enrich the teaching of basic skills. Diagnostic tests help determine students' instructional level.
	Kindergarten. Children are exposed to many different experiences to help them and their parents select future programs to suit individual educational needs.
McCollam	Traditional. Basic subjects are emphasized in accordance with state curriculum.
	Enrichment. District-identified and self-identified gifted students are encouraged to be self-directed in their work. Contracts are used extensively; students are guided in setting their own goals.
	Continuous Progress. In nongraded classrooms, students are grouped for reading, language arts, and math instruction according to their skills.
	Individualized Learning. Students work at their own level, with emphasis on individual needs and interests. Diagnostic tests are used to determine initial skill levels.
Meyer	Basic Skills. All academic skills, as well as social, motor, and auditory skills are emphasized. Special education students spend varying amounts of time in the regular classrooms.
	School 2000. The curriculum is designed to prepare students for successful adaptation to and functioning in the present and future. Problem-solving and learning by discovery and doing are stressed.
Miller	Individualized Learning. Instruction in the primary grades prepares students to take responsibility for their own work in the upper elementary grades where contracts are used extensively.
	Academic Skills. Acquisition of basic skills is emphasized in an atmosphere of consistency, routine, and structure.
Pala	Three R's Plus. The students' mastery of academic skills is emphasized. Contracts are used extensively. Self-contained classrooms are used for both monitoring and control of student achievement.
Basic Skills--Specific Goss	Developmental Reading. Oral and written communication are stressed; nongraded classes in reading and math are formed on the basis of diagnostic test results.
Meyer	Sullivan BRL. The language arts and math curriculum developed by BRL are supplemented with other materials. Students work at their own pace, moving on to new material after demonstrating mastery of a unit.
Pala	Math-Science. In addition to regular daily math and science classes, students choose math or science electives. Each elective lasts about five weeks and then new choices are made.
Fine Arts Meyer	Fine Arts. Daily arts and crafts activities are a feature of this program. Each month students choose a project to work on for the rest of that month.
Pala	Fine Arts. Music students have an opportunity to learn to play individual instruments and to participate in group musical activities. Art students' curricula includes drawing, painting and ceramics.
Multicultural Cassell	Cultural Arts. Indian, European, American, Black, and Asian cultures are studied through such media as art, music, drama, cooking, crafts, sewing, and field trips.
Miller	Multicultural. Hawaiian, Black, Japanese, and Mexican cultural studies make extensive use of folk dancing, food tasting, musical instruments, and folk art. The customs, history, and geography of each culture are also studied.
Activity-Centered Cassell	Daily Living. Basic academic subjects are taught with an emphasis on the skills necessary for daily living. Activity classes selected by students for four-week periods have included among others, sewing, gardening, woodshop, cooking, and camping.
Goss	Activity-Centered. Competence in reading, writing, and math is developed through such activities as science experiments, art, crocheting, sewing skills, map making, and woodwork. Students choose these activities.
	7th Grade School. Courses are offered to provide students with experience in the area of their choice, including consumer education, journalism skills, creative arts, vocational education, and law enforcement.
Pala	Creative Arts. Intensive courses in home economics or shop are provided in addition to regular academic work.

Table 5.3

PROGRAM CLASSIFICATIONS[a]

Rand Program Orientation	Sequoia Institute Program Classification						
	Traditional/Academic	Individualized Learning	Innovative/ Open Classroom	Gifted	Fine and Creative Arts	Multicultural	Learning by Doing
Basic Skills--General	Cassell Traditional Plus McCollam Traditional Meyer Basic Skills Miller Academic Skills Pala Three R's Plus	McCollam Individualized Miller Individualized	McCollam Continuous Progress Meyer School 2000	McCollam Enrichment			
Basic Skills--Specific	Goss Developmental Reading Pala Math/Science	Meyer Sullivan BRL					
Fine Arts					Meyer Fine Arts Pala Fine Arts		
Multicultural						Cassell Cultural Arts Miller Multicultural	
Activity-Centered					Pala Creative Arts		Cassell Daily Living Goss Activity-Centered 7th Grade School

[a] Rand classified Cassell-Kindergarten under Basic Skills--General; Sequoia Institute did not classify it.



Fig. 5.1—Mini-school size, 1972-73 (student enrollment and number of teachers)

Table 5.4

MINI-SCHOOL ENROLLMENT BY PROGRAM TYPE, 1972-73

Program Type	Number Enrolled	Percent of Total Voucher Enrollment
Rand Classification		
Basic Skills--General	1979	51
Basic Skills--Specific	496	13
Fine Arts	234	6
Multicultural	354	9
Activity-Centered	835	21
Total	3898	100
Sequoia Classification		
Traditional/Academic	1481	38
Innovative/Open Classroom	292	8
Gifted	75	2
Fine and Creative Arts	453	11
Learning by Doing	616	16
Individualized Learning	511	13
Multicultural	354	9
Kindergarten	116	3
Total	3898	100

NOTE: Based on data prepared by the Sequoia Institute for the Alum Rock Union Elementary School District, April 27, 1973. Total varies slightly from Table 5.10, which is based on enrollment of October 3, 1973.

Allocations of Instructional Time

Since mini-schools had different instructional emphases, the way they used their instructional time could be expected to reflect these differences. All teachers in the mini-schools, therefore, were asked to estimate the amount of time allocated to each academic subject, to special activities related to the program (such as home economics and shop in the Creative Arts program), and to noninstructional activities such as recess, breaks, lunch, and daily routine.[1] Their estimates were averaged for grades above the second grade (as appropriate) in calculating the overall estimate for each mini-school. Table 5.5 shows time distributions by mini-schools.

Reading and language arts received the most attention. The elementary school teachers estimated that they spent on the average about 45 percent of their instructional time on these subjects, ranging from only 25 percent of the time in School 2000 to 52 percent in Miller Multicultural.

On the whole, there is no difference between the average time the Basic Skills programs devoted to reading and language arts and the time the other elementary program orientations reported for those subjects, which casts some doubt on the merit of Rand's classification scheme for the purpose of explaining variations in instructional time. Note, however, that several mini-schools which had promised parents emphasis on specific subjects—the math/science program and the two fine arts programs—did spend considerably more time on these subjects than other mini-schools. Table 5.5 shows that three of the four Activity-Centered programs spent substantial time (between 10 and 35 percent) on special program activities, such as sewing and woodshop. The fourth Activity-Centered mini-school—the 7th Grade School at Goss—also offered its students special courses such as vocational education, consumer education, and journalism skills, which might have been classified as program activities in Table 5.5. However, the teachers in this program, in reporting their use of instructional time to Rand, credited the hours spent on these activities to the academic subjects they felt were being reinforced in the process.[2]

Individualization of Instruction

Educators and parents are concerned with promoting teaching that is tailored to the needs of individual students—usually termed individualization of instruction. Conceptually, instructional tailoring ranges from a low of the teacher working with the entire class to a high of the teacher working with only one student. In our analysis we use three levels to describe the degree of individualization. High denotes predominantly individualized and small-group instruction; medium is a mixture of whole class, small group, and individual; low is mostly whole class and small group with little individual instruction.

From observation in classes and from discussions with teachers individually and in mini-school faculty groups, we estimated the average degree of individualization by program, as shown in Table 5.6. Seven of the 22 programs had a high degree of

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[1] These are teacher estimates and are not intended to be precise. Furthermore, a breakdown such as this cannot take into account the reinforcement of reading, language arts, and arithmetic that takes place in all other subject areas. The intent here is to determine whether mini-schools do in fact emphasize different aspects of the curriculum. The time estimates in the elementary schools are a composite of grades 3 through 6 and, for the middle school, grades 6 through 8.

[2] Three mini-schools are not included in this discussion. A breakdown of instructional time is obviously inappropriate for the Cassell Kindergarten. At the Miller Individualized Learning mini-school, where students work at their own pace to complete individual contracts, spending widely varying amounts of time on different subjects, the teachers felt that any breakdown of instructional time by subject would be misleading. The faculty of the Enrichment mini-school at McCollam did not provide the information.

Table 5.5

MINI-SCHOOL ALLOCATION OF INSTRUCTIONAL TIME, BY PROGRAM ORIENTATION

Rand Program Orientation	Percentage of Time Allocated to: Language Arts	Reading	Arithmetic	Social Studies	Science	Art	Music	Program Activity
Basic Skills--General								
Cassell: Traditional Plus	18	27	27	9	5	6	8	--
Kindergarten[a]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
McCollam: Traditional	22	22	22	18	5	5	6	--
Enrichment[b]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Continuous Progress	17	27	27	11	6	9	3	--
Individualized Learning	24	24	24	16	5	5	2	--
Meyer: Basic Skills	23	27	27	7	7	5	4	--
School 2000	12	12	29	16	16	6	9	--
Miller: Individualized Learning[b]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Academic	15	30	20	15	12	4	4	--
Pala: Three R's Plus	24	29	24	18	--	5	--	--
Basic Skills--Specific								
Goss: Developmental Reading	14	27	20	18	9	6	6	--
Meyer: Sullivan BRL	17	29	24	10	8	8	4	--
Pala: Math/Science	15	15	30	--	40	--	--	--
Fine Arts								
Meyer: Fine Arts	16	28	20	8	4	20	4	--
Pala: Fine Arts	20	20	25	--	--	10	25	--
Multicultural								
Cassell: Cultural Arts	16	30	25	20	--	6	3	--
Miller: Multicultural	21	31	18	13	11	3	3	--
Activity-Centered								
Cassell: Daily Living	12	23	23	8	6	3	6	19
Goss: Activity-Centered	20	22	22	12	8	3	3	10
7th Grade School	11	26	21	26	3	8	5	--
Pala: Creative Arts	17	17	16	16	--	--	--	34

[a] Not applicable.

[b] No breakdown provided.

Table 5.6

ESTIMATED DEGREE OF INDIVIDUALIZATION IN THE MINI-SCHOOLS, BY RAND PROGRAM ORIENTATION

Rand Program Orientation	Estimated Degree of Individualization in the Mini-schools: High	Medium	Low
Basic Skills--General	5	4	2
Basic Skills--Specific	1	2	
Fine Arts			2
Multicultural		1	1
Activity-Centered	1	1	2
Total	7	8	7

individualized instruction, 8 were scaled medium, and 7 low. Twelve of the 14 basic skills programs had a high or medium degree of individualized instruction. The other programs were much less individualized, with 5 out of 8 showing low levels of individualized instruction. Both programs that called themselves individualized—one at McCollam and one at Miller—were ranked high, whereas both programs that featured one grade only—Cassell Kindergarten and Goss 7th Grade—were low. As expected, programs that mixed grade levels as part of their instructional strategy ranked high or medium in individualization.

Resource Use

This section explores and measures the differences in resource use among the 22 mini-schools of the 1972-73 school year, particularly how the mini-schools spent their compensatory voucher funds. Technical Appendix V-C describes total spending levels by mini-school and school, including nonvoucher schools. Spending per student varied widely among the mini-schools (from $586 to $969). In part, this reflects the number of compensatory voucher students enrolled in the program. However, these differences also reflect differences in school size, teacher salary, and administrative cost. Therefore Technical Appendix V-C also presents a method for computing a "comparable instruction cost per classroom," which controls for fortuitous cost differences.

With respect to use of compensatory vouchers, two data sources provide a picture of the differences in the ways mini-schools planned to spend and did spend them. The first source is the mini-school budget. Each mini-school provided a budget showing how it planned to spend these funds for teachers, aides, instructional materials, instructional equipment, field trip transportation, portable classroom space (in one host school), and conferences. (Teacher salaries were almost always provided from basic voucher funds, not compensatory voucher funds.) The interest lies in the different expenditure patterns, not in the actual dollars of the compensatory voucher budget—a figure that in principle changes as students transfer among the mini-schools.

The second source is the purchase order forms that the mini-schools used to requisition materials, equipment, supplies, and instructional services. Approximately 2000 requisition forms are in the data base that the district supplied to Rand. There is no guarantee that copies of *all* requisitions were made. However, our data suggest that we did receive almost all of the requisitions for materials, supplies, equipment, and services.

Planned Expenditure Patterns for Compensatory Voucher Funds. Each mini-school had compensatory voucher funds for the discretionary use of its faculty and principal. The size of the budget was determined by the number of eligible students (those qualifying for free lunch programs) multiplied by the compensatory voucher, valued at $237.77 for kindergarten through 6th grade and $301.55 for 7th and 8th grades.

Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show planned expenditure patterns for compensatory vouchers by mini-school, organized respectively by school and program type. The expenditure categories used are certificated staff (teachers), classified personnel (aides), instructional materials (including consumable supplies), instructional equipment, field trips, and portable classroom space.

On the average the 22 mini-schools budgeted about 60 percent of the money for instructional materials, with aides next highest at only 15 percent. Equipment, additional teachers, and field trips accounted for 9, 7, and 6 percent, respectively. One school, Goss, allocated the cost of portable classroom space to the mini-schools

Table 5.7

COMPENSATORY VOUCHER PLANNED EXPENDITURE PATTERN,
BY SCHOOL AND MINI-SCHOOL

School and Mini-school	Percentage Distribution of Funds[a]					
	Teachers	Aides	Mate-rials	Equip-ment	Field Trips	Por-tables
Cassell						
Cultural Arts	--	22	55	13	10	--
Daily Living	--	20	51	23	6	--
Traditional	--	29	48	17	6	--
Kindergarten	--	22	68	10	--	--
Goss						
Activity-Centered	9	39	23	12	5	12[c]
7th Grade School	--	22	15	5	26[b]	32[c]
Developmental Reading	25	26	22	11	4	12[c]
McCollam						
Traditional	--	4	74	12	10	--
Enrichment	--	--	97	--	3	--
Continuous Progress	19	5	68	3	5	--
Individualized	--	3	87	6	4	--
Meyer						
Basic Skills	--	25	61	10	4	--
Sullivan BRL	--	15	60	20	5	--
Fine Arts	--	23	57	17	3	--
School 2000	--	14	81	--	5	--
Miller						
Individualized[d]	--	--	90	10	--	--
Multicultural[d]	46[e]	24	11	7	10	--
Academic	45[e]	--	55	--	--	--
Pala						
Three R's Plus[d]	--	--	86	6	7	--
Creative Arts	--	44	48	--	8	--
Fine Arts	--	--	69	31	--	--
Math/Science	--	--	94	--	6	--
Unweighted Average of All Programs	*7*	*15*	*60*	*9*	*6*	*3*

[a] These were categories provided in the mini-school budget format.

[b] This covers the support of transportation from the host school to facilities that were leased for part of the year.

[c] The cost of portables was equally split among the three mini-schools; it represents a larger share for the 7th Grade School, which had the smallest budget.

[d] Miller Multicultural and Pala Three R's Plus budgeted 2 and 1 percent, respectively, for conference attendance.

[e] Two under-enrolled programs chose to retain teachers.

Table 5.8

COMPENSATORY VOUCHER PLANNED EXPENDITURE PATTERN, BY MINI-SCHOOL AND RAND PROGRAM ORIENTATION

	Percentage Distribution of Funds					
Rand Program Orientation	Teachers	Aides	Mate-rials	Equip-ment	Field Trips	Por-tables
Basic Skills--General						
Cassell: Traditional	--	29	48	17	6	--
Kindergarten	--	22	68	10	--	--
McCollam: Traditional	--	4	74	12	10	--
Enrichment	--	--	97	3	--	--
Continuous Progress	19	5	68	3	5	--
Individualized	--	3	87	6	4	--
Meyer: Basic Skills	--	25	61	10	4	--
School 2000	--	14	81	--	5	--
Miller: Individualized	--	--	90	10	--	--
Academic	45	--	55	--	--	--
Pala: Three R's Plus	--	--	86	6	7	--
Basic Skills--Specific						
Goss: Developmental Reading	25	26	22	11	4	12
Meyer: Sullivan BRL	--	15	60	20	5	--
Pala: Math/Science	--	--	94	--	6	--
Fine Arts						
Meyer: Fine Arts	--	23	57	17	3	--
Pala: Fine Arts	--	--	69	31	--	--
Multicultural						
Cassell: Cultural Arts	--	22	55	13	10	--
Miller: Multicultural	46	24	11	7	10	--
Activity-Centered						
Cassell: Daily Living	--	20	51	23	6	--
Goss: Activity-Centered	9	39	23	12	5	12
7th Grade School	--	22	15	5	26	32
Pala: Creative Arts	--	44	48	--	8	--
Unweighted Average of All Programs	*7*	*15*	*60*	*9*	*6*	*3*

and another (Miller) explicitly budgeted for attendance at a major multicultural conference. The heavy emphasis on materials in the first year may be temporary. As the demonstration proceeds, mini-schools may build up a store of materials, and therefore shift spending priorities.

While these planned expenditure patterns for the compensatory voucher funds provide a quick overview of resource use by the mini-schools, additional insights can be gained from analyzing the resources that each mini-school requisitioned. During the summer of 1972 and the 1972-73 school year, each mini-school used forms to requisition instructional items or services.

Requisitioned Instructional Materials, Equipment, and Services. The schools used purchase order forms to requisition instructional materials, supplies, equipment, and transportation for field trips. Other forms were used to record expenditures for in-service training, conference and meeting attendance, and payment for special instructional consultants. In most cases, these forms showed the item, quantity, cost, and the amount to be charged to different account numbers.

In estimating the distribution of requisitioned instructional materials and equipment (shown in Tables 5.9 and 5.10), the requisitions were sorted by mini-school and by type of item purchased. The objective was to differentiate consumable supplies from more durable instructional materials. The district's accounting system is not set up to allow automated retrieval of this kind of information.

The expenditure patterns vary considerably within schools. The greatest variation is within Pala, where the Math/Science mini-school shows 87 percent for materials, 8 percent for supplies, and 5 percent for equipment, whereas the Fine Arts mini-school shows 23 percent for materials, 25 percent for supplies, and 52 percent for equipment such as kilns and musical instruments. This variation con-

Table 5.9

DISTRIBUTION OF REQUISITIONED INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT, BY HOST SCHOOL AND MINI-SCHOOL

	Percentage Distribution			
School and Mini-school	Materials	Supplies[a]	Equipment	Services[b]
Cassell				
Cultural Arts	36	38	19	7
Daily Living	41	27	25	7
Traditional	56	20	17	7
Kindergarten	76	13	5	6
Goss				
Activity-Centered	37	27	31	5
7th Grade School	23	11	11	55
Developmental Reading	43	25	34	--
McCollam				
Traditional	56	9	35	--
Enrichment	83	5	12	--
Continuous Progress	61	19	20	--
Individualized	69	5	26	--
Meyer				
Basic Skills	53	23	22	2
Sullivan BRL	78	8	14	--
Fine Arts	37	14	48	1
School 2000	34	27	23	16
Miller				
Individualized	39	4	57	--
Multicultural	49	27	24	--
Academic	45	40	15	--
Pala				
Three R's Plus	65	15	6	14
Creative Arts	33	49	18	--
Fine Arts	23	25	52	--
Math/Science	87	8	5	--
Resource Center	87	--	13	--
Unweighted Average of All Programs	*51*	*20*	*24*	*5*

[a] Includes consumable materials and admission tickets on field trips.

[b] Includes requisitioned bus transportation and special instructional services.

Table 5.10

DISTRIBUTION OF REQUISITIONED INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT, BY RAND PROGRAM ORIENTATION AND MINI-SCHOOL

Rand Program Orientation	Percentage Distribution			
	Materials	Supplies[a]	Equipment	Services[b]
Basic Skills--General				
Cassell: Traditional	56	20	17	7
Kindergarten	76	13	5	6
McCollam: Traditional	56	9	35	--
Enrichment	83	5	12	--
Continuous Progress	61	19	20	--
Individualized	69	5	26	--
Meyer: Basic Skills	53	23	22	2
School 2000	34	27	23	16
Miller: Individualized	39	4	57	--
Academic	45	40	15	--
Pala: Three R's Plus	65	15	6	14
Basic Skills--Specific				
Goss: Developmental Reading	43	23	34	--
Meyer: Sullivan BRL	78	8	14	--
Pala: Math/Science	87	8	5	--
Fine Arts				
Meyer: Fine Arts	37	15	48	--
Pala: Fine Arts	23	25	52	--
Multicultural				
Cassell: Cultural Arts	36	45	19	--
Miller: Multicultural	49	27	24	--
Activity-Centered				
Cassell: Daily Living	41	27	25	7
Goss: Activity-Centered	37	27	31	5
7th Grade School	23	11	11	55
Pala: Creative Arts	33	49	18	--
Unweighted Average of All Programs	*51*	*20*	*24*	*5*

[a] Includes consumable materials and admission tickets on field trips.

[b] Includes requisitioned bus transportation and special instructional services.

trasts sharply with the prevoucher pattern and the spending pattern of nonvoucher schools which are locked in by central allocation on a per-pupil basis for the various items.

During the first year, mini-schools did not spend all of their compensatory voucher funds; about $165,000 or one-third of the total discretionary compensatory voucher funds were carried over for the second year. We did not collect the data that would allow us to calculate the exact carry-over by mini-school; however, we do know that mini-schools showed different propensities for spending in the first year, and we can suggest some possible reasons for these differences.

Some mini-schools decided to hold on to their money until they had a better idea of exactly what they needed for their program; others played what they termed "hardware catch-up"—buying instructional equipment to bring their classrooms up to what they considered a more adequate equipment level. In some mini-schools, the buying agenda resulted from the feeling that items should be purchased quickly because the money might disappear. In other mini-schools, the faculty knew that voucher funds could be carried over for use in the following year.

Underlying these different actions is, of course, the variation in the leadership practices of the principal, as well as differences in the strength of the mini-school faculties. Some principals told their faculties how much money was available and that funds could be carried over. Other principals kept their faculties pretty much in the dark about matters relating to the budgets, maintaining almost an aura of mystical complexity about budgeting. The value of the compensatory voucher and the size of the total compensatory voucher fund were not finally settled until early December 1972. Until then, mini-schools could have only a very rough estimate of how much they would eventually have to spend. But even after this, teachers were often heard complaining that they were not given current information on the amount of money in their budgets. For the second year of the demonstration it was decided to provide each mini-school with a planning budget estimate of 80 percent of its projected budget total. This removed a good deal of the financial uncertainty the faculties felt in the first year.

Other factors likely to contribute to the mini-school carry-over include the shortness of planning time initially, the lack of time for planning during the school year, inadequate knowledge of instructional equipment and materials and, finally, the newness of the planning role and authority to spend. All of these factors are interrelated. Although no one factor really stands out as the most important, differences in the principal's leadership practices and inadequate knowledge of new equipment and materials might be candidates.

The need for information about materials and about what materials work for different types of students was voiced by a majority of the mini-school faculties during the structured discussions with Rand staff. They wanted an accessible clearinghouse-like operation for the dissemination of information. An improved communication mechanism for teachers might serve the purpose of exchanging information about the effectiveness of different materials. Such a mechanism might, in fact, be an operational part of the district's newly instituted Professional Development Center.

PROGRAM OFFERINGS IN THE SECOND YEAR

The original array of educational programs did not change drastically as 7 new schools entered the voucher demonstration in 1973, although there was a marked decline in enrollments in traditional/academic programs offset by an increase in open classrooms and fine arts programs, as shown in Table 5.11 . Sequoia Institute

(Alum Rock, 1973) has classified the program offerings for 1973-74, and we can examine the number of programs for both years that fall into each classification as shown in Table 5.12. Only the Sequoia classifications are used, because Rand has not yet completed 1973-74 classroom data collection.

Table 5.11

CHANGES IN ORIGINAL VOUCHER SCHOOL ENROLLMENT FROM FIRST TO SECOND YEAR, BY SEQUOIA INSTITUTE CLASSIFICATION

Sequoia Institute Program Classification	Original Voucher Schools				Change in Percentage of Total Enrollment 1972-1973
	10/3/72		9/28/73		
	Number of Students	Percent	Number of Students	Percent	
Original					
Traditional/Academic	1536	39	1261	32	-7
Innovative/Open Classroom	302	8	375[a]	9	+1
Gifted	52	1	82	2	+1
Fine and Creative Arts	508	13	594	15	+2
Learning by Doing	630	16	594	15	-1
Individualized Learning	540	14	587	15	+1
Multicultural	367	9	370	9	0
Added in 1973-74					
Kindergarten	--	--	106[b]	3	--
Bilinqual/Bicultural	--	--	--	--	--
Total enrollment	3935	100	3969	100	--

[a] Includes one new mini-school added in 1973.

[b] Unclassified in 1972-73.

Table 5.12

NUMBER OF PROGRAMS FOR FIRST AND SECOND YEARS, BY SEQUOIA INSTITUTE CLASSIFICATION

Sequoia Institute Program Classification	1972-73	1973-74
Original		
Traditional/Academic	7	15
Innovative/Open Classroom	2	4
Gifted	1	1
Fine and Creative Arts	3	4
Learning by Doing	3	6
Individualized Learning	3	4
Multicultural	2	3
Added in 1973-74		
Kindergarten	--	3
Bilingual/Bicultural	--	2
Total	21[a]	42[b]

[a] The Sequoia Institute did not assign Cassell-Kindergarten to a program type in 1972.

[b] At the time Sequoia released these classifications, one school had not made a final decision about its offerings. The school has since developed 3 alternative mini-schools.

ARE THE MINI-SCHOOLS' OWN PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS ACCURATE?

In the spring of 1972, parents received a description of each program, written under severe time constraints, by each mini-school faculty. (Documentary Appendix B includes these 1972-73 mini-school program descriptions.) The descriptions were of necessity rather general. The question naturally arises, how good is the match between the mini-schools' description of their programs and what they did?

Observers of the voucher demonstration have expressed concern that in an attempt to recruit students, mini-schools could describe a program in attractive terms and then not implement the program as it was described. Rand's discussions with mini-school faculties and classroom observation cast some light on this question.

From the checklist used for classroom observation (Technical Appendix V-A) and from information that teachers supplied about instructional materials and field trips, Rand wrote independent descriptions of each program. These were compared with the descriptions originally sent to parents in the spring of 1972 by the mini-school faculties. No gross discrepancies were observed between planned activities as described by teachers in the spring of 1972 and activities actually implemented during the 1972-73 school year. Changes were made in the programs between September and June, but the basic orientation was not changed in any program.

PROGRAM CHANGES DURING THE FIRST YEAR

Each mini-school faculty was asked to document major changes in its programs *after* the start of school in September 1972. Many of the programs were trying out new instructional strategies, including materials, student grouping, use of personnel in addition to the classroom teacher, and new ways of organizing instruction. The changes reported by the faculties fall into the following categories:

- *Instructional material and curriculum:* 19 changes included such items as integrating the teaching of social studies into the core program, switching to a different reading curriculum, and lengthening the time spent on an activity.
- *Student grouping practices:* 18 changes included discontinuing or implementing staggered arrival times, regrouping classes according to grade level, and going from a whole class to a modified individual approach.
- *Personnel:* 8 changes included adding aides, a half-time teacher, or an art specialist to teach each class in a program one hour per week.
- *Organizational and procedural:* 10 changes included setting up a center in one classroom and moving students in and out, eliminating field trips, and adopting a standard discipline policy.

As programs moved further away from a basic skills orientation, and further away from conventional practice, there tended to be more organizational and procedural changes during the course of the school year. In the other categories of change, there is no discernible difference between basic-skills-oriented programs and other programs. The 6 mini-schools reporting no changes all have a basic skills program orientation.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, mini-schools do vary to some extent on such features as classroom grouping, individualization of instruction, resource use, emphasis on certain subject matter, and educational approach. It seems fair to say that none of the mini-schools represents a new departure for American education, but many of them do represent new departures for Alum Rock. Together, the 22 mini-schools of the first year constitute a broadening of the traditional techniques and curricular emphasis which generally characterized these six schools before the demonstration.

In the main, the mini-school alternatives represented ideas which were already in the minds of teachers, but which they had lacked the resources or organizational support to attempt prior to the voucher demonstration. As would be expected, teachers differed in their desire to try out new techniques. Many chose to continue traditional patterns of teaching essentially unchanged, except for the use of new materials and more field trips, which added funds made possible. Others taught the basic skills much as they had in the past, but supplemented the academic core with class periods devoted to special activities or fine arts. Still others attempted more far-reaching changes in classroom practice, introducing such innovative techniques as ungraded classrooms or open classrooms. The amount of diversity among the programs in the first year may have been limited, to some extent, by the shortness of planning time and lack of outside technical assistance available to teachers in developing their program offerings.

It appears that the first year's range of programs was diverse enough to satisfy most participating parents. When voucher-school parents were interviewed after several months of the demonstration, only 10 percent said there was some kind of special program which they wanted the schools to offer that they did not offer, and some of these 10 percent said that what they wanted was a basic skills program, of which there were already several (see Sec. VI for parent survey results). The first year's program offerings were for the most part the creation of the teachers, reflecting both their ideas of sound educational practice and preferred styles of teaching. As the demonstration continues, parental demand may play a larger part in determining what types of programs are offered; if it does, it remains to be seen whether the degree of diversity in the system would increase or decrease as a consequence.

VI. PARENT PERSPECTIVES AND RESPONSES

INTRODUCTION

This section examines elements of parental involvement in the Alum Rock voucher demonstration: parents' choices of schools and programs for their children; the reasons they gave for their choices; the type and perceived quality of information they used in making their choices; their attitudes toward program diversity; and the extent to which they took advantage of the transfer option—the ability to change a child's program or school in the course of the school year. The section also analyzes parents' satisfaction with various features of the Alum Rock school system and their attitudes toward parental influence on the schools.

In addition, the section compares the attitudes of both parents and nonparents in Alum Rock with those of a national sample of adults, to place the Alum Rock adults' reactions into context and furnish a basis for interpretation. We also compare, as between the fall of 1972 and fall of 1973, the responses of two samples of Alum Rock parents whose children were enrolled in voucher schools during both school years. Their responses indicate how parents' views developed during one year's participation in the demonstration.

Parental participation in the demonstration's first year and controversies surrounding the provision of information to parents are discussed in Sec. IV, "Implementation."

KEY FINDINGS

Fall 1972 Survey

- Three-fourths of all Alum Rock parents, both voucher and nonvoucher, rated their schools and the performance of their teachers and principals as "good" or "very good."
- Four-fifths of all parents were "satisfied" or "very satisfied" with their teachers, schools, principals, and progress of their children in school; they were less satisfied with the school board and PTA.
- Differences between responses of voucher and nonvoucher parents are minimal and inconsistent. Voucher parents tended to be somewhat more satisfied with the performance of the school district than were nonvoucher parents, but support was very high among both groups. Voucher parents were slightly more in favor of greater parental influence in the hiring and firing of teachers and principals than were nonvoucher parents; but the differences were very small.
- Voucher parents of all ethnic groups and educational and income levels supported the Alum Rock voucher system; less than 9 percent thought the voucher system would harm their children's education; over three-fourths thought it would improve public education in Alum Rock.
- Less than 60 percent of voucher parents favored the extension of the Alum Rock voucher system to include private schools.
- Slightly more than half the parents subscribed to the belief that choice of school and program will lead to greater parental control.
- Voucher parents believed that vouchers will benefit all groups, not solely the

disadvantaged; only one-fifth believed vouchers will benefit black and Mexican-American children more than they will white children.

- In response to more specific questions about the benefits of vouchers, one-half of the voucher parents said they believed vouchers will benefit all eight groups listed in the question: children from black, white, Mexican-American, lower-income, and middle-income families; teachers; principals; and parents. Only 13 percent believed vouchers will benefit none of these groups.
- Some voucher parents were not adequately informed about the voucher system. For example,
  - — 17 percent were not aware of the voucher system.
  - — Of those who were aware of the voucher system, 23 percent could not correctly identify the name of their child's program within a school.
  - — Over one-half were unaware of their transfer option.
- Most aware voucher parents believed the school system did a "good" or "very good" job of explaining the voucher system (65 percent); school materials were most frequently cited as the "most helpful" source of information. (An "aware" voucher parent is one who had "heard about the educational voucher program that started in some of the schools here in Alum Rock this year.")
- More than four-fifths of aware voucher parents thought program choice is a good idea, and less than one-tenth thought the number of programs offered was insufficient.
- Parents were overwhelmingly satisfied with the programs offered for their children; over 90 percent said they were "very satisfied" or "satisfied" with the program offerings.

Transfer Activity, 1972

- At the outset in 1972, few voucher parents used their option to transfer their children among schools (less than 4 percent of the students changed schools during the summer application period).
- During the school year, parents used within-school (program-to-program) transfers more than between-school transfers. Approximately 4 percent of the students transferred between programs within the same school, while less than 1 percent transferred between schools during the school year.
- Whites, blacks, and Mexican-Americans were equal in their propensities to transfer their children by using their voucher option.

Transfer Activity, 1973

- Voucher-related transfer activity among parents was greater during the summer of 1973 than in the summer of 1972.
- Once again, parents preferred within-school transfers to between-school transfers.
- Differential transfer rates did not emerge for parents of different ethnic backgrounds in 1973.

National Sample and Alum Rock Comparisons

- In both Alum Rock and national samples, parents report more satisfaction with schools than do nonparents.
- Alum Rock respondents favor parental influence on decisions about school staff

and curriculum more than do respondents in the national sample, but are less in favor of parental influence on school expenditures.

- Demographic differences between the Alum Rock and national samples do not account for these attitudinal differences.

Fall 1973 Survey

Results are reported only for those parents whose children attended voucher schools in both years of the demonstration—so-called "old voucher parents".

- Satisfaction with various features of the educational system in 1973 remained as high as in 1972, or increased.
- The desire for parental influence in personnel decisions increased significantly.
- Parents were significantly better informed in 1973 than in 1972.
- Expectations and beliefs about vouchers and the benefits of a voucher system remained highly positive and undifferentiated in the fall of 1973.

THE DATA

Survey Data

Field Research Corporation (FRC), Rand's survey subcontractor, conducts personal interviews in Alum Rock. The major survey effort occurs in the fall of each demonstration year when FRC interviews from 1200 to 1500 adults residing in Alum Rock. The survey items tap a variety of parental attitudes about vouchers, educational choice, and satisfaction with schools and their personnel; assess informational levels about programs and vouchers; and explore a range of parental behavior. (The Technical Appendix contains a copy of the interview schedule.) Rand also requested the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) to append selected attitudinal items contained in the Alum Rock questionnaire form to their annual National Amalgam Survey of adults conducted in the spring of 1973. The survey data obtained from the Amalgam survey provides a national context in which to place the Alum Rock results.

This section presents selected results from the fall 1972 Alum Rock survey, the fall 1973 Alum Rock survey, and the spring 1973 National Amalgam Survey. Because the fall 1973 Alum Rock survey data became available only at the time this report was being written, this section contains only limited analyses of the responses of one subset of 1973 voucher parents—those whose children had participated in the demonstration from its inception. A brief description of each of the surveys and their subsamples follows; the Technical Appendix contains a more complete description.

Fall 1972 Survey. The fall 1972 Alum Rock survey contains a variety of subsamples, two of which (voucher parents and nonvoucher parents) are analyzed below. There are also nonparent subsamples in the survey (adults with no children in the Alum Rock public schools), which are not discussed at length in this report. Thus the four main groups are:[1]

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[1] Parents included in the nonvoucher probability sample (179) and those in the Changer sample (54) are not included in the 1972 analyses. These samples were selected for special purposes; if included they would have affected the representativeness of the original samples. The total number of respondents therefore was 1453, not 1220. (See the Technical Appendix for details of the sample.)

	Sample Size
Voucher parents: parents of children in voucher schools	600
Nonvoucher parents: parents of children in nonvoucher public schools	257
Voucher nonparents: nonparents living in the voucher area	243
Nonvoucher nonparents: nonparents living in the nonvoucher area	120
Total interviews	1220

Sampling respondents in this manner generates a series of control groups to eliminate area of residence and parental status as possible explanations for the apparent effects of education vouchers on the attitudes and behavior of voucher parents.

Fall 1973 Survey. The fall 1973 Alum Rock survey contains the same subsamples as the previous fall's survey. At this point, however, the only data we will use from the fall 1973 survey are the responses of so-called "old voucher parents," i.e., those parents who had at least one child enrolled in a voucher school during both years of the demonstration. There are 286 such parents in the fall 1973 sample.

As noted previously, the data from the 1973 fall survey serve a limited purpose in this report: by comparing them with data from the fall 1972 survey we may see whether and how parents' attitudes have changed over the course of a year. For this reason, we restrict our attention to parents who have participated in the demonstration from its inception. (Any observed changes cannot be definitely attributed to the influence of vouchers, of course, unless a similar comparison is made for nonvoucher parents and comparable changes are not found—an exercise beyond the scope of this analysis. Furthermore, new and old voucher parents should be compared for differences attributable to length of experience with vouchers.) Our temporal comparisons are not based on interviews of the same parents in both years, but on separate samples representative of this group of parents.

National Amalgam Survey. The National Amalgam Survey, conducted in March 1973, is a survey of 1500 adults representative of the nation as a whole. For the analyses in this section, respondents are broken down into parents (481), i.e., adults with children enrolled in grades K to 8 of any school, and nonparents (1019), i.e., all other adults. Comparisons with the Alum Rock samples are carried out separately for parents and nonparents.

Record Data

Demographic and school data about students and families were collected from the Alum Rock School District and processed by the Data Management Contractor. These data allow us to analyze transfer activity within and among schools and the extent to which voucher parents used their transfer options.

* * *

The analyses of parental reactions are presented in seven subsections: Satisfaction, Influence, Beliefs About Vouchers, Information About Decisionmaking, Choice, Transfer Activity, and The National Context.

The analyses of the fall 1972 survey data are limited by design and purposely do not rely on sophisticated survey data analysis techniques. The 1972 survey data constitute the first wave of a series of yearly interviews of the Alum Rock community, and should be viewed as a baseline. They record the initial attitudes and self-reports of behavior of the Alum Rock respondents; later, with these initial data as a starting point, we can assess change in attitudes and behavior in the Alum Rock community. We view the fall 1972 survey as a baseline, assuming that vouchers will have had little effect on parents' educationally related attitudes by that point; we therefore expect only minor and inconsistent differences in the attitudes of voucher and nonvoucher parents.[2]

Data analysis of the first year's survey has been limited to constructing attitudinal profiles for different groups in the Alum Rock community. These profiles present initial differences in the attitudes of various groups, possibly suggesting on what groups vouchers might exert their greatest effect.

The longer-term analyses of the survey data will rely on more sophisticated techniques. They will examine changes in parental attitudes and behavior for various subgroups, and the extent to which these changes can be uniquely attributed to educational vouchers. Parental survey data will also be linked to student and teacher data, permitting us to conduct multilevel analyses. It will then be possible to understand more about the relationship of parental attitudes and behavior to cognitive and noncognitive student outcomes, and to assess the impact of changes in parental behavior and attitudes on student outcomes and teacher reactions. These multilevel analyses will require the use of regression and analysis of covariance techniques.

SATISFACTION

> *Are parents satisfied with schools and their personnel, and are voucher and nonvoucher parents equally satisfied?*

Survey questions were constructed to differentiate between (a) *perceived quality* and (b) *satisfaction*. To assess perceived quality, questions like the following were included:

> Q8. In general, do you think that the education (child) is getting at (school) is very good, good, fair, or poor?[3]

And to assess satisfaction, questions like this were asked:

> Q28. In general, how satisfied are you with the job the Alum Rock Board of Trustees (School Board) is doing?

The distinction is important, for it is possible that some parents may perceive teachers as doing a very good job and yet be dissatisfied because they believe the teachers should be doing even better. Similarly, some parents may perceive that teachers are doing only a fair job, but be satisfied nonetheless, because they believe the teachers are doing the best they can. Empirically, the distinction proves to be valid; the correlations between satisfaction and quality are between 0.4 and 0.6.

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[2] The lack of differences between voucher and nonvoucher parents would be a definite advantage for future analyses involving differential changes in the attitudes and behaviors of voucher and nonvoucher parents. A lack of initial differences between voucher and nonvoucher parents minimizes the "pretest-treatment" interaction problem. This is the case where differences in groups' initial levels correlate with the extent of their change in an experimental situation.

[3] Asking questions about a child's progress in school or parental perceptions of a child's progress in school presents problems when the respondent has more than one child enrolled in a school. For parents with more than one child enrolled in voucher schools, the interviewer selects one child randomly using a Kish table. (See Leslie Kish, *Survey Sampling*, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1965, pp. 398-399.) This child becomes known as the "Kishkid." The interviewer then asks the parent to answer all such questions with only that child in mind; otherwise, parents might average their perceptions. This technique has another advantage. For sampling purposes, it uniquely assigns a family to a single grade, school, and program—those of the "Kishkid." This insures that the sample will be balanced for grade, birth order, and program.

The survey items assessed parental satisfaction with eight different aspects of education: (a) education in general (Q30); (b) schools (Q8); (c) the school board (Q28); (d) PTA (Q27); (e) principals and teachers (Q9, Q10, Q25, Q26); (f) child's progress (Q12); (g) child's happiness in school (Q7); (h) child's perception of teacher (Q11).

Of course, it is possible to build scales from these items, and it would be appropriate to do so for many analyses; but presently the extent and breadth of satisfaction of Alum Rock parents is of interest. For this reason, results for each of the satisfaction items will be presented individually.

Comparing voucher and nonvoucher parents in terms of their satisfaction levels produces a community profile, as well as a profile of voucher parents. The small differences between the two samples indicate that voucher parents did not differ from other parents in the community as a whole, which confirms our initial assumption.

The only way to describe parents in Alum Rock, both voucher and nonvoucher, at the time of this survey, is to say they were "satisfied"—satisfied with their schools and the progress of their children in school. Most parents rated as "good" or "very good" the quality of the education offered in Alum Rock and the job done by teachers. (See Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3.) Satisfaction was greatest with respect to the progress of their children in school, and lowest with respect to the PTA and the school board.

On the perceived-quality items, ratings varied moderately by ethnic group for voucher parents: 8 to 10 percent fewer Mexican-American than white parents were likely to respond "good" or "very good" to items assessing the overall quality of schools and the performance of the principals.

Differences between voucher and nonvoucher parents were small and inconsistent in the domain of educational satisfaction and perceived quality. The overall satisfaction level was so high, in fact, that there appears to be little room for improvement. These high levels of parental satisfaction with schools should not be viewed as surprising. Gallup reports high levels of parental satisfaction with the public education system for national samples of adults in 1972 and 1973.[4]

The high levels of Alum Rock parents' satisfaction may also reflect Alum Rock's low degree of political and social activity and awareness in educational matters. As noted earlier in this report, families move in and out of the district a good deal, and the Alum Rock boundaries do not coincide with those of any other political or geographic unit. The evidence is that parents generally did not play much of a role in school affairs or in developing the voucher demonstration. This seems to be related to a low level of parental information about schooling in Alum Rock, and therefore relatively little opportunity to make informed judgments about school quality. If the voucher demonstration is successful in raising the level of parent information, it may lead to greater parental ability to judge educational quality, and perhaps, in the short run, to greater dissatisfaction with the schools.

Changes in Satisfaction, Fall 1972 to Fall 1973

As evidenced by their responses to the fall 1973 survey, satisfaction and perceived quality among original voucher parents remained as high after one year of

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[4] See G. H. Gallup, "The Annual Gallup Poll of Public Attitudes Toward Education," *Phi Delta Kappan*, Vol. 53, No. 1, 1972; ——, Vol. 54, No. 1, 1973.

Table 6.1

PERCEIVED PARENT SATISFACTION WITH SCHOOLS, 1972 PARENT/COMMUNITY SURVEY[a]

Percent Responding "Good" and "Very Good" to the Question	Voucher Parents						Nonvoucher Parents					
	Total (600)	White (267)	Black (65)	Mexican-American (268)	Less Than High School Graduate (328)	High School Graduate (272)	Total (257)	White (78)	Black (14)	Mexican-American (165)	Less Than High School Graduate (131)	High School Graduate (126)
Q8 In general, do you think the education (CHILD) is getting at (SCHOOL) is very good, good, fair, or poor?	73.8	77.5	76.9	69.4	72.0	75.9	74.3	79.5	50.0	73.9	71.0	77.8
Q9 Do you think the principal is doing a very good job, a good job, a fair job, or a poor job?	74.6	79.8	73.9	69.7	71.4	78.4	70.0	71.8	64.2	69.7	68.7	71.4
Q10 Do you think his/her teacher is doing a very good job, a good job, a fair job, or a poor job?	79.4	80.1	75.4	79.5	78.8	79.9	81.7	85.9	57.1	81.8	80.9	82.6

[a] The ethnicity variable was formed as follows: Mexican-Americans and American Indians form one category, blacks form another, and the "white" category includes whites and orientals.

Table 6.2

PERCEIVED CHILD SATISFACTION WITH SCHOOLS, 1972 PARENT/COMMUNITY SURVEY

Question	Voucher Parents						Nonvoucher Parents					
	Total (600)	White (267)	Black (65)	Mexican-American (268)	Less Than High School Graduate (328)	High School Graduate (272)	Total (257)	White (78)	Black (14)	Mexican-American (165)	Less Than High School Graduate (131)	High School Graduate (126)
Percent responding "most" to:												
Q7 Do you think (CHILD) likes school this year most, some, or almost none of the time?	87.3	86.1	89.2	88.1	87.4	87.2	88.3	92.3	71.4	87.9	84.7	92.1
Percent responding "a lot" and "somewhat" to:												
Q11 Does (CHILD) like (his/her) (homeroom) teacher a lot, somewhat, a little, or not at all?	89.5	92.5	87.7	87.0	87.1	92.4	91.0	89.7	85.8	92.1	90.0	92.0
Percent responding "very well" and "fairly well" to:												
Q12 So far this school year, how do you think (CHILD) is doing in (his/her) school work? Very well, fairly well, not too well, or very poorly?	90.5	91.3	93.8	88.8	88.3	93.1	93.0	96.7	92.9	90.3	88.9	96.8

Table 6.3

PERCEIVED PARENT SATISFACTION WITH DISTRICT, 1972 PARENT/COMMUNITY SURVEY

Percent Responding "Very Satisfied" and "Somewhat Satisfied" to:	Voucher Parents						Nonvoucher Parents					
	Total (600)	White (267)	Black (65)	Mexican-American (268)	Less Than High School Graduate (328)	High School Graduate (272)	Total (257)	White (78)	Black (14)	Mexican-American (165)	Less Than High School Graduate (131)	High School Graduate (126)
Q23 Everything considered, how satisfied are you with how (CHILD) is doing in school these days--very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, very dissatisfied?	89.7	89.6	87.8	90.3	89.6	89.8	87.2	88.4	71.4	87.8	87.8	86.5
Q25 How satisfied are you with the job (CHILD'S) (homeroom) teacher is doing?	91.0	92.2	90.8	89.9	90.2	92.0	92.2	92.3	71.4	94.0	93.1	91.3
Q26 How satisfied are you with the job the principal of (CHILD'S SCHOOL) is doing?	83.5	84.3	62.2	82.1	83.7	83.3	83.3	83.3	71.4	84.2	84.0	82.5
Q27 How about parents' associations or the PTA--how satisfied are you with the job they are doing in (CHILD'S SCHOOL)?	53.8	54.7	44.6	55.2	53.0	54.7	46.9	46.2	42.9	47.9	48.0	46.0
Q28 In general, how satisfied are you with the job the Alum Rock Board of Trustees is doing?	57.1	55.0	57.0	59.3	56.9	57.7	49.0	48.7	35.7	50.3	51.1	46.8
Q30 In general, how satisfied are you with the kind of education your child(ren) can get in Alum Rock? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?	86.6	85.4	84.6	88.4	87.7	85.4	81.7	79.5	57.1	84.8	87.1	76.2

the demonstration, or, with regard to some items, increased slightly. The magnitude of the change was a function of the initial level: ratings increased the most on those variables where the initial level was the lowest. (See Tables 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6.) In particular, satisfaction with the school board (Q28) increased more than did the other satisfaction variables (13 percent). Two of the perceived quality measures—schools (Q8) and principals' performance (Q9)—changed significantly (about 8 percent), and these changes were slightly greater for less-educated than for the better-educated respondents[5] (see Table 6.4).

Table 6.4

PERCEIVED PARENT SATISFACTION WITH SCHOOLS, 1973 PARENT/COMMUNITY SURVEY: VOUCHER PARENTS

	Percent Responding "Good" and "Very Good" to:	Total (286)	White (126)	Black (27)	Mexican-American (133)	Less Than High School Graduate (161)	High School Graduate (125)
Q8	In general, do you think the education (CHILD) is getting at (SCHOOL) is very good, good, fair, or poor?	82.1	80.0	73.1	85.8	81.4	82.6
Q9	Do you think the principal is doing a very good job, a good job, a fair job, or a poor job?	81.9	83.5	69.2	83.0	84.9	77.9
Q10	Do you think his/her teacher is doing a very good job, a good job, a fair job, or a poor job?	84.0	83.5	76.9	86.0	83.5	84.4

PARENTAL INFLUENCE

Do parents in Alum Rock favor parental influence on school decisionmaking? Do they favor it in some areas and not in others?

To assess the degree to which parents in Alum Rock favored parental influence in school decisionmaking, four items were included in the fall 1972 survey:

Q36A. Do you think parents should be able to help decide which teachers get hired or fired in their children's schools?

Q36B. Should parents be able to help decide whether a principal is hired or kept on?

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[5] The 1972-73 changes in the attitudes of blacks should be viewed with great caution, since there are only 28 black families in the fall 1973 survey of old voucher parents. Given the small sample size, a change of at least 22 percent is necessary to obtain statistical significance in the case of a two-category variable. The changes are broken down by ethnicity so the patterns of whites and Mexican-Americans can be contrasted.

Table 6.5

PERCEIVED CHILD SATISFACTION WITH SCHOOLS, 1973
PARENT/COMMUNITY SURVEY: VOUCHER PARENTS

Question	Total (286)	White (126)	Black (27)	Mexican-American (133)	Less Than High School Graduate (161)	High School Graduate (125)
Percent responding "most" to:						
Q7 Do you think (CHILD) likes school this year most of the time, some of the time, or almost none of the time?	86.6	85.2	88.5	87.4	84.8	88.4
Percent responding "a lot" and "somewhat" to:						
Q11 Does (CHILD) like (his/her) (homeroom) teacher a lot, somewhat, a little, or not at all?	88.4	89.6	92.3	86.6	87.6	90.1
Percent responding "very well" and "fairly well" to:						
Q12 So far this school year, how do you think (CHILD) is doing in (his/her) school work? Very well, fairly well, not too well, or very poorly?	89.5	87.8	90.7	92.9	87.6	91.7

Q36C. And should parents be able to help decide what should be taught in school?

Q36D. Should they be able to help decide how the school spends its money?

At the outset of the demonstration, parents' advocacy of parental influence varied with the decision in question: regardless of their voucher status, parents favored parental involvement least in decisions about hiring and firing teachers (Q36A) and most in deciding what should be taught in school (Q36C). (See Table 6.7.) Voucher parents were slightly more likely than nonvoucher parents to favor parental influence on curriculum content and on hiring and firing of principals. (See Table 6.7.)

There are too few black nonvoucher parents in the sample to permit comparisons of voucher and nonvoucher blacks, but within the voucher parent sample, blacks are most in favor of parental influence, especially in teacher employment decisions.

Differences between voucher and nonvoucher parent are miniscule for Mexican-Americans; none exceeds 3.1 percent. For white parents, however, one interesting sample difference occurs: by 8 percent, white voucher parents are more favorable toward parental influence on what should be taught in schools than white nonvoucher parents.

Table 6.6

PERCEIVED PARENT SATISFACTION WITH DISTRICT, 1973
PARENT/COMMUNITY SURVEY: VOUCHER PARENTS

Percent Responding "Very Satisfied" and "Somewhat Satisfied" to:	Total (286)	White (126)	Black (27)	Mexican-American (133)	Less Than High School Graduate (161)	High School Graduate (125)
Q23 Everything considered, how satisfied are you with how (CHILD) is doing in school these days--very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, very dissatisfied?	88.0	87.0	88.0	89.0	89.6	86.0
Q25 How satisfied are you with the job (CHILD'S) (homeroom) teacher is doing?	93.7	92.2	96.1	94.5	93.4	94.0
Q26 How satisfied are you with the job the principal of (CHILD'S SCHOOL) is doing?	88.7	86.0	88.5	91.5	88.9	88.5
Q27 How about parents' associations or the PTA--how satisfied are you with the job they are doing in (CHILD'S SCHOOL)?	62.6	61.2	53.8	65.9	61.0	64.8
Q28 In general, how satisfied are you with the job the Alum Rock Board of Trustees is doing?	70.6	70.4	69.2	70.9	71.7	69.4
Q30 In general, how satisfied are you with the kind of education your child(ren) can get in Alum Rock? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?	90.8	86.5	88.4	95.3	94.0	86.8

Taking into account voucher and nonvoucher parents' levels of education provides some interesting insights.[6] With respect to curriculum (Q36C), the differences are large and consistent: for both voucher and nonvoucher parents, the better-educated parents by a factor of 8 to 20 percent desire greater parental influence (Table 6.8). On the question of hiring and firing teachers and principals (Q36A, Q36B), the educational differences are modest, but an interesting interaction occurs: among voucher parents, the less educated favor parental influence more than do the better educated; the reverse is true for nonvoucher parents (see Table 6.8).

These initial findings suggest several things: first, that advocacy of parental influence differs with the decision area in question; second, that both overall and by ethnicity, voucher-nonvoucher differences are small and inconsistent regardless of

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[6] The socioeconomic status results are presented only for education of the respondents. The analyses were also carried out for occupation and income. Controlling for both of these variables generated results similar to those for education, but the differences were not as consistent or as large. To simplify the presentation, only education will be used as a control variable. Education was split into a dichotomous variable: those without a high school diploma (N=325) and those with (N=278).

Table 6.7

ADVOCACY OF PARENTAL INFLUENCE, BY ETHNICITY, 1972 PARENT/COMMUNITY SURVEY

Question	Voucher Parents				Nonvoucher Parents			
	Total (600)	White (267)	Black (65)	Mexican-American (268)	Total (257)	White (78)	Black (14)	Mexican-American (165)
Q36A Do you think parents should be able to help decide which teachers get hired or fired in their children's schools?	36.3	35.6	44.6	35.1	36.6	38.5	35.7	35.8
Q36B Should parents to able to help decide whether a principal is hired or kept on?	53.7	53.2	56.9	53.4	49.4	44.9	64.3	50.3
Q36C Should parents be able to help decide what should be taught in school?	62.7	68.5	67.7	55.6	56.4	60.3	71.4	53.3
Q36D Should they be able to help decide how the school spends its money?	55.0	56.6	61.5	51.9	54.5	52.6	78.6	53.3

Table 6.8

ADVOCACY OF PARENTAL INFLUENCE, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, 1972 PARENT/COMMUNITY SURVEY

Question	Voucher Parents			Nonvoucher Parents		
	Total (600)	Less Than High School Graduate (328)	High School Graduate (272)	Total (257)	Less Than High School Graduate (131)	High School Graduate (126)
Q36A Do you think parents should be able to help decide which teachers get hired or fired in their children's schools?	36.3	38.5	33.9	36.6	35.1	38.1
Q36B Should parents be able to help decide whether a principal is hired or kept on?	53.7	56.9	50.0	49.4	45.8	53.2
Q36C Should parents be able to help decide what should be taught in school?	62.7	57.2	69.3	56.4	46.6	66.7
Q36D Should they be able to help decide how the school spends its money?	55.0	49.2	62.0	54.5	50.4	58.7

decision area; third, that the power of new-found vouchers may have whetted less-educated parents' desire for greater influence (less-educated nonvoucher parents expressed less "activist" attitudes).

Differences in Advocacy of Parental Influence, Fall 1972 to Fall 1973

Between the first and second year of the voucher demonstration, voucher parents' advocacy of parental influence on school decisions increased in all four areas of decisionmaking: (Q36A) hiring and firing teachers (16 percent); (Q36B) hiring and firing principals (8 percent); (Q36C) curriculum content (7 percent); and (Q36D) school finances (5 percent). (See Table 6.9.) Note that changes with respect to the hiring and firing of teachers and principals were greater for the better-educated respondents (see Table 6.10).

As noted in Sec. IV, actual increases in parental participation in school decisionmaking in the first year of the voucher demonstration were not very substantial. We have indicated in Sec. IV that this was probably the result of both parental apathy and ambivalence on the part of other demonstration participants—especially voucher principals and many voucher teachers—toward giving parents real opportunities to affect school decisions. The fact that more voucher parents endorse parental influence in school decisions after one year of the demonstration may represent an attitudinal change on their part that could foreshadow greater actual attempts to exert such influence.

In any event, more parents now endorse the notion of parental influence in school decisions, particularly in personnel matters, and it seems likely that these increases are a by-product of the voucher demonstration; that is, however, only one of several possible explanations. The increases may reflect a community or national trend. Before we conclude that these changes are a by-product of vouchers, other explanations must be ruled out.

Table 6.9

VOUCHER PARENTS' ADVOCACY OF PARENTAL INFLUENCE, BY ETHNICITY, 1973 PARENT/COMMUNITY SURVEY

Percent Responding "Yes" to:		Total (286)	White (126)	Black (27)	Mexican-American (133)
Q36A	Do you think parents should be able to help decide which teachers get hired or fired in their children's schools?	52.2	52.5	59.3	50.4
Q36B	Should parents be able to help decide whether a principal is hired or kept on?	62.0	64.2	74.1	57.4
Q36C	And should parents be able to help decide what should be taught in school?	69.6	69.2	88.9	65.9
Q36D	Should they be able to help decide how the school spends its money?	59.8	60.0	66.7	58.1

VOUCHER BELIEFS AND BENEFITS

> *What are the basic beliefs about the voucher system held by voucher parents? Do they think it will affect the education system of Alum Rock and what groups in the population do they think it will benefit most?*

In the fall of 1972, 77 percent of voucher parents (Q55A, Table 6.11), regardless of ethnicity or educational level, believed that vouchers will improve the public schools in Alum Rock. When asked how the voucher system affected their child's chances of getting the kind of education the parent desired, 61.3 percent thought the chances were "better," while only 9.1 percent felt that the chances were not as good (Q47, Table 6.12).

Another set of questions asked respondents what groups they believed will benefit from vouchers. Parents were asked:

> Q48. Here is a list of groups and people that the voucher system will affect. Do you think that (GROUP) will be helped or hurt by the voucher system?
>
> A. Children from lower-income families
> B. Children from middle- and upper-income families
> C. Black children
> D. White/Anglo children
> E. Chicano or Mexican-American children
> F. Teachers
> G. School administrators
> H. Parents

Table 6.10

VOUCHER PARENTS' ADVOCACY OF PARENTIAL INFLUENCE, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, 1973 PARENT/COMMUNITY SURVEY

Percent Responding "Yes" to:	Total (286)	Less Than High School Graduate (161)	High School Graduate (125)
Q36A Do you think parents should be able to help decide which teachers get hired or fired in their children's schools?	52.2	50.3	53.7
Q36B Should parents be able to help decide whether a principal is hired or kept on?	62.0	57.6	66.7
Q36C Should parents be able to help decide what should be taught in schools?	69.6	66.9	73.2
Q36D Should they be able to help decide how the school spends its money?	59.8	53.6	68.3

Table 6.11

VOUCHER PARENTS' BELIEFS ABOUT VOUCHERS, 1972
PARENT/COMMUNITY SURVEY

	Ethnicity				Education	
Percent of Parents Agreeing with the Statement that:	Total (495)	White (240)	Black (56)	Mexican-American (199)	Less Than High School Graduate (240)	High School Graduate (255)
Q55A The voucher system will result in better public schools in Alum Rock.	77.7	78.0	78.5	77.2	77.2	78.2
Q55B Under the voucher system a parent can change the school his child attends at regular times during the school year.	47.8	44.0	38.5	53.7	47.1	48.4
Q55C Some families will leave Alum Rock rather than have their children go to voucher schools.	22.6	25.0	23.2	19.6	21.7	23.5
Q55D Parents should be able to use vouchers in parochial and private as well as public schools.	58.2	52.6	69.7	61.6	58.8	57.8
Q55E Under the voucher system the more schools a parent has to choose from, the more control parents will have over the school system.	53.6	54.9	49.2	53.4	52.0	55.6
Q55F The voucher system will do more for the education of blacks and Chicanos than it will for the education of whites.	21.2	21.3	21.4	23.1	19.2	23.1
Q55G Under the voucher system some schools would have too many students and other schools would have empty classrooms.	34.1	38.3	33.9	29.2	32.1	36.1
Q55H For most parents how close a school is to home is the most important reason for choosing a school for his children to attend.	75.4	72.4	81.5	76.9	76.6	74.2
Q55I The voucher system will give parents more control over the schools of Alum Rock.	55.6	57.9	41.0	56.8	55.4	55.7

Table 6.12

VOUCHER PARENTS' BELIEFS ABOUT EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY OFFERED THROUGH VOUCHERS, BY ETHNICITY AND EDUCATION, 1972 PARENT/COMMUNITY SURVEY

Q47 Overall, do you think the chances of your child(ren) getting the kind of education you want for (him/her/them) are better under the voucher system, about the same, or not as good as they were last year?	Ethnicity				Education	
	Total (495)	White (240)	Black (56)	Mexican-American (199)	Less Than High School Graduate (240)	High School Graduate (255)
Better	61.3	58.9	62.5	63.8	63.8	59.0
Same	29.6	32.0	25.0	28.1	26.7	32.4
Not as good	9.1	9.1	12.5	8.0	9.5	8.6

Parents overwhelmingly thought *all* groups would benefit from vouchers. (See Tables 6.13 and 6.14.) School administrators were expected to benefit by the fewest respondents (63.3 percent of parents) and children from black, Chicano, and low-income families were expected to benefit by the most respondents (78 to 80 percent of parents).

Recognizing that the respondent's ethnic group could affect expectations about which groups would benefit from vouchers, we analyzed the responses to this set of questions while controlling for respondent's ethnic group. The results indicate that ethnic group membership did not affect expectations of group benefits or harm. (See Table 6.13.) Blacks, more than Anglos or Mexican-Americans, tended to see vouchers as likely to benefit teachers and school officials.

On the issue of differential benefits to various groups, respondents were also asked directly whether they thought "the voucher system will do more for the education of blacks and Chicanos than it will for the education of whites" (Table 6.11, Q55F). Only 21 percent of the parents agreed with this statement.

Many voucher advocates believe that voucher programs, to have their maximal impact, must include private and parochial schools, but a bare plurality (58 percent) of Alum Rock parents favor the extension of vouchers to private and parochial schools. Blacks were the most favorable group in this respect.

Two items (Q55I and Q55E) gave respondents the opportunity to agree or disagree with assumptions of the voucher model about the relationship between choice and control. Only 55.6 percent of parents agreed that vouchers will give parents greater control over the schools of Alum Rock, and 53.6 percent agreed that the greater the number of schools parents have to choose from, the more control they will have (see Table 6.11).

In summary, after two months of the voucher program, parental support for vouchers was widespread and undifferentiated. Parents responded very positively to items that asked directly about vouchers. At the same time, assumptions underlying the voucher model generated considerably less agreement. This suggests that at the time of the survey, the voucher program had gained for itself widespread verbal support, but that the underlying dynamics were not clear to many respondents.

On the other hand, it might be argued that the positive parental reactions resulted from the increased federal support for the school system or the changes it produced in the administration of the school district. This latter contention, though plausible, seems unlikely given the overall level of sophistication of Alum Rock parents about their schools in the fall of 1972.

Table 6.13

VOUCHER PARENTS' VIEWS OF VOUCHER BENEFIT FOR GROUPS, BY ETHNICITY, 1972

Group	Percent Responding "Helped" to Question Q48			
	Total (495)	White (240)	Black (56)	Mexican-American (199)
Q48 Do you think (GROUP) will be helped or hurt by the voucher system?				
Children from lower-income families	79.6	80.1	73.2	80.9
Children from middle- and upper-income families	73.6	74.9	73.2	72.4
Black children	78.2	78.4	75.0	78.9
White/Anglo children	75.8	77.2	73.2	74.9
Chicano or Mexican-American children	78.8	79.3	71.4	80.4
Teachers	69.0	68.5	78.6	66.8
School administrators	63.3	60.2	73.2	64.3
Parents	76.6	75.1	75.0	78.9

Table 6.14

VOUCHER PARENTS' BELIEFS ABOUT EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY OFFERED THROUGH VOUCHERS, BY ETHNICITY AND EDUCATION, 1973

Q47 Overall, do you think the chances of your child(ren) getting the kind of education you want for (him/her/them) are better under the voucher system, about the same, or not as good as they were last year?	Ethnicity				Education	
	Total (276)[a]	White (120)	Black (27)	Mexican-American (129)	Less Than High School Graduate (153)	High School Graduate (123)
Better	69.2	66.7	63.0	72.0	71.5	66.7
Same	23.9	24.2	33.3	21.7	23.8	23.6
Not as good	6.9	9.1	3.7	5.4	4.7	9.7

[a] The total number of respondents in this and subsequent tables of 1973 results represents only "aware" parents--those who said they had heard of the voucher project.

Changes in Beliefs and Expectations about Vouchers, Fall 1972 to Fall 1973

Parents continued to support the voucher system in a highly undifferentiated manner in fall 1973 as they did in fall 1972. In 1973, old voucher parents are still very positive in their beliefs and expectations about vouchers. Significant changes occurred on only two items between 1972 and 1973. First, parents showed greater agreement with Q55A:

> "The voucher system will result in better public schools in Alum Rock."

In 1972, 77.7 percent of the voucher parents in Alum Rock agreed with this statement. In 1973, 90.9 percent of the old voucher parents agreed. A significant change also occurred on Q55I:

> "The voucher system will give parents more control over the schools in Alum Rock."

In 1972, 55.6 percent of the voucher parents agreed with this statement. In 1973, 65.9 percent of the old voucher parents agreed. This increase was slightly larger for the less-educated old voucher parents than for old voucher parents who are high school graduates (see Tables 6.14 and 6.15).

In 1973 more parents perceived vouchers as potentially beneficial to each of the groups about which they were asked. The increase in the percentage of parents expecting various groups to be helped by vouchers ranged from 5 to 11 percent (see Table 6.16).

In summary, these changes indicate that old voucher parents in 1973 still perceived vouchers in a very positive way and had high expectations for vouchers as a means of improving education in Alum Rock.

PARENTAL AWARENESS

In the fall of 1972, Alum Rock parents had varying degrees of awareness and knowledge of the voucher system and its operations. The failure of some parents to know even the most rudimentary facts about the voucher system is important for later analyses, since it calls into question the reliability of some attitudinal responses of these low-information respondents. Furthermore, it limits many analyses to that subset of parents who are aware of vouchers.

Were parents with children in voucher schools aware of the voucher program and the names of their children's mini-school programs?

In the early months at Alum Rock, many parents were unaware of the voucher system's existence even though their children had been enrolled in voucher schools for two months at the time the fall interviews were conducted. Of the 600 parents interviewed, 105, or 17 percent, claimed they had never heard of the educational voucher program (Q38), and of the 496 parents who had heard of vouchers, 114, or 23 percent, could not remember what program their child was enrolled in (Q51). They could recall the name of the school, but not the mini-school or program they had selected for their child (see Table 6.17).

Parental awareness of the voucher program varies according to the ethnicity and social class of the respondent, and according to whether the parent had a child in the Alum Rock schools during the year prior to the voucher demonstration. Here are the details:

Ethnicity

Whites were best informed; 89.9 percent knew about the voucher project and 82.6 percent of these were able to name their child's program. Black parents were almost as well informed: 86.2 percent had heard of the voucher project. Mexican-Americans, particularly those interviewed in Spanish, were the least informed. Among English-speaking Chicanos, 78.1 percent were aware of the project; but

Table 6.15

VOUCHER PARENTS' BELIEFS ABOUT VOUCHERS, 1973

	Ethnicity				Education	
Percent of Parents Agreeing with the Statement that:	Total (276)	White (120)	Black (27)	Mexican-American (129)	Less Than High School Graduate (153)	High School Graduate (123)
Q55A The voucher system will result in better public schools in Alum Rock.	90.9	89.2	96.3	91.5	91.4	90.2
Q55B Under the voucher system a parent can change the school his child attends at regular times during the school year.	68.1	70.8	59.3	67.4	60.3	78.0
Q55C Some families will leave Alum Rock rather than have their children go to voucher schools.	24.6	30.8	29.6	17.8	19.9	30.9
Q55D Parents should be able to use vouchers in parochial and private as well as public schools.	56.2	49.2	55.6	62.8	58.3	53.7
Q55E Under the voucher system the more schools a parent has to choose from, the more control parents will have over the school system.	59.5	56.2	65.4	59.7	62.5	55.7
Q55F The voucher system will do more for the education of blacks and Chicanos than it will for the education of whites.	15.2	16.7	25.9	11.6	13.2	17.9
Q55G Under the voucher system some schools would have too many students and other schools would have empty classrooms.	28.6	31.7	22.2	27.1	29.8	27.6
Q55H For most parents how close a school is to home is the most important reason for choosing a school for his children to attend.	67.4	64.2	59.3	72.1	75.5	56.9
Q55I The voucher system will give parents more control over the schools of Alum Rock.	65.9	63.3	63.0	69.0	68.9	62.6

Table 6.17

VOUCHER PARENTS' AWARENESS OF VOUCHER SYSTEM, FALL 1972

Item	Percent Responding "Yes" to: Q38 Have you heard about the educational voucher program that started in some of the schools here in Alum Rock this year?
Ethnicity	
White (267)	89.9
Black (65)	86.2
Mexican-American	
Interviewed in English (183)	78.1
Interviewed in Spanish (85)	65.9
Education	
Less than high school graduate (328)	73.2
High school graduate (272)	93.8
Total (600)	82.5
Item	Percent Responding "Yes" to: Q51 Some schools have more than one program. Do you happen to know which program (CHILD) is enrolled in?
Ethnicity	
White (240)	82.5
Black (56)	78.6
Mexican-American	
Interviewed in English (143)	74.1
Interviewed in Spanish (56)	64.3
Education	
Less than high school graduate (240)	71.7
High school graduate (255)	83.2
Total (495)	77.6

Table 6.16

VOUCHER PARENTS' PERCEIVED VOUCHER BENEFIT FOR GROUPS, BY ETHNICITY, 1973

Group	Percent Responding "Helped" to Question Q48			
	Total (276)	White (120)	Black (27)	Mexican-American (129)
Q48 Do you think (GROUP) will be helped or hurt by the voucher system?				
Children from lower-income families	85.5	80.8	88.9	89.1
Children from middle- and upper-income families	82.2	79.2	81.5	85.3
Black children	86.6	84.2	77.8	90.7
White/Anglo children	85.5	84.2	81.5	87.6
Chicano or Mexican-American children	87.0	85.8	77.8	89.9
Teachers	75.7	73.3	81.5	76.7
School administrators	72.8	69.2	77.8	75.2
Parents	87.0	86.7	92.6	86.0

among non-English-speaking Chicanos, only 65.9 percent were aware. (See Table 6.17.)

SES

Social class as measured by education of the respondent relates to parental awareness. Of those respondents who did not graduate from high school, 26 percent did not know about the voucher program; among those respondents who had graduated from high school, only 7 percent were ignorant of the voucher program (Table 6.17).

For advocates of the voucher model, the initial data on parental awareness convey a mixed message. There is a clear suggestion that awareness is strongly correlated with educational level, which might imply that the children of educated people will benefit more. But the differences in awareness by educational level are not matched by significant differences in awareness by ethnic group, except for Mexican-Americans interviewed in Spanish (see Table 6.18). Clearly, simple awareness of the voucher system is the absolute minimum prerequisite for rational parental decisionmaking. If parents do not know what choices are available, they can hardly choose schools for their children effectively.

Table 6.18

VOUCHER PARENTS' AWARENESS OF VOUCHER SYSTEM, FALL 1973

Item	Percent Responding "Yes" to: Q38 Have you heard about the educational voucher program that started in some of the schools here in Alum Rock last year?
Ethnicity	
White (126)	95.2
Black (27)	100.0
Mexican-American	
Interviewed in English (108)	98.2
Interviewed in Spanish (25)	91.7
Education	
Less than high school graduate (161)	95.0
High school graduate (125)	98.4
Total (286)	96.5

Item	Percent Responding "Yes" to: Q51 Some schools have more than one program. Do you happen to know which program (CHILD) is enrolled in?
Ethnicity	
White (120)	93.1
Black (27)	81.5
Mexican-American	
Interviewed in English (106)	85.5
Interviewed in Spanish (23)	44.0
Education	
Less than high school graduate (153)	77.2
High school graduate (123)	94.5
Total (276)	84.9

Differences in Parental Awareness, Fall 1972 to Fall 1973

By the beginning of the second year of the demonstration, 97 percent of the old voucher parents said they had heard of the voucher program, and 85 percent claimed to know the name of their children's program. Once again, education and ethnicity correlated with a knowledge of vouchers and the identification of a child's program. (While only 44 percent of the parents interviewed in Spanish could name their child's program, this number should not be taken too seriously because of the small sample size—only 23 such respondents.)

SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT VOUCHERS

Many sources of information about vouchers were available to parents, and the parent questionnaire elicited a number of responses on their relative importance. This information is reported in Technical Appendix VI-D; this section summarizes the principal findings of the appendix.

As of November 1972, 83 percent of the parents knew about the voucher model in Alum Rock (Table 6.17). These aware parents reported that their sources of information were: printed school materials (87 percent), conversations with school personnel (66 percent), conversations with neighbors, children, and others (50 percent), the mass media (50 percent), and formal meetings (40 percent).

Beyond simple awareness of the model, however, parents were not highly informed. Only two-thirds could identify their child's program by name. But most aware parents believed they had adequate information for their decisions, and voiced approval of the school system's information system. For their program decisions, almost all parents relied on information provided by the schools in the form of written materials or conferences with teachers or principals. Even though parents perceived their information as adequate, it often was not, nor was it always accurate: three parents in five did not understand the basic rule of student transfers, and over half did not realize that the schools provide free transportation for children to voucher schools outside their neighborhood.

These findings condition all other findings about parental program choice: most parents did not have sufficient information to make rational voucher-related decisions; moreover, most parents were not aware of their ignorance.

From a policy perspective, these findings about program information and its distribution suggest that as of 1972:

- The school system needed to develop more effective ways to inform parents about their options.
- Parent counselors needed to become more informed about programs and their availability.
- Rules and procedures about transferring students from one program to another needed to be more clearly explained to parents.

Analysis of the old voucher parents' responses to similar questions in the 1973 fall survey offer some indirect evidence about these three points. The percentage of parents who had accurate information about transportation policies rose from 58.7 percent to 83 percent, and the percentage of parents who knew what their transfer rights were rose from 50 percent to 65 percent. This indicates that there was substantial improvement between 1972 and 1973 in parent knowledge about the operations of the system, presumably through a combination of greater parent interest and more effective school information activities.

PROGRAM CHOICE AND DIVERSITY

Do parents value the idea of program choice, and do they believe there is enough educational diversity in Alum Rock?

Only aware voucher parents are included in these analyses (N = 495). They are overwhelmingly (83 percent) in favor of program choice, a figure that varied little with ethnic group or level of education (see Table 6.19). Blacks and Mexican-Americans were slightly more enthusiastic about choice than whites were, and the less educated liked the idea slightly more than the better educated. These trends seem to reflect a tendency, reported earlier, for have-nots to be more supportive of programs that appear to increase their options than are groups who already have (or perceive themselves as having) substantial power.

Table 6.19

VOUCHER PARENTS' ADVOCACY OF PROGRAM CHOICE BY ETHNICITY AND EDUCATION, 1972

	Ethnicity				Education	
Percent Responding "Very Good" or "Good" to:	Total (495)	White (240)	Black (56)	Mexican-American (199)	Less Than High School Graduate (240)	High School Graduate (255)
Q43 Taking everything together, do you think giving parents a choice between different types of programs is a very good idea, a good idea, a fair idea, or a poor idea?	83.3	80.1	85.7	86.4	85.9	80.9

Most voucher parents (70 percent) regarded the number of programs offered in 1972-73 as about right. Slight ethnic and educational effects appear (see Table 6.20). Whites were slightly more likely to feel that the right number of programs had been offered. Blacks and Mexican-Americans were slightly more likely to feel that there were not enough. At the same time, though, whites were as likely as blacks (and 7 percent more likely than Mexican-Americans) to report that at the time when they had to choose, there was a special kind of program they would have liked, but that was not available (see Table 6.21).

The less educated were slightly more likely than the better educated to feel that the right number of programs had been offered (Table 6.20). The better educated were more likely to feel that there were programs they would have preferred which were not available (Table 6.21).

Most parents reported satisfaction with the number, range, and diversity of programs offered, and reports of dissatisfaction were uncommon.

Not surprisingly, parental satisfaction with the programs offered during the first voucher year was very high: 91 percent of parents reported feeling very satisfied or somewhat satisfied with the kinds of programs offered, and differences among ethnic groups and social classes seem quite small (Table 6.22).

Table 6.20

VOUCHER PARENTS' APPROVAL OF NUMBER OF PROGRAMS OFFERED, BY ETHNICITY AND EDUCATION, 1972

	Ethnicity				Education	
Percent Responding "About Right Number" to:	Total (495)	White (240)	Black (56)	Mexican-American (199)	Less Than High School Graduate (240)	High School Graduate (255)
Q44 This school year, would you say that there are too many different programs available, too few, or just about the right number?	70.4	74.3	67.9	66.3	72.5	68.4

Table 6.21

REPORTED LACK OF DESIRED PROGRAMS, BY ETHNICITY AND EDUCATION, VOUCHER PARENTS, 1972

	Ethnicity				Education	
Percent Responding "Yes" to:	Total (495)	White (240)	Black (56)	Mexican-American (199)	Less Than High School Graduate (240)	High School Graduate (255)
Q45 At the time you had to decide which school your child(ren) would attend, was there some kind of special program you wanted the schools to offer that they didn't offer?	9.8	13.0	12.5	5.1	6.7	12.7

Table 6.22

VOUCHER PARENTS' SATISFACTION WITH PROGRAMS, BY ETHNICITY AND EDUCATION, 1972

	Ethnicity				Education	
Percent Responding "Very Satisfied" or "Satisfied" to:	Total (495)	White (240)	Black (56)	Mexican-American (199)	Less Than High School Graduate (240)	High School Graduate (255)
Q46 How satisfied are you with the kinds of programs offered this school year--very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?	90.7	89.7	85.7	93.5	93.4	88.2

In summary, most aware parents believed there was enough program diversity, liked the idea of choice, and felt satisfied with the program offerings. Ethnic and educational differences do not greatly affect the overall pattern of attitudes toward program choice.

Parental Reasons for School Selection

> *What factors motivated parents in choosing schools for their children?*

In the fall of 1972, parents were asked directly about school selection but not program selection. In general, parents relied on nonprogram-related reasons in choosing schools. At the outset of the demonstration, 299 of the 496 aware voucher parents (60 percent) cited a school's nearness or a child's previous enrollment as their primary criterion, and 104 more cited the same factors as secondary criteria. In all, then, one or the other of these two factors affected the school choices of 403 of the 495 aware parents (81 percent). Only 230 of the parents (46 percent) offered more than one reason.

Other evidence supports the conclusion that parents wanted most of all to send their children to their neighborhood schools—76 percent of the aware parents agreed with the statement:

> "For most parents, how close a school is to home is the most important reason for choosing a school for his children to attend."

Moreover, 88.9 percent of the aware parents stated that their children actually did attend the school closest to the home. This overall finding was true regardless of ethnicity or education.

Only 63 of the 495 parents (12.7 percent) cited a program-related reason as their primary reason for selecting a school, and another 76 parents (15.3 percent) offered a program-related reason as a secondary factor in their school selection; this means only 139 parents (28 percent) reported relying on program content in any way for their selection of a school. Forty-one of the 495 parents (8.2 percent) claimed that they had made no choice of schools.

These responses provide some evidence that if program-related reasons did affect parental choice, it was at the program level within the school, and not at the school level. It is not surprising that parents tended to stay with their neighborhood schools; at the start of the demonstration, the voucher schools had similar reputations, programs had acquired no reputations of their own, and the program choices the schools offered sounded roughly the same (a basic-skills or traditional mini-school, plus several "innovative" options).

As parents become more familiar with the voucher system and as programs develop reputations, geographic proximity may lose some of its importance. The 1973 parent survey results indicate that this may be happening already. Fewer parents (62 percent in 1973 versus 81 percent in 1972) cited geographic location as a factor in their choice of schools, and more people cited program characteristics as the most significant factor in their decision.

TRANSFER ACTIVITY

A major feature of a voucher demonstration is the ability of parents to transfer a child from one program or school to another. Transfers indicate that parents are taking advantage of the choice offered to them by vouchers. This does not imply, of course, that parents who do not transfer their children are necessarily taking less advantage of vouchers; they may simply be satisfied with their original choices.

When a child transfers, the remainder of his voucher goes with him. (The problems in implementing this provision during the first year of the demonstration are discussed in Sec. IV.) Theoretically, therefore, a program's budget and expenditures equal the voucher dollars of the students it attracts. The program would face a financial crisis if large numbers of students transferred out of it. Transfers, then, represent one way in which parents can express preferences for and dissatisfaction with programs, and induce the school to respond to parental inputs.

As we have seen, mini-schools or programs, rather than schools, became the educational suppliers in the Alum Rock demonstration.

The emergence of programs rather than schools as the unit of parental choice has several implications:

- Educational diversity in program offerings may increase;
- Parents can transfer children from one program to another without changing schools; and
- Separate marketplaces for parental choice may develop within each school.

This analysis deals with two types of transfers:

- Transfers between schools, i.e., between programs in different schools;
- Transfers between programs within one school.

Transfers of the first type are called "school" or "between-school" transfers; those of the second type are called "program transfers." One would expect more program transfers than school transfers because program transfers entail fewer administrative details, take less time, and cause less family disruption. Moreover, many parents want all their children to attend the same school. In addition, transfers at the end of the school year (summer transfers) are likely to be more attractive to parents and children than transfers during the school year, because they are less disruptive to the family and school routine.

This analysis includes only voucher students. For the school year transfers, it includes all students not in special education programs; for summer transfers, it excludes all students who transfer between programs or schools because of graduation, kindergarten entry, feeder school entry, and immigration. (See Technical Appendix VI-C for details under "Legitimate Transfer Population.")

Three other types of student transfer are excluded from this analysis. First, student transfers that can be uniquely attributed to a family's residential mobility within the school district are eliminated; second, student transfers that resulted from the school district's redrawing of schools' attendance zones; and third, student transfers determined to be school-initiated and not parent-initiated are not included in this analysis (for further explanation see Technical Appendix VI-C).

1972 Transfer Activity [7]

> *Did parents take advantage of the voucher option to change the programs or schools of their children during the first year of the voucher demonstration?*

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[7] Changer families are of particular interest for the evaluation of vouchers; in a special effort to include them in the parent survey, a special sample of changer families was interviewed. These families made what appeared to be school changes because of the voucher option between May and October 1972.

Summer Transfers

During the first year of the voucher demonstration, transfer activity was low for both summer and school year transfers. (During the summer of 1972, within-school program transfers were not available to voucher parents.) Only 94 transfers can be directly attributed to parents' exercising their voucher options during the spring and summer of 1972. These 94 transfers represent less than 4 percent of the eligible transfer population (Table 6.23).[a]

Table 6.23

STUDENT TRANSFER ACTIVITY, 1972 AND 1973

Item	1972 Summer Transfers		1972-73 School Year Transfers		1973 Summer Transfers	
School transfers						
From old voucher schools	94		17		242	
From new voucher schools	0		0		538	
Total school transfers		94		17		780
Program transfers						
Old voucher schools	0		121		721	
New voucher schools	0		0		0	
Total program transfers		0		121		721
Total, school and program transfers		94		138		1501
Legitimate transfer population[a]						
Old voucher schools		2549		3086		2417
New voucher schools		0		0		2896
Total transfer population		2549		3086		5313

[a] See Appendix VI-C.

School Year Transfers

During the 1972-73 school year, 138 program and school transfers occurred: 17 (13 percent) were between-school transfers, and 121 (87 percent) were within-school program transfers.

The small number of transfers is not surprising, since we have seen that in the fall of 1972 only half the voucher parents knew they could change programs during the school year. It is interesting that ethnicity did not relate to transfer activity; white, black, and Mexican-American parents transferred their children at the same rate. Nor did the small number of school transfers noticeably affect the ethnic makeup of any school (see Sec. IX).

There were 56 families in the original changer sample, but not all had actually exercised their voucher option: 8 had made changes in schools associated with "special education" programs; 16 changed schools at the middle school level because of changes in the catchment areas of the middle schools; 7 appeared in the sample because of clerical errors; 4 changers were enrolled in kindergarten. Of the 21 remaining families, 6 had left the school district by June 1973. Thus 15 families were left; comparing these parents on a variety of attitude items with the voucher parent sample produced no interesting differences.

[a] In 1972, a particular type of administrative transfer occurred that initially inflated the rate of transfer activity. (See Technical Appendix VI-C for details.)

To sum up for the first demonstration year:

- The time of the year affects levels of transfer activity (there were more school-to-school transfers during the summer than during the school year).
- Parents did not transfer their children through the use of their voucher option very frequently.
- Parents preferred within-school program transfers to between-school transfers.
- Whites, blacks, and Mexican-Americans were equal in their propensity to transfer their children.
- Transfers did not noticeably change the ethnic makeup of any school.

1973 Transfer Activity

In the fall of 1973, seven new schools entered the voucher demonstration; this increased the number of programs available to parents at the time of their enrollment applications from 22 to 45. And, after a year's experience, parents knew more about the voucher mechanism, and the school system was more skilled in distributing program information to parents.

The following analysis of transfer activity for the spring of 1973 requires a distinction between new and old voucher students.

Old voucher students are students eligible for voucher-related transfers who were enrolled in the six original voucher schools during the 1972-1973 school year; *new voucher students* are students eligible for voucher-related transfers who were enrolled in the seven new voucher schools during the 1973-74 school year. (There are two middle schools—Fischer and Sheppard—among the new voucher schools, but only one—Pala—among the old ones.)

This distinction is necessary since old voucher students can engage in both school and program transfers at the time of their application, while new voucher students can engage in only between-school transfers at the time of their application because they have never been enrolled in mini-schools at all. In comparing the summer transfer activity of 1972 and 1973, preserving the "old-new" distinction provides for more distinct comparisons. An overall comparison of the transfer activity for the two years might be misleading since program transfers are available only to old voucher students. This has twc effects: first, for old voucher students it may decrease the number of between-school transfers if parents prefer program transfers; second, the transfers for new voucher students in 1973 are more appropriately compared with the 1972 transfers of old voucher students (neither had program transfers available).

Did parents take greater advantage in 1973 than in 1972 of their voucher option to change their children's schools or programs by means of summer transfers?

In the spring and summer of 1973, 780 students (14.7 percent of those eligible to do so) transferred from one school to another (Table 6.23). These transfers included 242 old voucher students (or 10 percent of this group) and 538 new voucher students (or 18.6 percent of this group). This compares with the 4.1 percent of eligible students who changed schools the previous summer. In addition, 29.8 percent (721) of old voucher students changed programs within the same school. Thus close to 40 percent of old voucher students changed either school or programs at the end of the first year of the demonstration. These figures seem to indicate an increased awareness of voucher options on the part of parents. It is also apparent that parents who are seeking a new program for their children prefer to find that program within the same school building; within-school transfers accounted for about three-fourths of the transfers of old voucher students.

Are programs in old voucher schools more attractive to new voucher parents because they have reputations based on their first-year performance?

Overall, old voucher schools do not attract disproportionate numbers of transfer students; 50.6 percent of all student transfers are to old voucher schools. Students transferring from new voucher schools show a slight preference for old voucher schools: 54.6 percent of the transfers from new voucher schools are to old voucher schools; students transferring from old voucher schools prefer the programs in the new voucher schools: 58.3 percent of the transfers from old voucher schools are to new voucher schools (see Table 6.24). These results appear to deny the existence of an old voucher school reputation effect. But before drawing this conclusion, we should look at the same analysis for students who transfer among the elementary schools.

Table 6.24

SCHOOL-TO-SCHOOL APPLICATION TRANSFERS IN 1973

	Elementary and Middle Schools			Elementary Schools Only		
Destination	Transfers from Old Voucher School in Spring 1973	Transfers from New Voucher School in Spring 1973	Total	Transfers from Old Voucher School in Spring 1973	Transfers from New Voucher School in Spring 1973	Total
To old voucher schools in fall 1973	101	294	395	93	252	345
To new voucher schools in fall 1973	141	244	385	40	156	196
Total	242	538	780	133	408	541

When the analysis is carried out for students enrolled only in the elementary schools, the old voucher schools disproportionately attract transfer students. Overall, 63.8 percent of the elementary school student transfers are to old voucher schools; 61.8 percent of the students transferring from new voucher prefer old voucher schools, and 69.2 percent of students transferring from an old voucher school prefer old voucher schools.

Does transfer activity vary according to parent's ethnic background?

The results in Table 6.25 reveal that in 1973 there were only small differences in propensity to transfer by ethnic group: black parents were the most likely to have transferred a student, and Mexican-Americans were the least likely. Black parents preferred school-to-school transfers more than the other groups did. For a discussion of the effects of transfer activity on ethnic distribution among voucher schools, see Sec. IX.

Thus, at the start of the second year of the demonstration:

- Parents took greater advantage of their voucher option than in 1972; this is true for old and new voucher students.
- When available, parents preferred program transfers to school transfers.
- Parents of different ethnic backgrounds did not show differential transfer rates.

A NATIONAL CONTEXT

If the findings of the Alum Rock survey of parental attitudes can be generalized to the entire nation, policymakers will have important information on which to base future decisions about vouchers. But if adults in Alum Rock have significantly different attitudes about education from those of adults in the nation as a whole, then the first-year findings in Alum Rock may not be valid for other communities.

Table 6.25

SUMMER TRANSFER ACTIVITY FOR 1973, BY ETHNICITY

	Ethnicity (%)		
Item	White	Black	Mexican-American
Stayers	71.7	67.7	73.8
Program changers	12.2	12.1	13.8
School changers	16.1	20.2	12.4

NOTE: The calculation excludes 71 students, about 1.3 percent of the total, because data were lacking on their ethnicity.

To assess the validity of the Alum Rock findings for the nation as a whole and to provide a baseline for comparison, Rand had a subset of the fall 1972 Alum Rock survey items appended to a national survey of 1500 adults conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), Chicago, in the spring of 1973.

The national survey generates a context for interpreting a community survey's results. Even though a community sample may differ demographically from a national sample, local-national survey comparisons are still meaningful because overall sample comparisons can be replicated for different subgroups within each sample. For example, young white parents in the community sample can be compared with young white parents in the national sample. Similarly, regional and urbanism differences can be taken into account by limiting the local-national comparisons to those national respondents that come from the same region and type of community (urban or rural) as the local sample.

When local and national surveys are done regularly, changes in the attitudes of the respondents in the local survey can be compared with changes in the attitudes of the national respondents. Local respondents may mirror a similar trend nationally; but without temporal comparisons from a national sample, attitude changes by voucher demonstration participants might be incorrectly attributed to the effects of the demonstration rather than to a national trend. The national data can also be split into demographic subgroups to permit comparisons with the same subgroups in the local sample.

In March 1973, NORC conducted a National Amalgam Survey, known as the General Sociological Survey, to collect sociological and attitudinal data from a representative national sample of 1500 adults. It is known as an Amalgam Survey because it contains sets of items provided by many different researchers, none of whom alone could afford the cost of a national survey. They pool their resources, and with the help of NORC, they are able to receive a large amount of demographic and attitudinal data on a national sample of adults. (See Technical Appendix VI-B for details.)

The subset of items Rand appended to the Amalgam do not relate specifically to vouchers, but focus on more general educational attitudes related to the voucher model. These items sampled attitudes in the following domains:

1. *Satisfaction-Perceived School Quality.* This dimension focuses on evaluations of teachers, principals, school boards, and education in general in a local community (Q8, Q9, Q30).
2. *Parental Choice and Advice.* These items explore parents' attitudes about the role of choice in the context of curriculum, the schools their children attend, and the perceived responsiveness of principals and teachers to the advice of parents (Q29A, Q29G, Q29H, Q35D).
3. *Beliefs About Parental Control.* These items examine parental beliefs about parents' participation in the hiring and firing of teachers, and the notion that parents should have greater influence over curriculum content and school expenditures (Q36A, Q36B, Q36C, Q36D).

With the exception of the Parental Choice-Advice items, the same or equivalent forms of these items have appeared on other national surveys.*

To place the attitudes of Alum Rock parents, as distinguished from all Alum Rock adults, in a national perspective, comparisons are carried out separately for parents and nonparents. Parents are defined in slightly different ways for the two samples:

- A parent in the Alum Rock sample is an adult with one or more children attending a public elementary or middle school.
- A parent in the Amalgam sample is an adult with one or more children enrolled in any elementary or middle school. (In the Amalgam survey it was not possible to differentiate parents by the type of school—public or private—that their children attend. Since parents with children in high school only were defined as nonparents in the Alum Rock survey, the same convention was adopted for the Amalgam survey.)

Parents have direct contact with school systems so that their attitudes are based on current experience, not on the reported experiences of other adults; their perceptions and attitudes should be more accurate than those of nonparents. This is not to say that nonparents' attitudes about education are not valid, but that they are less immediate, since they are likely to derive second-hand from other people's experience, and from news reports and the like.

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* See, for example, A. Campbell and H. Schuman, "Racial Attitudes in 15 American Cities," in *Supplemental Studies for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1968; and R. J. Riley and D. K. Cohen, *Attitudes Toward Education in the City of Boston: Report to the State Department of Education*, 1970. Both surveys found substantially less satisfaction than that reported in Alum Rock, with blacks more dissatisfied than whites. Using somewhat different satisfaction items, Gallup, op. cit., found levels of satisfaction in 1972 and 1973 that are closer to reported levels of satisfaction in Alum Rock.

To simplify these comparisons, Alum Rock voucher parents and nonvoucher parents are pooled into one group. (Analyses indicated that in these attitudinal domains, differences between voucher and nonvoucher parents were neither large nor consistent.) Thus, the appropriate comparisons are:

- Alum Rock parents versus national parents.
- Alum Rock nonparents versus national nonparents.

At first, these comparisons are carried out without controls for differences in the demography of the samples; these comparisons show the range of differences between the samples. After the Alum Rock-national sample comparisons are available, they are replicated for different subgroups. For example, Alum Rock parents without a high school diploma are compared with parents in a national sample without a diploma. If differences between these kinds of subgroups mirror the overall sample differences, then the overall Alum Rock national sample differences have greater meaning.

Satisfaction

Alum Rock adults perceive their schools and the performance of their teachers and principals as "good" or "very good" more frequently than do the adults in a national sample, but large differences exist between parents and nonparents. (See Table 6.26.) Compared with the national sample, Alum Rock parents have more positive perceptions (+6 percent) on two of the three perceived-quality items (Q8, Q10); and on the other item (Q9) there is virtually no difference. Alum Rock nonparents have less positive perceptions than national nonparents; the differences range from 5 to 10 percent. In regard to school boards (Q28), national adults express greater satisfaction than Alum Rock residents. This is true for parents and nonparents.

These data also show that the differences between parents and nonparents within each of the samples (3 to 31 percent) are greater than the differences between Alum Rock parents and national parents (1 to 17 percent) and are also greater than those between Alum Rock nonparents and national nonparents (1 to 10 percent).

The differences in satisfaction and perceived quality between parents and nonparents suggest that parents' direct contact with schools leads to more positive perceptions. This may reflect an attempt to reduce cognitive dissonance on the part of parents: "If my children attend these schools, they must not be so bad." Nonparents do not have similar contact or commitment. Also they pay taxes for schools, but do not receive the same benefits as parents. These findings suggest that parents' attitudes toward public schools may be much more favorable than those of the community as a whole; and because schools serve parents more than nonparents, parents' attitudes and perceptions may be more important.[10]

These differences are of course not precise; they are subject to sampling error. Technically, the sampling error on these percentages ranges from 4 to 7 percent for the overall samples of parents.

Parental Choice and Advice

On two of the choice items (Q29A and Q29I), Alum Rock parents and nonparents

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[10] These are consistent with other findings that parents are more satisfied with schools than are nonparents (Gallup, 1970, 1972, 1973).

Table 6.26

PARENTAL SATISFACTION WITH SCHOOLS AND THEIR STAFFS:
ALUM ROCK VERSUS A NATIONAL SAMPLE

(In percent)

Percent Responding "Very Good" and "Good" or (Q28) "Very Satisfied" and "Satisfied" to the Question:	Alum Rock Parents (N=857)	U.S. Parents (N=481)	Alum Rock Nonparents (N=363)	U.S. Nonparents (N=1014)
Q8 In general, do you think that the education the children get in the local elementary schools in this area is very good, good, fair, or poor?				
Total	73	67	44	54
Less than high school graduate	71	63	55	52
High school graduate	76	69	45	55
Q9 What about the principals in the local elementary schools in this area--do you think they are very good, good, fair, or poor?				
Total	73	74	49	54
Less than high school graduate	71	72	55	54
High school graduate	76	74	45	54
Q10 Do you think the teachers in the local elementary schools in this area are very good, good, fair, or poor?				
Total	80	74	49	59
Less than high school graduate	79	68	50	60
High school graduate	81	76	49	57
Q28 In general, how satisfied are you with the job your local school board is doing? Would you say you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?				
Total	55	72	52	58
Less than high school graduate	55	74	58	62
High school graduate	54	70	46	55

are more favorable than national adults, but on a third (Q29H) the pattern reverses.[11] (See Table 6.27.) The item that produces the reversal is:

> "Most parents like the idea that they should have a choice about the types of schools that their children attend."

This statement is subject to a variety of interpretations. For example, in communities where open enrollment and desegregation plans have been an issue, it may take on racial connotations by raising the controversy associated with open enrollment plans. Put another way, the respondents' community context may mediate the meaning of the statement. In Alum Rock, desegregation has not been a major issue, and it is likely that parents do not associate choice with the maintenance of neighborhood schools.

Parental Influence in School Decisionmaking

Adults in Alum Rock differ from adults in the nation as a whole in their beliefs about parental influence in three of the four decision areas: hiring and firing of teachers, hiring and firing of principals, and school spending. (See Table 6.28.) More Alum Rock respondents think parents should influence decisions about school staff, but more national respondents think parents should influence expenditure decisions.

National nonparents under age 40 hold different beliefs about parental influence from those of older nonparents. They desire a greater say in all the decision areas; in fact, their attitudes differ very little from those of Alum Rock parents.

Summary of Sample Differences

Without controlling for education, region, or race, comparisons of the fall 1972 Alum Rock and the March 1973 National Amalgam Surveys produce mixed results. Differences between the two samples vary with the attitudinal domain. In general:

- For the satisfaction items, parent/nonparent differences are larger than Alum Rock-national differences. In both samples, parents report more satisfaction with schools than do nonparents.
- Sample differences are moderate and consistent for the domain of choice and advice, with Alum Rock respondents being more supportive.
- Alum Rock residents are more supportive of parental influence over staff and curricular decisionmaking than the country as a whole, but less supportive of parental influence over school expenditures.

Do differences in the demography of the national and Alum Rock samples account for apparent attitudinal differences between the two samples?

If the pattern of differences between the Alum Rock and national samples holds when variables such as ethnicity and education are controlled, then the previous findings may be viewed with greater confidence.

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[11] Controlling for age for the nonparent sample (under 40 and over 40), the findings indicate that in both samples young nonparents are more likely than older nonparents to believe that parents should have a greater say about what their children learn in the schools (Q29A). The young nonparent group is composed of unmarried people or married couples without children or with young children. This group is unlikely to have children who have already passed through the junior high school level, in contrast to the older nonparents. Thus these findings suggest that, in the future, demand for greater say about curricular content may increase.

Table 6.27

PARENTAL AND NONPARENTAL ATTITUDES TOWARD PARENTAL CHOICE AND INFLUENCE IN THE SCHOOLS: ALUM ROCK VERSUS A NATIONAL SAMPLE, 1972-73

(In percent)

Percent Who Agree With the Statement that:	Alum Rock Parents (N=857)	U.S. Parents (N=481)	Alum Rock Nonparents (N=363)	U.S. Nonparents (N=1019)
Q29A Parents should have more to say about what their children learn in school.				
Total	84	75	81	75
Less than high school graduate	85	87	81	80
High school graduate	83	68	80	72
Q29H Most parents like the idea that they should have a choice about the kinds of schools their children attend.				
Total	84	92	84	90
Less than high school graduate	83	92	81	87
High school graduate	87	93	88	92
Q29I Children will get a better education if their parents can select the school they go to.				
Total	58	40	55	43
Less than high school graduate	62	41	54	49
High school graduate	57	40	55	40
Q29G In general, teachers and principals don't want the advice of parents.				
Total	30	40	40	47
Less than high school graduate	32	42	38	48
High school graduate	30	40	42	47
Q35D Giving parents a choice about the schools their children attend will make teachers more responsive to their complaints and suggestions.				
Total	65	53	62	60
Less than high school graduate	66	62	67	65
High school graduate	63	47	57	56

Demographically, the Alum Rock sample differs from the national sample in the same way that a sample from any large city might differ from a national sample. In particular, a greater proportion of the respondents in the Alum Rock sample are poorly educated and are members of minority groups. Compared with the subsample of national respondents residing in metropolitan areas in the urban north, the differences are smaller, but some differences remain. A much larger proportion of respondents in Alum Rock are Mexican-American than in a comparable sample of respondents in the urban north.

Taking into account the region of the country and the urbanism of a respondent's community does not change the overall pattern of differences between Alum Rock and national samples. Regional differences occur on some items, but they are not systematic. In Tables 6.26, 6.27, and 6.28 it is possible to contrast respondents of various educational levels in the two samples—e.g., less educated Alum Rock parents with less educated parents nationally. Comparisons of this type yield differences similar to the overall Alum Rock-national comparisons.

Table 6.28

PARENTAL AND NONPARENTAL ATTITUDES TOWARD PARENTAL INFLUENCE OVER SCHOOL STAFF, CURRICULUM, AND EXPENDITURES: ALUM ROCK VERSUS A NATIONAL SAMPLE, 1972-73

(In percent)

Percent Responding "Yes" to the Question:	Alum Rock Parents (N=857)	U.S. Parents (N=481)	Alum Rock Nonvoucher Nonparents (N=363)	U.S. Nonparents (N=1019)
Q36A Do you think parents should be able to help decide which teachers get hired or fired in their children's schools?				
Total	36	28	35	27
Less than high school graduate	37	30	37	28
High school graduate	35	28	34	25
Q36B Should parents be able to help decide whether a principal is hired or kept on?				
Total	52	41	50	40
Less than high school graduate	54	46	49	40
High school graduate	51	39	51	38
Q36C Should parents be able to help decide what should be taught in schools?				
Total	61	54	59	57
Less than high school graduate	54	52	56	53
High school graduate	68	55	63	59
Q36D Should they be able to help decide how the school spends its money?				
Total	55	64	58	62
Less than high school graduate	50	57	55	60
High school graduate	61	67	61	62

VII. TEACHER REACTIONS TO THE VOUCHER DEMONSTRATION IN 1972-73

INTRODUCTION

It is clear that the capabilities, activities, attitudes, and morale of teachers are important to all schools, including the ones in the voucher demonstration. Of all school personnel, teachers have the closest contact with students, and have the greatest influence on them. And teacher organizations have a strong voice in shaping educational legislation at local, state, and national levels.

This section has four main purposes. The first is to compare demographic characteristics of Alum Rock teachers with those of teachers elsewhere. The second is to describe the role of teachers in starting and expanding the demonstration. The third is to describe ways in which the first year of the demonstration has affected teachers. The fourth is to describe ways in which the teachers have influenced the course of the demonstration.

Information on Alum Rock teachers, their activities, and their perspectives has been collected from a variety of sources. Self-administered questionnaire surveys were distributed to all Alum Rock teachers in November 1972 and May 1973. Rand staff members attended numerous voucher-related functions, talked with teachers, and observed classrooms in the six voucher schools (see Sec. V). The district supplied information on teacher demographic characteristics (age, sex, and ethnicity). Comparative data on teachers in other districts and areas were garnered from publications of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the California State Department of Education. Descriptions of the sources and quality of data ordinarily appear within the text, as the data are presented.

KEY FINDINGS

- In general, there are no striking demographic differences between teachers in voucher schools and teachers in nonvoucher schools.
- Teachers and their representatives played a mildly supportive role in the district's decision to enter the demonstration. Teachers in the 6 original voucher schools formally voted their approval of participation, although some teachers reported that they did so under pressure from their principals.
- In the early spring of 1973, teachers at 7 more schools voted to join the demonstration for 1973-74. As in the 6 original voucher schools, principals actively worked to influence their teachers toward joining the demonstration.
- In November 1972 most teachers in the 6 voucher schools reported they were pleased to be participating in the demonstration. Teachers in the 18 nonvoucher schools were about evenly split when asked if they would be pleased to participate.
- In May 1973 most teachers in the 6 original voucher schools again reported they were pleased to be participating in the demonstration. Most teachers in the 7 expansion schools reported being pleased that their schools had decided to join the demonstration. And most teachers at the remaining nonvoucher schools reported being pleased that their schools were *not* joining the demonstration.

- Many voucher teachers said they had reaped benefits from the demonstration, including:
  - a. More money for classroom use.
  - b. Increased decisionmaking autonomy.
  - c. Closer peer relations within some mini-schools.
  - d. Increased stimulation to innovate.
- Many voucher teachers also reported that the demonstration imposed costs on them, including:
  - a. More work.
  - b. Tensions between mini-schools.
  - c. Inconveniences arising from free student enrollment and transfer privileges.
  - d. Job or status insecurity.
- By the spring of 1973, voucher teachers had not reached any clear consensus about the demonstration's effects on students.
- Teachers exerted a noticeable influence on the rules of the demonstration governing teachers' job rights, information to be made available to parents, and rules governing student transfers during the school year.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ALUM ROCK TEACHERS

The following pages compare various characteristics of Alum Rock teachers with those of other teachers in Santa Clara County, in California, and in the nation.

A comparison of the Alum Rock teachers with a national sample of 1533 teachers[1] in terms of age and sex suggests that Alum Rock has smaller percentages of younger teachers (aged 29 or less) and of older teachers (aged 50 or more) than would be typical for the nation (Table 7.1). On the other hand, Alum Rock's percentage of male teachers (23 percent) is very close to the national average (24 percent).

Table 7.2 reveals that Alum Rock has had a larger percentage of Spanish-surnamed teachers than the state or nation since at least 1968. The number of Spanish-surnamed teachers in Alum Rock has jumped from 27 in 1970 to 73 in 1972. In the fall of 1972, nearly 11 percent of Alum Rock's teachers were Spanish-surnamed, compared with 3 percent statewide and 1 percent nationwide. This is primarily due to a strong affirmative action hiring policy recently adopted by the district.

Table 7.2 also shows that Alum Rock has had a larger percentage of black teachers than the state average since 1968, but that their numbers have remained relatively stable. Alum Rock's employment of black teachers has been slightly below the national average since 1968 (which is relatively high primarily because of the high percentage of black teachers in the southern states and the District of Columbia).

Figure 7.1 compares median teachers' salaries in Alum Rock, Santa Clara County, and California. In 1968 and 1969, they were all comparable. Alum Rock slipped behind in 1970-71, and then jumped ahead of both the county and state averages in 1971-72, when the district adopted a new salary schedule. For the five-year period as a whole, it seems fair to say that Alum Rock teachers' salaries have been comparable to other teachers' salaries in the same region.

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[1] Statistics for 1046 elementary and junior high school teachers are reported here. The overall response rate for this survey was 84 percent. Survey details can be found in *Status of the American Public School Teacher, 1970-1971*, pp. 8-9 and Appendix A.

Table 7.1

AGE AND SEX OF ALUM ROCK TEACHERS AND A NATIONAL SAMPLE
(In percent)

Schools	Age				Sex		
	Under 30	30-49	50 or More	Number of Respondents	Male	Female	Number Respondents
U.S.[a]	38	38	25	1032	24	76	1046
Alum Rock[b]	25	61	14	608	23	77	612

SOURCE: NEA Research Division, *Status of the American Public School Teacher, 1970-71*, Appendix C, p. 119. National data were collected in spring 1971. Alum Rock data are for fall 1972.

[a] Includes elementary, middle school, junior high, and intermediate school teachers. Excludes junior-senior high, senior high, and combination elementary-secondary teachers.

[b] About 90 percent of the teachers in Alum Rock are represented. Teachers not assigned a school code by the Data Management Contractor were excluded; they were primarily specialists (e.g., reading, speech, educationally handicapped).

Table 7.2

ETHNIC GROUP MEMBERSHIP OF ALUM ROCK TEACHERS COMPARED WITH STATE AND NATIONAL PERCENTAGES

Area	Fall 1968		Fall 1970		Fall 1972[a]	
	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number
Spanish-surnamed teachers						
United States	0.8	--	1.0	--	1.2	--
California	2.2	--	2.5	--	2.9	--
Alum Rock	3.0	17	4.6	27	10.9	73
Black teachers						
United States	9.6	--	9.4	--	9.5	--
California	4.5	--	4.9	--	5.1	--
Alum Rock	7.3	42	7.0	41	7.8	52

SOURCE: United States Office for Civil Rights, Directory of Public Elementary and Secondary Schools in Selected Districts, fall 1968 and fall 1970.

Alum Rock Union School District, "October 1972 Racial and Ethnic Data (revised 12/13/72)."

United States Office for Civil Rights (telephone communication): fall 1972 data for California.

[a] Fall 1972 figures for Alum Rock include teachers and other certificated staff assigned to schools.



SOURCE: California State Department of Education, Salaries of Certified Employees in California Public Schools, Sacramento, 1972; and Santa Clara County Office of Education, A Report of Certificated Salaries and Related Information for Santa Clara County School Districts, San Jose, annual publication.

NOTE: Figures have been rounded for ease of comparison.

Fig. 7.1—Median teachers' salaries for Alum Rock, Santa Clara County, and California, 1968,1972

Comparison of Alum Rock Teachers in Voucher and Nonvoucher Schools

Statistical tests comparing demographic characteristics of teachers in 13 voucher and 11 nonvoucher schools show no significant differences in teachers' age, sex, ethnicity, or salary distributions. Selected demographic characteristics of teachers, aggregated by school, are presented in Technical Appendix VII.

TEACHER PERSPECTIVES IN NOVEMBER 1972

Alum Rock teachers were involved in both the district's and their schools' decisions to participate in the voucher demonstration. Despite opposition to vouchers by both the National Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers, Alum Rock teacher organizations chose to support the transition voucher demonstration. Section III discusses the results of the 1971 Alum Rock feasibility study survey of teacher attitudes, the teachers' role in starting the demonstration and shaping its initial rules, and the position of Alum Rock teachers' organizations.

In early November 1972 Rand distributed a questionnaire to all teachers in Alum Rock, under a cover letter from the Superintendent of Schools, William Jefferds. The questionnaire took about an hour to fill out. Teachers were guaranteed confidentiality of their responses, and were requested to mail their completed questionnaires back to Rand in the addressed, stamped envelopes provided. The questions concerned teachers' initial experiences with the demonstration and their attitudes toward the demonstration and its various aspects.

The response rate was 76 percent for teachers in the 6 voucher schools, and 58 percent for teachers in the 18 other Alum Rock schools. There is multiple evidence that nonresponse bias was not a problem in this survey. Table 7.3, for example, shows that teachers who did not return a questionnaire in November 1972 were almost identical to teachers who did in the attitudes they expressed toward the demonstration sixteen months later. Responding and nonresponding teachers have also been found to have similar demographic characteristics (e.g., age and salary).

Teachers' responses to the November 1972 Rand Questionnaire are described below, organized around the following three topics: (1) voucher teachers' *early experiences* with the demonstration; (2) voucher and nonvoucher teachers' *overall reactions* toward the demonstration; and (3) teachers' more specific *expectations* and attitudes about the demonstration that could explain their overall reactions to it.

Table 7.3

MARCH 1974 COMPARISON OF TEACHERS WHO DID AND DID NOT RETURN QUESTIONNAIRES IN THE NOVEMBER 1972 RAND SURVEY

(In percent)

Question (asked in March 1974): In general, do you think the voucher demonstration will increase, decrease, or not change the quality of education received by the children of Alum Rock?

Teacher Group	Increase Quality	Not Change Quality	Decrease Quality	N
Fall 1972 respondents	56	34	10	77
Fall 1972 nonrespondents	55	38	6	65

SOURCE: Telephone survey of Alum Rock teachers conducted for Rand in early March 1974 by Field Research Corporation. For this survey, 24 percent of the teacher population was contacted. Ninety-seven percent of the teachers who were contacted agreed to be interviewed.

Voucher Teachers' Early Experiences

One significant change that came with the demonstration was an increase in funding. Almost all teachers (94 percent) reported receiving increased funds for classroom use, and 73 percent reported an increase in teacher authority over the expenditure of funds (Table 7.4). Section V discusses some of the ways teachers chose to use these new funds.

Another change, noted by 74 percent of the voucher teachers, was increased competition for students. Eighty percent of the responding voucher teachers said

Table 7.4

VOUCHER TEACHERS' EARLY EXPERIENCES WITH THE DEMONSTRATION

Question	Percent Agreeing	Number of Respondents
NEW FUNDS, INCREASED TEACHER AUTHORITY OVER FUNDS		
Under the voucher demonstration, have you received additional funds to spend in your classroom? (Q9)	94	99
Under the voucher demonstration, do teachers have more say over the expenditure of funds on a school-wide basis? (Q10)	73	100
INCREASED COMPETITION FOR STUDENTS		
Some people have suggested that under the voucher demonstration teachers have begun to compete to get the students into their programs. Have you noticed such competition at your school? (Q49)	74	102
In speaking to parents, did you recommend particular programs for their children? (Q26)	38	98
From what you know, did other teachers make specific program recommendations to parents? (Q27)	80	96
NEW EDUCATIONAL OFFERINGS		
Do you think the new programs which your school is offering as part of the voucher demonstration represent significant departures from your school's previous educational methods? (Q5)	57	101
Are you conducting your own classroom this fall very differently from the way you have in the past? (Q8) ..	79	100
EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT OF TEACHERS TO PROGRAMS		
Is the program in which you are teaching your first choice? (Q6)	76	101
Do you feel the teacher assignment process in general was fair? (Q7)	79	99
MIXED REACTIONS TO HRC TRAINING		
Have you participated in a Human Resources Center Training Program? (Q51)	71	101
If yes, would you say the training has:		
Facilitated the voucher demonstration? (Q51a)	46	71
Created new problems? (Q51a)	76	68
LITTLE INCREASE IN CONTACT WITH PARENTS		
Compared with last year, are your contacts with parents of disadvantaged children more frequent? (Q32)	24	108
Compared with last year, are your contacts with other parents more frequent? (Q32)	22	107

SOURCE: Rand Teacher Questionnaire, November 1972.

NOTE: In the context of this questionnaire, the term "disadvantaged" describes children eligible to receive free school lunches.

they had observed competition in the form of teacher recommendations of specific mini-schools to parents; however, only 38 percent said that they themselves had recommended particular programs to parents.

When asked if the demonstration had increased educational innovation in their schools, voucher teacher response seemed to depend on the way the question was asked. A slim majority (57 percent) of the responding teachers felt that their mini-school programs represented "significant departures" from their schools' previous educational methods. But fully 79 percent reported that they were conducting their classrooms "very differently" from the way they had in the past.

Seventy-six percent of the original voucher teachers reported being assigned to the mini-school program of their first choice, and 79 percent reported that the teacher assignment process "in general" was fair (e.g., equitable).

Seventy-one percent reported participating in staff training activities provided by the Human Resources Center (HRC). Their reactions to the training were mixed. About half of the participating teachers (46 percent) reported that the training had "facilitated the voucher demonstration." But 76 percent also felt that the training had "created new problems." HRC's relation to the demonstration is discussed more fully in Secs. III and IV.

One of the hoped-for outcomes of the demonstration in Alum Rock was increased interaction between schools and parents. In the first two months, however, voucher teachers reported relatively little change in their frequency of contact with parents. Twenty-four percent felt that their contacts with parents of disadvantaged children were more frequent compared to the previous year, whereas 68 percent felt that their contacts were about the same in frequency. Twenty-two percent felt that their contacts with "other parents" had become more frequent, whereas 73 percent felt that their contacts with these parents were about the same. Such increases as did occur in teachers' contacts with parents seemed unrelated to teachers' direct participation in the demonstration, since 18 percent of nonvoucher teachers also reported increased contacts with parents of disadvantaged children, and 19 percent reported increased contacts with "other parents."

Teachers' Overall Reactions

Table 7.5 summarizes the responses of voucher and nonvoucher teachers to several questions about their overall reactions toward the demonstration. Seventy percent of the responding voucher teachers reported being somewhat pleased or very pleased to be participating in the demonstration, and 23 percent reported being somewhat displeased or very displeased. Teachers in the 18 nonvoucher schools were about evenly split when asked if they would be pleased to participate in the demonstration. Forty-two percent said they would be somewhat pleased or very pleased to participate, while 36 percent said they would be somewhat displeased or very displeased to do so.

When teachers were asked if *other teachers* in their school felt favorable or unfavorable about the demonstration, the responses were considerably different. Only 41 percent of voucher teachers felt that other teachers in their school were favorable or very favorable toward the demonstration. Only 18 percent of nonvoucher teachers felt that other teachers in their school were favorable or very favorable toward the demonstration.

How can this discrepancy between teachers' personal reactions and their perceptions of their colleagues' reactions be explained? At least two alternative explanations are possible. One explanation might be a "collective ignorance" phenomenon, in which many respondents are unaware of their colleagues' true feelings about a

Table 7.5

INDICATORS OF TEACHERS' OVERALL REACTIONS TOWARD THE DEMONSTRATION IN NOVEMBER 1972

(In percent)

In general, how pleased are you (would you be) to be participating in the voucher demonstration?
(V48, NV33)

Teacher Group	Somewhat or Very Pleased	Indifferent	Somewhat or Very Displeased	Number of Respondents
Voucher	70	7	23	109
Nonvoucher	42	22	36	276

How do you think other teachers in your school feel about the voucher demonstration? (V37, NV22)

Teacher Group	Favorable or Very Favorable	Indifferent/ Don't Know	Unfavorable or Very Unfavorable	Number of Respondents
Voucher	41	18	41	101
Nonvoucher	18	36	46	273

If you had a choice, would you prefer to teach in some other school? (V45, NV30)

Teacher Group	Yes	No	Number of Respondents	
Voucher	11	89	101	
Nonvoucher	13	87	268	

SOURCE: Rand Teacher Questionnaire, November 1972.

situation. Such a phenomenon could have occurred in the first months of the demonstration if teachers generally felt more comfortable expressing their complaints about the demonstration than expressing their satisfactions when among their colleagues. A second explanation might be that some teachers were unwilling to acknowledge their own negative reaction to the demonstration, but instead projected their own negative reaction onto others.

Whichever of these explanations is true, our evidence shows that after two months, teachers' overall reactions to the demonstration were mixed. A substantial number of teachers reported feeling favorably disposed and a substantial number unfavorably disposed toward the demonstration. In general, voucher teachers tended to report more positive overall reactions than did nonvoucher teachers.

Teacher Expectations and Attitudes about Likely Demonstration Outcomes

Teachers' overall reactions to the demonstration in the fall of 1972 were presumably based on their more specific expectations about it. For example, Table 7.6 shows teachers' expectations when asked whether different groups were likely to be helped or hurt by the voucher demonstration. More teachers felt that parents and children would be helped by the demonstration (55 to 57 percent) than felt that teachers or

Table 7.6

TEACHER BELIEFS REGARDING WHOM THE DEMONSTRATION WILL HELP OR HURT

(In percent)

Here is a list of groups and people that the voucher demonstration may affect. How do you think they will be affected?
(V2, NV2)

Group	Will be Helped	Neither	Will be Hurt	Number of Respondents[a]
Black children	57	36	7	369
White children	55	40	5	362
Mexican-American children	57	34	7	369
Teachers	48	26	26	362
School administrators	45	36	18	357
Parents	55	38	6	360

SOURCE: [illegible]and Teacher Questionnaire, November 1972.

[a] Includes voucher and nonvoucher teachers.

school administrators would be helped by it (45 to 48 percent). Correspondingly, more teachers felt that teachers and school administrators would be hurt by the demonstration (18 to 26 percent) than felt that parents or children would be hurt by it (5 to 7 percent). Thus it seems that many of the teachers who disliked the demonstration did so more from expectations that it would hurt teachers than from expectations of harm to children or parents.

Teachers' expectations about the demonstration's likely effects on students are shown in Table 7.7. About half of the teachers felt that the demonstration would increase the quality of education received by children in Alum Rock. Most of the responding teachers expected that the demonstration would alleviate the problem of poor instructional equipment, and about half expected it would increase students' interest in learning. In contrast, the list of school problems that most teachers did *not* expect the voucher demonstration to alleviate is much longer, and included (1) racial tensions, (2) need for improved teacher training, (3) large class sizes, (4) too much time spent on discipline, (5) lack of effective administration, (6) inability of teachers to work together, (7) high student turnover, and (8) too many interruptions during class periods.

Most responding teachers expected that parents' influence would increase as a result of the voucher demonstration, as shown in Table 7.8. Most teachers also seemed to believe that parents *should* have more say about what their children learn in school, so that the expected increase in parental influence was a negative expectation only for a minority of teachers.

Most teachers did not seem to feel that an increase in parental influence would necessarily reduce teachers' influence, as Table 7.9 indicates. Depending on the way the question was phrased and its location in the questionnaire, between 57 and 72 percent of voucher teachers expected that under the demonstration teachers would have more influence on how schools were run. Between 39 and 54 percent of the responding nonvoucher teachers shared this opinion. As we shall see later, the increased decisionmaking authority and autonomy that devolved to mini-school

Table 7.7

BELIEFS REGARDING THE DEMONSTRATION'S EFFECT ON THE QUALITY OF EDUCATION

(In percent)

In general, how do you think the voucher demonstration will affect the quality of education received by the children of Alum Rock? (V1, NV1)

Teacher Group	Increase Quality	Not Change Quality	Decrease Quality	Number of Respondents
Voucher	56	39	5	105
Nonvoucher	47	45	8	255

Reasons teachers often give for reduced effectiveness of schools	Percent of Alum Rock teachers who think this is a problem and that the demonstration will alleviate it (V40, NV25)	
	Voucher Teachers	Nonvoucher Teachers
Poor instructional equipment	72	58
Student lack of interest in learning	50	44

SOURCE: Rand Teacher Questionnaire, November 1972.

teachers during their first year was one of the main benefits they experienced from the demonstration.

While most voucher teachers expected to have greater influence over school affairs, most also expected an increase in conflict among themselves (specifically between mini-school programs), and with principals and district administrators of the voucher demonstration (Table 7.10). Among the issues that most teachers expected would create conflict were student transfer policies, evaluation policies, and hiring practices.

Differences in Attitude among Different Groups of Teachers

As the demonstration began, were positive or negative teacher attitudes concentrated among teachers with particular demographic characteristics or political affiliations? Table 7.11 suggests that teachers' early attitudes toward the demonstration varied somewhat with their ethnic group membership, years of teaching experience, and affiliation with teacher organizations, but that these differences in attitude were hardly dramatic. Mexican-American and black teachers tended to be slightly more favorable toward the demonstration than Anglo teachers, younger teachers tended to be more favorable than older teachers, and teachers who were not affiliated with the local teacher organizations tended to be somewhat more favorable than those who were.

Table 7.8

OPINIONS ON INCREASING PARENTAL INFLUENCE

Question	Percent Agreeing	
	Voucher Teachers	Nonvoucher Teachers
Will the limited (public schools only) version of the voucher system give parents more control over schools? (V57b, NV39b)	69	68
Under the voucher demonstration, do you think parents of disadvantaged children will have more influence? (V36, NV21)	58	50
Under the voucher demonstration, do you think other parents will have more influence? (V36, NV21)	55	45

All things considered, do you think giving parents a choice between different types of programs for their children is a good or very good idea, a fair idea, or a poor or very poor idea? (V23, NV15)

(In percent)

Teacher Group	Type of Parents	Good or Very Good Idea	Fair Idea	Poor or Very Poor Idea	Number of Respondents
Voucher	Parents of disadvantaged children	66	18	16	110
Voucher	Other parents	71	18	11	105
Nonvoucher	Parents of disadvantaged children	52	30	19	281
Nonvoucher	Other parents	60	28	11	265

SOURCE: Rand Teacher Questionnaire, November 1972.

Table 7.9

BELIEF THAT TEACHER INFLUENCE OVER SCHOOL POLICY WILL INCREASE

Question	Percent Agreeing	
	Voucher Teachers	Nonvoucher Teachers
Under the limited (public schools only) version of the voucher system, will teachers have more to say about the way the schools are run? (V57f, NV39)	72	54
Under the voucher demonstration do you think teachers will have more influence on school policy? (V20, NV12)	57	39

SOURCE: Rand Teacher Questionnaire, November 1972.

Table 7.10

TEACHER EXPECTATIONS OF STAFF CONFLICT

Question	Percent Agreeing	
	Voucher Teachers	Nonvoucher Teachers
Will there be conflict in the coming year? (V38, NV23)		
Between teachers in one program and teachers in another program	65	36
Between district administration of the voucher demonstration and teachers?	63	40
Between principals and teachers?	54	37
Between "other parents" and teachers?	23	28
Between disadvantaged parents and teachers?	15	33
What issues do you feel will or will not create conflict? (V39, NV24)		
School transfer policies	80	66
Evaluation policies	75	67
Hiring practices	72	71
Parent/community access to test results	47	48
Implementation of curriculum	36	51

SOURCE: Rand Teacher Questionnaire, November 1972.

TEACHERS' ROLE IN EXPANDING THE DEMONSTRATION

Section IV discusses the roles of principals and parents in expanding the demonstration to 7 additional schools for the 1973-74 school year. This section describes in greater detail the role which teachers had in the expansion process. Data sources include interviews with teachers, reports from Rand observers at meetings and conferences, and a questionnaire distributed by Rand to all Alum Rock teachers in May 1973.

Communication between Voucher and Nonvoucher Teachers

Alum Rock being only a moderate-sized district, a teachers' "grapevine" was not long in forming between voucher and nonvoucher schools. Teachers have told us that both positive and negative information about the demonstration traveled through the grapevine.

More formal communication also went on between voucher and nonvoucher teachers. One main occasion for such communication took place on January 10 and 11, 1973, when the Sequoia Institute called a two-day conference at San Jose State University to provide information for teachers and parents who might be interested in expanding the voucher demonstration to their schools. The conference was financed by federal funds, and all participants, including parents, were paid for attending. The conference consisted mainly of informal, small group discussions between current participants in the demonstration and those who were interested in joining.

Table 7.11

EARLY TEACHING ATTITUDES TOWARD THE DEMONSTRATION BY ETHNIC GROUP, TEACHING EXPERIENCE, AND UNION MEMBERSHIP

(In percent)

In general, how do you think the voucher demonstration will affect the quality of education received by the children of Alum Rock? (V1,NV1)

	Increase Quality	Not Change Quality	Decrease Quality	Number of Respondents
ETHNIC GROUP				
Mexican-American	63	37	0	27
Black	64	35	0	17
White/Anglo	49	44	7	293
TEACHING EXPERIENCE				
1 - 5 years	58	37	4	89
6 - 10 years	49	46	5	112
11 - 15 years	55	34	11	65
16 - 20 years	49	39	12	41
20 + years	25	72	3	32
UNION MEMBERSHIP				
No affiliation	61	36	3	67
AREA only	49	43	8	227
AFT or both	45	48	7	56

How do you think teachers will be affected by the voucher demonstration? (V2,NV2)

	Will Be Helped	Neither	Will Be Hurt	Number of Respondents
ETHNIC GROUP				
Mexican-American	74	15	11	27
Black	65	24	12	17
White/Anglo	45	26	28	295
TEACHING EXPERIENCE				
1 - 5 years	56	24	20	68
6 - 10 years	50	24	26	113
11 - 15 years	54	18	28	67
16 - 20 years	41	28	31	39
20 + years	20	40	40	35
UNION MEMBERSHIP				
No affiliation	65	15	21	68
AREA only	43	30	27	229
AFT or both	49	23	28	57

SOURCE: Rand Teacher Questionnaire, November 1972.

Teacher representatives from the 6 original voucher schools generally gave very positive descriptions of the demonstration, in contrast with the expressions of dissatisfaction that often marked meetings within the voucher schools. A number of nonvoucher teachers noted disparities between what they were hearing at San Jose State and what they had previously heard about the demonstration through the grapevine. Some nonvoucher teachers were suspicious that the voucher school representatives had been hand-picked to make the demonstration look good, and in some respects this may have been true. For example, some schools sent their mini-school leaders as representatives. Mini-school leaders may have been chosen because they were among the best-informed of the voucher teachers; but they were also likely to be among the more committed voucher teachers, having gained some influence and prestige as a result of the demonstration.

In any case, teacher representatives from the voucher schools did not dwell on their complaints about the demonstration, but on its positive aspects, and thereby probably eased the expansion process.

Influence of School Administrators, Parents, and HRC on Teachers' Decisions to Join

In the 6 original voucher schools, the principals' desire to join the demonstration had certainly influenced some teachers' decisions to vote for participation. The same was true for the 7 expansion schools. Principals who wanted to join the demonstration actively sought their teachers' agreement. Typically, they invited voucher representatives to visit their schools and make informational presentations, arranged for teachers to visit voucher schools, and talked about the voucher project with individual teachers they hoped to influence. As in the original voucher schools, principals at the expansion schools seemed more eager to join than their teachers were. In the spring teacher questionnaire distributed by Rand, 77 percent of the responding expansion-school teachers cited the principal's influence as a factor affecting their school's decision to join the demonstration (Table 7.12).

The Superintendent, of course, was also clearly in favor of expanding the demonstration in its second year; and 35 percent of the expansion school teachers believed his influence affected their school's decision to join.

As noted in Sec. IV, there also was substantial community support for expansion at 4 of the 7 schools that decided to join the demonstration in the spring of 1973. Of the expansion teachers, 57 percent believed parental influence affected their school's decision to join. Organized parental opposition to expansion also occurred at one school that was interested in joining but eventually decided not to.

HRC consultants were often present as "facilitators" at school faculty meetings that were held to discuss joining the demonstration, but very few expansion teachers (19 percent) believed HRC had much to do with the outcome.

Formal Teacher Approval of Participation

Principals at 12 schools had shown an interest in joining the voucher demonstration, and had discussed the possibility with their faculties. Teachers at 7 of those 12 schools voted to join the demonstration in its second year. Teachers at 5 schools declined. Teachers at another 6 nonvoucher schools did not actively consider joining the demonstration.

Table 7.12

EXPANSION TEACHERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD JOINING THE DEMONSTRATION

Question	Percent "Yes"	Number of Respondents
Your school has decided to join the voucher demonstration for the 1973-74 school year. Are you pleased with this decision? (Q4)	60	117
Are you satisfied that the decision reflects the true feelings of your faculty? (Q5)	52	117
Do you feel that one or more of the following factors affected the outcome? (Q5a)		
Principal's influence	77	106
Influence of a small group of teachers	65	97
Influence of parents	57	100
Feedback from 6 original voucher schools	42	91
Not enough time for decisionmaking	42	90
Superintendent's influence	35	97
Not enough opportunity for everyone to be heard	30	87
Influence of Human Resources Center	19	88
What were the main reasons for your school's decision to join the voucher demonstration? (Q6)		
Increased funds	92	107
Flexibility of programming	78	96
Opportunity for innovation	76	93
More influence of teachers over the budget	74	92
Opportunity for improved teacher teamwork	58	89
Greater autonomy for teachers in the classroom	58	91
Uncertain status of Title I funds	50	88
Faculty desire to support principal	29	87
Chance to be part of a nationwide demonstration	24	85

SOURCE: Rand Teacher Questionnaire, May 1973.

TEACHER PERSPECTIVES IN MAY 1973

By May 1973, teachers in the original voucher schools had lived for eight full months with the voucher demonstration. Teachers at 7 new schools had voted to join the demonstration in its second year. Finally, voucher and nonvoucher teachers alike had ample opportunity to share information and opinions about the demonstration with one another.

Rand collected a considerable amount of information from teachers in the spring of 1973. A questionnaire survey of all teachers in the district was distributed in May. The response rate was about the same as it had been the previous fall: 73 percent for the original voucher teachers, 62 percent for the expansion voucher teachers, and 59 percent for the nonvoucher teachers. As in the fall, response bias did not seem to be a problem with this survey. Also, Rand staff members interviewed teachers and visited classrooms in all 22 mini-schools at the 6 original voucher schools. Both questionnaire information and information collected in person-to-person contacts with teachers are reported here. Each source of data has its weaknesses and strengths.

The mail surveys have consisted mostly of fixed-choice questions. Such questions permit straightforward, unambiguous tabulation of responses, but encourage respondents to express opinions even on subjects they may have never considered before. The personal interviews, on the other hand, have been open-ended and informal in format. Quantification of open-ended interview responses through content analysis is a more ambiguous process than the simple tabulation of responses to fixed-choice questions, but the open-ended format does not pressure respondents to choose among preselected responses, and may therefore indicate more accurately what issues are uppermost in the respondents' minds.

Another strength of the interviews deserves mention: person-to-person contact made it possible for Rand staff members to judge the candor of teachers' responses in a way which mail surveys alone would not have permitted. The fact that Rand staff members enjoyed a frank and open interchange in their meetings with teachers lends considerable strength to the interview data. The fact that interview and survey data were rarely contradictory supports the premise that teachers were generally candid in their responses to the mail surveys.

Teachers' Overall Reactions to the Demonstration

Table 7.13 summarizes the overall reactions of several teacher groups toward the demonstration. Of the original voucher teachers, 84 percent reported being pleased about participating—up from 70 percent the previous fall. In the 7 expansion schools, 60 percent of teachers reported being somewhat or very pleased that their schools had decided to join—up from 46 percent who in the fall had said they would be pleased to participate. In the 11 nonvoucher schools, 69 percent of teachers reported being pleased that their schools had decided *not* to join, and only 25 percent indicated they would rather have joined. Since 38 percent of these same teachers had indicated an interest in participating the previous fall, it would seem that the attitude of teachers in the nonvoucher schools became more negative toward the demonstration between fall and spring.

A total of 79 percent of the original voucher teachers and 64 percent of the expansion voucher teachers believed (correctly) that most teachers in their schools felt somewhat or very favorable toward the demonstration. Of nonvoucher teachers, 68 percent thought (correctly) that most teachers in their schools felt somewhat or very unfavorable toward the demonstration. Thus, the discrepancy found in the fall between teachers' self-reported attitudes and their perceptions of other teachers' attitudes had practically disappeared in the spring. This finding seems to add weight to the "collective ignorance" hypothesis as an explanation of the fall discrepancy.

The following generalizations can be drawn from the data presented in Table 7.13:

- In the spring of 1973, teachers in the 6 original voucher schools showed the most favorable attitudes, and teachers in the 11 nonvoucher schools the least favorable attitudes, toward the demonstration.
- Teachers in the 6 original voucher schools and in the 7 expansion schools showed more positive attitudes toward the demonstration in the spring of 1973 than they had shown the previous fall.
- Teachers in the 11 nonvoucher schools showed more negative attitudes toward the demonstration in the spring than they had shown the previous fall.

Table 7.13

COMPARISON OF TEACHERS' OVERALL REACTIONS TO THE DEMONSTRATION IN NOVEMBER 1972 AND MAY 1973

(In percent)

A. Personal Reactions

Teacher Group	Time	Somewhat or Very Pleased	Indifferent	Somewhat or Very Displeased	Number of Respondents
In general, how pleased are you to be participating in the voucher demonstration?[a]					
Original voucher	Fall	70	7	23	109
Original voucher	Spring	84	4	13	110
In general, how pleased would you be to be participating in the voucher demonstration?					
Expansion voucher	Fall[b]	46	20	34	104[c]
Nonvoucher	Fall[b]	38	26	36	156[c]
Your school has decided to join the voucher demonstration for the 1972-73 school year. Are you pleased with this decision?					
Expansion voucher	Spring	60	4	36	117
Your school is not joining the voucher demonstration for the 1973-74 school year. Are you pleased with this outcome?					
Nonvoucher	Spring	69	6	25	179

B. Beliefs About Other Teachers' Reactions

Teacher Group	Time	Somewhat or Very Favorable	Indifferent or Don't Know	Somewhat or Very Unfavorable	Number of Respondents
How do you think (most)[d] other teachers in your school feel about the demonstration?					
Original voucher	Fall	42	18	41	101
Original voucher	Spring	79	7	14	112
Expansion voucher	Fall[b]	24	38	38	98[c]
Expansion voucher	Spring	64	10	26	107
Nonvoucher	Fall[b]	15	34	51	155[c]
Nonvoucher	Spring	20	12	68	177

C. Preference to Teach Elsewhere

Teacher Group	Time	Yes	No	Number of Respondents
If you had a choice, would you prefer to teach in some other school?				
Original voucher	Fall	11	89	101
Original voucher	Spring	13	87	108
Expansion voucher	Fall[b]	13	87	102[c]
Expansion voucher	Spring	26	74	109
Nonvoucher	Fall[b]	11	89	152[c]
Nonvoucher	Spring	15	85	170

SOURCE: Rand Teacher Questionnaires, fall 1972 (V37, V45, V48, NV22, NV30, NV33) and spring 1973 (Q4, Q28, Q39, Q42).

[a] In the spring 1973 questionnaire this question reads, "In general, how pleased are you about participating . . .?"

[b] These schools had not decided by fall 1972 whether to join the demonstration, and are differentiated here by their later decisions to join or not join.

[c] Blank school codes for 23 nonvoucher teachers in fall 1972 prevented their assignment to the "expansion voucher" and "nonvoucher" categories used here. Consequently, numbers of respondents in those categories do not sum exactly to the numbers of nonvoucher respondents reported in Table 7.6.

[d] The word "most" was used only in the spring 1973 questionnaire.

Teachers' Expectations and Attitudes about Likely Demonstration Outcomes

Just as the original and expansion voucher teachers' overall reactions to the voucher demonstration were more positive in May than in November, so were their more specific expectations and attitudes about the demonstration. For example, they were more likely to expect that the demonstration would improve the quality of education in Alum Rock (Table 7.14) and to feel that giving parents a choice of programs was a good idea (Table 7.15).

Teachers in the 11 nonvoucher schools, whose overall reactions had become less favorable since the fall, were also less likely to expect that the demonstration would increase the quality of education (Table 7.14). However, slightly more nonvoucher teachers felt that parental choice was a good idea compared with their opinions the previous fall (Table 7.15).

Although 74 percent of the voucher teachers thought the demonstration would improve education in Alum Rock, not many specific student gains were reported in the mini-school interviews—and those gains were not very explicit ("great for the kids"), and fell more often in the affective than in the cognitive domain. Several mini-schools reported that students were happier, liked their schoolwork better, or liked their teachers better than in the previous year. Two mini-schools cited reduced vandalism and fewer discipline problems as results of the demonstration. One mini-school believed its students had become more "understanding and compassionate." Another claimed that more field trips than before had served to "widen the students'

Table 7.14

TEACHER EXPECTATIONS OF STUDENT OUTCOMES

(In percent)

In general, how do you think the voucher demonstration will affect the quality of education received by the children of Alum Rock?

Teacher Group	Time	Increase Quality	Not Change Quality	Decrease Quality	Number of Respondents
Original voucher	Fall	56	39	5	105
Original voucher	Spring	74	25	1	113
Expansion voucher	Fall[a]	48	44	8	98[b]
Expansion voucher	Spring	56	41	4	113
Nonvoucher	Fall[a]	50	43	7	143[b]
Nonvoucher	Spring	33	51	16	171

SOURCE: Rand Teacher Questionnaires, fall 1972 (V1,NV1) and spring 1973 (Q7).

[a] These schools had not decided by fall 1972 whether to join the demonstration, and are differentiated here by their later decisions to join or not join.

[b] Blank school codes for 23 nonvoucher teachers in fall 1972 prevented their assignment to the "expansion voucher" or "nonvoucher" categories used here. Consequently, numbers of respondents in those categories do not sum exactly to the numbers of nonvoucher respondents reported in Table 7.8.

Table 7.15

TEACHER ATTITUDES ABOUT PARENTAL CHOICE

(In percent)

All things considered, do you think giving parents a choice between different types of programs for their children is a good or very good idea, a fair idea, or a poor or very poor idea?

Teacher Group	Time	Good or Very Good Idea	Fair Idea	Poor or Very Poor Idea	Number of Respondents
Original voucher	Fall	66-71[a]	18	10-16[a]	105-110[c]
Original voucher	Spring	87	11	2	111
Expansion voucher	Fall[b]	58-68[a]	26-29[a]	5-13[a]	101-103[c]
Expansion voucher	Spring	74	17	8	115
Nonvoucher	Fall[b]	51-57[a]	29	14-21[a]	105-160[c]
Nonvoucher	Spring	60	28	13	177

SOURCE: Rand Teacher Questionnaires, fall 1972 (V23,NV15) and spring 1973 (Q17).

[a] Percentages varied slightly when teachers were asked to distinquish between "parents of disadvantaged children" and "other parents." See Table 7.9.

[b] These schools had not decided by fall 1972 whether to join the demonstration, and are differentiated here by their later decisions to join or not join.

[c] Blank school codes for 23 nonvoucher teachers in fall 1972 prevented their assignment to the "expansion voucher" or "nonvoucher" categories used here. Consequently, numbers of respondents in those categories do not sum exactly to the numbers of nonvoucher respondents reported in Table 7.9.

horizons." At only one school did teachers report that students were happier *and achieving more* than they had during the previous year. Teachers in several mini-schools suggested that the mini-school structure would provide greater continuity in a child's education from year to year because of the close cooperation among teachers of various grades. (This would depend, of course, on the student's continued enrollment in the same school.) Some teachers seemed to feel or imply that students were benefitting more from the extra funding than from the voucher system itself. As an example, one mini-school that reported improved pupil progress felt that this progress was due "10 percent to vouchers and 90 percent to the extra money." Other teachers were skeptical about their students' ability or readiness to benefit from the new educational offerings requiring student self-direction and responsibility.

Teacher perceptions of benefits or costs to students must, of course, be considered as only one of several sources of information about student outcomes. This is particularly so when many teachers may be concerned that they will gain or lose something *for themselves* as a result of the voucher demonstration.

Primary Benefits to Teachers

More Discretionary Funds. Participation in the first year of the voucher demonstration brought with it "compensatory" vouchers worth $238 for each "free lunch" student in kindergarten through 6th grade and $300 for 7th and 8th graders, beyond the normal district funding per pupil. These compensatory vouchers were primarily intended to encourage socioeconomically integrated programs and to provide extra resources for the children who most needed them. Since many Alum Rock students were eligible for the compensatory vouchers, a substantial amount of extra money was involved, providing a clear economic incentive for teachers to try the voucher idea.

In the fall of 1972, 82 percent of the original voucher teachers had agreed that "all things considered, *the* major benefit of the voucher system is the additional money received by schools in the district."[2] (emphasis added) The following spring, most voucher teachers seemed to view money as *one* of the major benefits of their participation in the demonstration, but not the only one. Voucher teachers frequently cited new audiovisual equipment, curriculum materials, teacher aides, and field trips as benefits provided by the extra funds. Some teachers flatly stated in the spring interviews that the extra funding was *the* main reason for their participation, but this did not seem to be the dominant point of view. Teachers at one mini-school said, in fact, that they had resented "OEO's attempt to sell the program purely on the basis of money," and that, if the extra funds were discontinued, they would attempt to retain other features of the demonstration, e.g., mini-school structure and teacher autonomy, within the limits of their smaller budget. This suggests that teacher support for the demonstration has not been wholly dependent on the extra funding supplied by the Federal Government.

Increased Decisionmaking Autonomy. Teachers at 17 of the 22 original voucher mini-schools interviewed by Rand in the spring of 1973 cited increased autonomy and flexibility in planning and decisionmaking as a major benefit of participation.

This change in the teachers' role was also evidenced by voucher teachers' responses to the spring teacher survey: 66 percent thought there had been "a considerable shift" of decisionmaking authority from the school district down to the individual school.[3] Of these teachers, 96 percent cited greater opportunity to innovate, 67 percent cited increased teacher authority, and 57 percent cited "upgrading of teachers' professional role" as main advantages of the demonstration (Table 7.16). Moreover, 58 percent of the expansion voucher teachers indicated that "greater autonomy for teachers in the classroom" was a main reason for their school's decision to join the demonstration (Table 7.12).

While decentralization of decisionmaking might have been extended to the mini-school level without a competitive voucher framework, the voucher idea was clearly seized on by some principals and teachers *because it provided a sound rationale* for decentralized decisionmaking. Teachers and principals argued that mini-schools could not diversify their offerings and compete to attract students unless they had the freedom to plan and make decisions using their own best judgment, nor could they be held accountable for their school's or mini-school's success or failure without such autonomy.

Closer Peer Relations within Some Mini-schools. In the spring teacher survey, 75 percent of the voucher teachers cited "improved teacher teamwork" as one of the main advantages of the demonstration (Table 7.16). Teachers at 8 of the 22 mini-schools specifically mentioned increased interaction and closer working relationships with their mini-school colleagues as a benefit of the voucher demonstration.

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[2] Rand Teacher Questionnaire, November 1972, Q57c.

[3] Rand Teacher Questionnaire, May 1973, Q14.

Table 7.16

VOUCHER TEACHERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE DEMONSTRATION'S MAIN ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

Advantage or Disadvantage	Percent Agreeing	Number of Respondents
Aside from the increased funds, which of the following are the main advantages of the voucher demonstration? (Q9)		
Greater opportunity to innovate	96	113
Curriculum better suited to student needs	87	106
Good learning experience for teachers	84	107
Improved teacher teamwork	75	106
Greater parent involvement	73	106
More teacher authority	67	97
Student transfer option	66	104
Upgrading of teachers' professional role	57	101
What are the main disadvantages of the voucher demonstration? (Q10)		
Too many meetings	88	113
Too much extra paperwork	67	104
Friction between mini-schools	65	111
Instability of class enrollment	54	108
Too many new teaching demands	53	103
Competition for students	48	105
Job insecurity	31	103
Pressure from parents	15	103

So far, which do you feel are greater--the advantages or disadvantages? (Q10a)

(In percent)

Advantages Are Greater	They Are About Equal	Disadvantages Are Greater	Number of Respondents
62	13	25	115

SOURCE: Rand Teacher Questionnaire, May 1973.

Increased Stimulation to Innovate. Teachers at 9 of the 22 mini-schools commented in interviews that the voucher demonstration had increased their motivation and stimulated innovative efforts that might not have occurred otherwise. In the same vein, 84 percent of voucher teachers agreed in the spring survey that the first year of the demonstration had been a "good learning experience for teachers" (Table 7.16).

In many teacher comments, the competitive element in the new situation was clearly a part of the stimulus. One mini-school reported that the sense of "being watched" gave them greater pride in what they were doing. At another mini-school, teachers reported, as a mixed benefit of the demonstration, that they are working harder to "provide motivation for students" to keep them in the program. At a third mini-school, teachers report satisfaction because, for the first time, they have been "forced" to learn about various educational alternatives. A teacher at a fourth mini-school said, "Competition is constructive—it keeps you on your toes and alert." Teachers in a group interview at yet another mini-school commented that they personally "thrive on competition."

Primary Costs to Teachers

More Work. "More work" was the most-often-mentioned complaint about the voucher demonstration in the survey and in Rand's spring 1973 interviews. Among the original voucher teachers, 88 percent agreed that there were too many meetings, 67 percent that there was too much extra paperwork, and 53 percent that there were too many new teaching demands (Table 7.16). Of 22 mini-school groups interviewed, 19 mentioned extra work as a negative consequence. Some mini-school teachers described themselves as "tired but happy," but others described themselves as "overwhelmed," "exhausted," and "worked to death."

Table 7.17 shows the amount of extra work voucher teachers reported spending in the first year of the demonstration. For half of the teachers, that amount was 6 hours or more per week. It is not clear to what extent the extra workload in the first year was a function of the increased decisionmaking authority of the mini-schools and their need to compete for students, to what extent it was caused by the demonstration's specific requirements for extra meetings with HRC, parents, etc., and to what extent it was caused by the difficulties of transition to a new way of working and will decrease in coming years. Partial answers to this question will be obtained in the coming year of the demonstration.

Table 7.17

EXTRA WORK REPORTED BY VOUCHER TEACHERS

(In percent)

Some voucher school teachers have reported that their workload has increased this past year. How much additional time, if any, would you say you have spent? (Q32)	
None	5
1 to 2 hours/week	10
3 to 5 hours/week	35
6 to 10 hours/week	34
Over 10 hours/week	17
Number of respondents	113

SOURCE: Rand Teacher Questionnaire, May 1973.

Tensions Between Mini-schools. The mini-school form of organization in voucher schools seems to have resulted in substantially deteriorated peer relationships and social tensions across some mini-school boundaries. In the spring survey, 65 percent of the voucher teachers agreed that friction between mini-schools was a main disadvantage of the demonstration (Table 7.16). In mini-school interviews, teachers in eleven programs reported some deterioration in the amount of contact or rapport among mini-school faculties. In some cases, this was a matter merely of reduced contact caused by different lunch periods and scheduled breaks, or by fewer common concerns. However, relations among teachers in some schools markedly worsened as a result of competition within the building. One mini-school felt that attempts by programs to "upstage" or "try to outdo" one another were a bad influence on the school. Another mini-school described competition as "cutthroat" and "threatening to the integrity of the school." Another group of teachers unhappily described the division within their school as "like three separate business enterprises." Other teachers said staff morale was weakened and there was less sharing of ideas as a result of competition.

Inconveniences Arising from Broader Student Enrollment and Transfer Privileges. In the spring survey, 54 percent of the voucher teachers agreed that "instability of class enrollment" was a main disadvantage of the demonstration (Table 7.16). In the mini-school interviews, teachers in 7 programs commented specifically on the inconveniences caused by first-year demonstration rules regarding student enrollment or transfer rights. Teachers felt inconvenienced by the overlarge classes brought by unrestricted student enrollments and by budget uncertainty caused by the officially unlimited student transfer privilege. Teachers did, in fact, act to change the rules of the demonstration to limit student enrollment and transfer privileges. This development is discussed more fully later in this section and in Sec. IV.

Job or Status Insecurity. Insecurities resulting from increased competition for students were not as widely reported as other costs incurred by voucher teachers. Less than half (48 percent) of the voucher teachers agreed that competition for students was a main disadvantage of the demonstration, and only 31 percent agreed that job insecurity was a main disadvantage (Table 7.16). Similarly, job or status insecurity was only mentioned in 6 of 22 mini-school interviews as a negative consequence of the new, more competitive system. Where the issue was mentioned, however, feelings about it were often expressed quite strongly. Some teachers did not trust the guarantees by OEO and the district that teachers would not lose their salaries. Others were displeased with the prospect of being transferred to a school or program not of their choice, or being kept on "as a clerk in the district office," even if paid their full teacher's salary.

Status insecurity appeared to be equally as important as simple financial insecurity in shaping teachers' reactions to the new competitive situation. Teachers did not want to be exposed to the negative judgment of themselves that would be implied in some transfer situations, even when their financial security would not be affected. Teachers at one mini-school were "outraged" by the possibility that another mini-school in the same building might look outside the school for an additional teacher if their program expanded. A teacher at another school had to join a program in which she felt unwelcome, as the price of staying on at her school. Other teachers at the same school seemed to feel they had been deliberately excluded from the program of their choice by peers who rejected them.

Other Costs. Teachers at several mini-schools mentioned the administrative problems of getting prompt reimbursement for their expenses. Other teachers mentioned unstable OEO and central office budget policies as problematic for them. Teachers in some mini-schools complained about what they felt was inaccurate publicity about the demonstration in the news media. All of these costs would seem to be transitional, and not likely to continue as the voucher demonstration progresses.

TEACHER ATTITUDES ABOUT AND INFLUENCE ON THE RULES OF THE DEMONSTRATION

So far, this section has discussed some of the ways the demonstration affected teachers in its first year, and also one of the obvious ways that teachers influenced its outcome: by supporting or opposing it. Teachers also exercised noteworthy influence on the rules by which the demonstration was run and would be run in the future—notably, rules governing teachers' job rights, dissemination of information to parents, and students' rights to transfer among programs.

Rules Governing Teachers' Job Security

Concern for teachers' job security or conditions of employment has not been high on the list of concerns expressed by voucher advocates. Most voucher proponents have taken the parents' and students' point of view, and have given little or no support or acknowledgment to the public school teacher's interests in his or her livelihood. The CSPP *Education Vouchers* report, for example, was written almost entirely from the parents', students', and public interest points of view. Nowhere is attention devoted to the effects of the alternative voucher models on teachers.

Teachers themselves are concerned, needless to say, and are organized to act on matters related to their working conditions and job security. Nationwide, teacher organizations have been a major source of opposition to the voucher concept, partly because of its potentially negative consequences for teachers. In Alum Rock, the local teacher organizations chose not to oppose the voucher idea in its entirety, but rather to see that it would be implemented in a way not inimical to teachers' job interests.

One provision mentioned earlier, which teachers' representatives insisted on before the demonstration began, was the protection of teachers from sudden loss of employment in their first year of participation. This provision was included in the first-year demonstration rules as a result of teachers' insistence at the 1972 Santa Clara University conference.

OEO's financial support of the demonstration in its first year gave the district enough money to be able to guarantee, as a last resort, positions in the district office for any teacher who was displaced from a voucher school and could not find a position at another school in the district. This fund was not used in the first year. Teachers at one school did use part of their discretionary budget to retain their full staff in spite of a 12 percent drop in student enrollment, which could have meant loss of two teachers.

Rules Governing Information to Parents and Mini-School Expansion

Controversy surrounding the issue of parental information was discussed in Sec. IV. In seeking revisions in the central voucher staff's original evaluation plan, the voucher principals generally were acting with knowledge of and in accordance with the feelings of their teaching staffs.

In the November 1972 Rand questionnaire, teachers were asked to comment on a number of types of information that could be made available to parents, such as the names of teachers assigned to each program, achievement test scores by program; the school district's evaluations of individual teachers; and ratings of the voucher programs by an independent citizen's commission. Teachers in the voucher schools tended to oppose distributing such information, at least until their new mini-schools had had a chance to settle down. The majority of voucher and nonvoucher teachers indicated that parents should *eventually* (that is, at least by the end of the demonstration's third year) have access to aggregate test scores by school, program, and classroom, and to independent citizens' commission ratings of voucher schools. However, no more than 23 percent of the voucher teachers or 42 percent of the nonvoucher teachers favored making any of this information available to parents on a continuing basis. Most voucher and nonvoucher teachers felt that school district evaluations of individual teachers should not be made available to parents at all.[4]

No teachers' names appeared with any of the program descriptions circulated to parents in the spring of 1972. In the spring of 1973, 4 out of 44 programs provided teachers' names along with their program descriptions.[5]

Rules Governing Student Transfer Rights

As described in Sec. IV, teachers played a major role in shaping the demonstration's rules on student transfers and mini-school expansion. As noted there, the fact that mini-schools were allowed to close enrollment helped satisfy teachers' desires for stable conditions in which to plan and teach, at the expense of parental choice.

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[4] Rand Teacher Questionnaire, November 1972, Q46.

[5] Alum Rock Unified School District, *Educational Choices for Your Child*, 1972 and 1973-74.

VIII. MEASURING STUDENT OUTCOMES

INTRODUCTION

Sections VI and VII described parent and teacher responses to questionnaires and interviews about the first year of the demonstration. We did not interview students until the second year, so there are no comparable data on student attitudes for 1972-73.

Voucher theory implies that a number of other measures of student outcomes would cast light on the effects of vouchers. They include: achievement test scores, dropout rates, affective development, school attendance rates, vandalism, and, in the long run, college attendance and such job-related factors as earnings, prestige, and satisfaction.

Clearly, the Alum Rock demonstration will provide no information on college attendance or post-school career patterns. It can provide data on achievement scores, school attendance, student attitudes, and vandalism. Affective development is a complex issue, discussed below; it is difficult to know how to relate affective test results to voucher school program activities.

We had access to five categories of data, discussed in the following paragraphs.

Attendance. Monthly reports of unexcused absences by school for voucher and nonvoucher schools, 1970-74; monthly reports of excused absences for voucher schools only, 1972-74. The California Education Code requires districts to keep records of unexcused absences only, because these are subtracted from enrollment figures in computing state payments to the district.

Achievement. For 1970-74, state-mandated test scores by school and grade for all schools in grades 1, 2, 3, and 6; for voucher schools, in all grades, Rand asked the schools to administer the Metropolitan Achievement Test (MAT), fall and spring, in 1972-73 and 1973-74. In 1973-74, the district administered the MAT to nonvoucher students in all grades, but in 1972-73, it was administered only to Title I nonvoucher schools. These data are somewhat flawed by various factors: (1) California has changed the tests it administers over the years; (2) Alum Rock teachers insisted that they be allowed to administer MAT out of grade level for voucher students who they thought would do poorly if tested at their own grade level, which makes it necessary to rely on test publishers' concordances for relating different test levels; (3) 1972-73 MAT data are available by student for voucher schools, but only by school and grade for Title I schools; (4) because Alum Rock has very high student mobility rates, about 30 percent of students taking the MAT in the fall were not there to take it in the spring.

Vandalism. District reports on property damage by school, September 1968-December 1973; fire damage reports by school, January 1971-January 1974; window breakage comparisons by school, 1972-73. The data vary in coverage by year, because the district did not carry vandalism insurance in each of the years from 1968 to 1973, and the need for complete and accurate reporting therefore varied from year to year. Furthermore, it is often impossible to relate vandalism or arson incidents to students at a particular school.

Affective Development. In 1972-73, on an exploratory basis, Rand administered five affective tests to a sample of students (Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory, The Sears Self-Concept Inventory, Purdue Social Attitude Scale, Primary Self-Concept Scale, and Primary Mental Abilities Test). In the spring of 1974, in voucher schools, the Coopersmith test was administered in upper elementary grades and the Purdue scale in the lower grades.

Student Attitudes. In 1972-73, no student interviews were conducted; in the spring of 1974, 120 voucher and nonvoucher students received personal interviews, using an instrument developed at Rand.

KEY FINDINGS

- The main finding is that at the end of the first year, data on student outcomes were largely inconclusive, incomplete, or absent; therefore we can say little about the effect of the program on students. Our inability to draw conclusions or even findings stems proximately from data problems, but more fundamentally from the nature of the intervention. The first year being a start-up year, a good deal of teachers' and administrators' time was spent organizing for the new system. Given this situation, the most relevant student outcome might have been attitudes toward the voucher program, but we will be unable to report on them before late 1974, because of the absence of attitudinal data from 1972-73.
- With respect to each of the variables that we did collect data on, the information is limited.

Achievement Scores

On the state-mandated tests (grades 1, 2, 3, and 6), voucher students' average scores by school and grade were uniformly lower than in 1971-72, while the average scores for nonvoucher schools were as good as or better than in 1971-72. This finding held after taking into consideration socioeconomic status measures, such as ethnicity and welfare status. The voucher schools' drop in reading scores amounted to about one-sixth of a standard deviation (roughly two months grade equivalent score) as compared with the statewide distribution of scores on these tests.

For the MAT test, however, with students tested at each grade level in fall and spring, a somewhat different picture emerges from preliminary analysis. The voucher schools and Title I schools averaged nearly the same fall-to-spring grade equivalent gains for each grade where comparisons were possible (grades 2, 3, 4, and 5).[1] In each of these grades, voucher school children averaged higher MAT grade equivalents in both fall and spring, by an average of about one-half grade equivalent at each grade level.

But in the state-mandated tests, results were just the opposite for 1972-73. Title I schools had higher average scores than voucher schools for each grade where comparisons could be made (grades 1, 2, and 3). We discuss briefly below why our preliminary analysis of the two data sets might have produced conflicting results.

Attendance

In 1972-73, unexcused absences at voucher schools averaged about 30 percent less than at nonvoucher schools; but the same pattern held true in 1971-72, before the demonstration started. The district has no records of excused absences at nonvoucher schools, but the voucher school data on excused absences, which on the average are sixteen times more frequent than unexcused absences, cast substantial doubt on the value of unexcused absences as a measure of attendance. There appears to be no close correlation at the school level between the rates of excused and unexcused absences; this means in effect that unexcused absences are a very poor measure of attendance.

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[1] The Title I schools, where average student body socioeconomic status is slightly lower than in voucher schools, averaged a slightly higher gain (the equivalent of less than one month in grade equivalent), but this difference is presumably accounted for by the fact that voucher school children were pretested in November while Title I children were pretested in September, so that they had an extra six weeks in which to register gains between fall and spring.

Vandalism

In the 1972-73 school year, the number of incidents of vandalism reported by the six voucher schools declined to 16 from 29 the previous year. There was a similar decline at the eighteen nonvoucher schools (from 69 to 47). For the period July-November 1973, when the district reinstituted insurance against vandalism, reporting was presumably more accurate, and 14 incidents were reported in old voucher schools, compared to 17 in all other schools. Summer window breakage dropped sharply in almost all Alum Rock schools between summer 1972 and summer 1973, but the decline in breakage at voucher schools was greater than that in nonvoucher schools. The data not being very reliable, it is hard to say how much of the damage and theft is caused by students who attend the particular school.

ISSUES IN MEASURING STUDENT OUTCOMES

Measures of student outcomes are often ambiguous, partly because the aims of education are themselves ambiguous. There is no consensus about the purposes of education (parents and children seek a wide array of different things from schooling), and it is often difficult to demonstrate a cause-and-effect relationship between an approach to schooling and observed outcomes. Furthermore, even when there is consensus about aims, such as improving self-esteem, or reading ability, or career opportunities, we may have no very good ways of measuring outcomes. Each of the measures discussed above—attendance, attitudes, affective test scores, achievement test scores, vandalism—is only a rough proxy for the things we are trying to measure: willingness to attend school; expression of student viewpoints about a voucher system as compared with traditional schooling; development of self-esteem, independence, or creativity; development of cognitive skills; healthy adaptation to the social system as represented by the schools. Furthermore, as noted above, we make no attempt to measure the differential effects of vouchers on such long-run outcomes as higher education, career choice, income, and so on.

In this section we focus mostly on problems associated with testing, as testing represents the bulk of Rand's and the district's efforts to date in measuring student outcomes. Attendance and vandalism are somewhat ambiguous measures anyway, and the district's available data base is not strong. However, we will begin with a brief discussion of attendance and vandalism data.

Attendance

Records are available districtwide only on unexcused absences. Unexcused absences are a small fraction of total absences, and excused absence data are available only for voucher schools.

In Table 8.1 the reader can perceive the lack of association between total absences and unexcused absences for voucher schools in 1972-73 and 1973-74. Rank correlations (Spearman) between total and unexcused absences by school are zero

Table 8.1

EXCUSED AND UNEXCUSED ABSENCES, VOUCHER SCHOOLS:
NUMBER OF DAYS PER STUDENT, SCHOOL AVERAGE

	Unexcused Absences		Total Absences		
School	Mean	Ascending Rank	Mean	Ascending Rank	Ratio of Total Absences to Unexcused Absences
			A. 1972-73		
Cassell	.12	1	13.73	5	111.63
Meyer	.20	2	10.45	1	53.05
McCollam	.23	3	13.07	3	57.32
Pala	.68	4	14.56	6	21.58
Goss	1.22	5	12.83	2	10.54
Miller	2.46	6	13.21	4	5.38
Total	0.75		12.86		17.15
			B. 1973-74[a]		
Pala	.06	1	6.04	2	100.67
Dorsa	.06	2	6.62	5	110.33
McCollam	.07	3	6.24	3	89.14
Cassell	.14	4	6.63	6	47.36
Arbuckle	.18	5	7.84	11	43.56
Meyer	.18	6	4.43	1	24.61
Conniff	.28	7	6.64	7	23.71
Goss	.41	8	6.83	9	16.66
Sheppard	.62	9	8.40	12	13.55
Hubbard	1.03	10	7.65	10	7.43
Miller	1.06	11	6.46	4	6.09
Fischer	2.12	12	9.18	13	4.33
Mayfair	3.29	13	6.72	8	2.04
Total	0.78		6.94		37.65

SOURCE: Alum Rock Attendance System.

[a] Cumulative, September 1973–January 1974.

for 1972-73 (6 schools) and .53 for 1973-74 (13 schools). Interstudent product moment correlations for 4669 students in 1972-73 and 8728 students in 1973-74 were only .32 and .43 in successive years. Those results make unexcused absences a questionable measure of differences in student interest as between voucher and nonvoucher schools. For the school year 1974-75, the district may collect data centrally on excused absences for nonvoucher schools, which will allow more valid comparisons. Meanwhile, for whatever it is worth, Fig. 8.1 compares unexcused absences through January 1974 for old and new voucher schools, and nonvoucher schools. Old voucher schools have steadily maintained lower unexcused absence rates than those of nonvoucher schools, and the introduction of vouchers shows no effect so far. New voucher schools have a much higher unexcused absence rate, apparently because three of them are middle schools, with older children, whose unexcused absence rates tend to be higher anyway.

As a final note of caution, it should be pointed out that state payments to the district are partly determined by average daily attendance, including excused absences. Therefore there may be pressure on schools to obtain excuses from parents and this pressure may be unevenly transmitted to parents by different schools and at different times. Note, for example, that the ratio of total absences to unexcused



SOURCE: Alum Rock Attendance System.

Fig. 8.1—Mean days of unexcused absence: voucher, nonvoucher, and expansion students, 1970 through January 1974

absences was more than twice as high in 1973-74 than in 1972-73, and that within each year there was very wide variation in that ratio between schools. Furthermore, among old voucher schools, the rank correlation between ratio of total absences to unexcused absences in successive years was not significantly different from zero.

Vandalism

There are also problems with vandalism data. First, we usually do not know if vandals are students at a particular school. Second, because multiple incidents of vandalism may be the work of only one or a few persons, counts of numbers of incidents or even cost of damages may reveal little about comparative trends between voucher and nonvoucher schools.

The six voucher schools reported 29 incidents of vandalism and theft to the district in 1971-72, but only 16 incidents in 1972-73. The comparable figures for the eighteen nonvoucher schools are 69 and 47. For the period July-November 1973, old voucher schools reported 14 incidents, and all others reported 17. From January 1971 to January 1974 the schools reported 11 casualty fires, one of them in an old voucher school during the 1972-73 school year, and three of them in new voucher schools during the 1973-74 school years. Window breakage declined sharply in Alum Rock schools from the summer of 1972 ($21,000) to the summer of 1973 ($10,000). The drop was relatively steeper in old voucher schools than districtwide, from $5700 to $2100.

Whatever indicative value these data have is confounded by the fact that the district's insurance coverage changed between 1969 and 1972 and records were kept differently before and after that period. About all we can say about those data is that district records of patterns of theft and destruction are not very useful as measures of voucher effects on student outcomes.

Achievement Testing

The following data are available on student achievement.

Metropolitan Achievement Test (MAT). These scores are available for: (1) all voucher students, for the fall (November) and spring (May) of 1972-73 and the fall (October) and spring (May) of 1973-74; teachers were allowed to assign tests below grade levels for individual students under the terms of an agreement between OEO and the district; (2) all nonvoucher students in Title I schools, for the fall (September) and spring (May) of 1972-73; no out-of-level testing authorized; (3) all nonvoucher students, for the fall (October) and spring (May) of 1973-74; out-of-level testing allowed.

State-Mandated Tests. As part of the California state testing program, all Alum Rock students in grades 1, 2, and 3 were administered the *Stanford Reading Test* (spring 1970 and 1971), *Cooperative Primary Test* (May 1972 and 1973), and *California State Reading Test* (April-May 1974).

All sixth grade Alum Rock students were administered the *Lorge-Thorndike Intelligence Test* (each fall, 1969 to 1972) and the *Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills* (each October, 1969 to 1973). In fall 1973, the two Title I schools that had a sixth grade administered the CTBS to their sixth grade students, but not the MAT. In 1973, voucher students took the CTBS in November instead of October.

Before describing the comparisons we made among voucher and nonvoucher schools, and prevoucher and postvoucher performance, it is appropriate to describe the data and their weaknesses, which may help to account for the apparent inconsistencies between the analysis based on state-mandated scores and that based on MAT scores.

The major issues in achievement testing were administrative and clerical difficulties in administering the MAT tests at voucher schools; problems of interpretation and comparability created by out-of-level testing; lack of comparison groups; and high student mobility. The state-mandated tests offer, in principle, the possibility of comparing nonvoucher and voucher student achievement, and also comparisons with statewide data, at least for grades 1, 2, 3, and 6. However, state-mandated test data are not available on individual students, but only by school and grade for selected grades, and in grades 1, 2, and 3 the state has mandated three different tests since 1970. Therefore, it was decided to administer the MAT in fall and spring for voucher schools; the same test was already being administered in the district's Title I schools, and in 1973-74 the district extended fall and spring MAT testing to all Alum Rock schools. Meanwhile, all schools continued with the state-mandated program, which meant that in 1973-74 many children in all Alum Rock schools were tested three times—twice on MAT and once on the state-mandated test—while in 1972-73 only voucher and Title I schools were exposed to multiple testing. This report deals only with state-mandated tests for the years 1970-73 and MAT tests for 1972-73, as reported in Technical Appendixes VIII-B and VIII-C. A more detailed analysis of these results, including 1973-74 achievement test results, will appear in Rand Report R-1497-NIE, scheduled for publication in the fall of 1974. Technical Appendix VIII-A of this report describes a number of the issues that arose in administering and analyzing achievement tests, which are summarized in the following paragraphs.

First, because Alum Rock students generally do not achieve at grade level, Rand wanted to be sure that the test chosen was appropriate for a wide range of possible outcomes, and would afford reasonably accurate comparisons when out-of-level tests were administered to students who would find the grade-level test too hard. MAT offers a transformation of raw scores that permits such comparisons.

Second, Rand administration of MAT tests imposed administrative burdens on teachers and students, particularly in view of multilevel testing in each classroom. These problems appeared to lessen over time, and the assignment of test levels was facilitated in the 1973-74 school year by administering students a short placement test that teachers could use as a guide to assigning students to test levels. However, there was an extra burden on teachers and students from multiple testing and this may have affected measured student outcomes.

Third, we had no formal comparison group for testing, so we are dependent on statistical controls for comparing voucher and prevoucher or voucher and nonvoucher student outcomes. The comparisons that are available are not very good, for a variety of reasons, including Alum Rock's unique population mix as compared with other California districts for which state-mandated test scores are available, and the scarcity of data that would allow us to compare the socioeconomic status of families of voucher, nonvoucher, and prevoucher students in Alum Rock.

Fourth, it is hard to use these data to compare student progress over time. There is a high student turnover (about 30 percent of students leave the district each year), which may affect the representativeness of results.

Fifth, the voucher program itself is not a treatment, but a series of different treatments, so that to compare voucher student outcomes with nonvoucher student outcomes may give misleading results. Similarly, some kinds of students may do better than others under voucher "treatments," and aggregating all students together may wash out such effects. For 1972-73, we have not compared scores of different types of students in different mini-schools with those of similar students in nonvoucher or prevoucher schools, because state-mandated tests cannot be linked to individual students or mini-schools (they are reported by grade and school, not by mini-school), and 1972-73 Title I MAT scores are available only by school and grade. In the future, data will allow such disaggregated comparisons, although certain types of confounding may be impossible to eliminate by statistical methods (e.g., if certain types of students choose certain types of mini-schools, it may be impossible to separate student effects from mini-school effects).

Finally, in the first year of the demonstration, as indicated in Sec. VII above, a great deal of teacher time was devoted to organizing the curriculum and procedures of the mini-schools, so that instructional time may have been reduced for the sake of start-up activities. The short-run consequence might be to reduce test scores below expected levels.

Rand's analysis of achievement scores to date is preliminary, and the results are contradictory. The analysis of state-mandated tests is described in Technical Appendix VIII-B. The main results were as follows:

- Grade 1, 2, and 3 voucher students, tested in May 1973, had lower test scores than those of students in the same grade and school the previous year. Sixth grade voucher students, tested in the fall, did worse in both 1972 and 1973 than they had done in fall 1971.
- Nonvoucher students in grades 1, 2, 3, and 6 achieved about the same test scores in 1973 as in previous years.

- In 1970-71 and 1971-72, Title I nonvoucher schools, when averaged as a whole, had lower scores than those of voucher schools in grades 1, 2, and 3; but in 1972-73, Title I schools' test scores were higher on average than those of voucher schools.

In other words, the available evidence from state-mandated tests is that in the first year of the demonstration, voucher students did less well than students in the same schools before vouchers were introduced and less well on average in 1972-73 than nonvoucher students in general and Title I students in particular. The voucher schools' drop compared with 1971-72 averaged about one-sixth of a standard deviation in the statewide distribution of interstudent scores, or about two months grade equivalent at grades 2 and 3.

On the other hand, MAT test comparisons between voucher and Title I schools seem to tell a different story (see Technical Appendix VIII-C). Grade-by-grade, fall-to-spring gain scores were available for voucher and Title I schools (although only by grade and school for Title I). Comparisons were possible for grades 2-5 inclusive.[1] Average gains in grade equivalent units are listed in a text tabulation below (a gain of one grade level equals 1.00).

Grade	Voucher (6.5 months elapsed between pretest and post-test)	Title I (8.0 months elapsed between pretest and post-test)
2	.51	.64
3	.53	.61
4	.51	.57
5	.54	.53
Average	.52	.59

Title I schools posted slightly higher gains (average of less than one month's grade equivalent), but, considering that voucher school post-tests came only 6.5 months after pretest, compared with 8 months for Title I schools, the gain scores were probably about the same after adjusting for differences in testing intervals.

More surprisingly, for both pretest and post-test on the MAT, voucher students averaged higher grade equivalent scores at every grade level than did Title I children. Grade equivalent means for fall 1972 and spring 1973 also appear below in a text tabulation. Those results might not be surprising in light of typical comparisons, because Title I schools included somewhat higher proportions of welfare students (51 percent compared with 34 percent for voucher schools). In fact, after adjusting for differences in proportions of students from families on welfare, there was no significant difference between grade equivalent scores in voucher and Title I schools on the MAT test (see Technical Appendix VIII-C). But, as pointed out above, the 1973 state-mandated test scores for grades 1, 2, and 3 gave just the opposite result. On the average, at each grade level, Title I Cooperative Primary Reading Test scores were higher than those for voucher schools.

[1] For grade 1, many voucher students were given a test form for which no grade equivalent exists. In 1972-73, Title I schools had grade 6 in only one school and no grade 7 or 8 classes.

Grade	Fall 1972		Spring 1973	
	Voucher	Title I	Voucher	Title I
2	2.08	1.52	2.59	2.16
3	2.64	2.17	3.17	2.78
4	3.05	2.50	3.56	3.07
5	3.80	3.18	4.34	3.71

At this stage of the analysis, then, we are in the unsatisfactory position of saying that by one set of reading tests, voucher children are scoring lower on average than other Alum Rock students, including Title I students; while by another set of reading tests the reverse is true, although the difference is not significant when aggregate differences in socioeconomic status by school are taken into account. This casts doubt on the reliability of the tests, or the accuracy of the computerized data tapes, or the stability of testing conditions, or the accuracy of the Rand analysis, or some combination of these. The preliminary Rand findings will be supplemented by extensive data analysis, including analysis of 1973-74 test scores for both MAT and state-mandated tests in all Alum Rock schools. As far as we know, the 1972-73 variations in testing conditions as between MAT and state-mandated tests were not of a kind to account for the observed differences, and the Educational Testing Service concordances among different test types offer no reason to expect such inconsistencies among different standardized tests (see Technical Appendix VIII-A).

In face of these uncertainties, we can only conclude from these data that the voucher demonstration did not result in higher test scores in the first year, nor in markedly lower ones, compared to 1972-73 scores in nonvoucher schools. Even if we made extreme assumptions—for example, that the findings of the analysis of state-mandated tests, as reported in Technical Appendix VIII-B, were correct and the findings of the MAT Title I voucher comparisons were incorrect—the differences would have no significance for the effects of vouchers unless they persisted. If they did persist and were reasonably small, it might still be the case that parents, teachers, and students would prefer freedom of choice at the price of small losses in achievement as measured by test scores.

Affective Test Selection

In 1972-73, seven different affective tests were administered to samples of voucher school children, five of them by Rand and two by the district. The objective was to find out which ones would be most useful for evaluating the voucher demonstration. The Purdue Social Attitude Scale was selected for use in grades 1 to 3 and the Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory for use in grades 4 to 8. These tests were administered in April-May 1974, and will be analyzed for two purposes: (1) measurement of affective change over time, which will probably require several years of data before useful analyses can be carried out; and (2) identification of affective characteristics that may be associated with success in different types of programs, a task that can be started after spring 1974 test data become available.

Therefore, the only analyses that were conducted of 1972-73 data were for the purpose of selecting the appropriate affective test batteries. The issues and criteria involved in this process are described in Technical Appendix VIII-D.

IX. DISTRIBUTION OF STUDENTS BY RACIAL AND ETHNIC GROUP

KEY FINDINGS

- There appears to have been little change in the distribution of Spanish-surnamed and black students *among schools* since the voucher demonstration began. Only one of thirteen voucher schools is "imbalanced" according to California's criterion for racial and ethnic group balance, and this school was just as "imbalanced" before the demonstration began.
- Up to November 1973, the distribution of Spanish-surnamed and black students among programs *within schools* has been almost perfectly balanced in 3 of the 6 original voucher schools, and slightly imbalanced in the remaining schools. Two of 22 mini-school programs in the first year could have been defined as "imbalanced" in 1972-73 if California's criterion were applied to programs rather than schoools. One program had a "multicultural" emphasis, which attracted mostly Spanish-surnamed students. The other was an "enrichment" program for gifted students, which enrolled mostly Anglo students. The same two programs and no others could also have been defined as "imbalanced" at the beginning of the demonstration's second year.
- So far, the distribution of Spanish-surnamed and black students among programs *within schools* has been almost perfectly balanced in 4 of the 7 expansion voucher schools, and slightly imbalanced in the remaining schools. Two of 22 mini-school programs in the expansion schools could have been defined as "imbalanced" in November 1973 if California's criterion were applied to programs rather than schools. Both such programs were "bilingual/bicultural" programs that attracted mostly Spanish-surnamed students.

INTRODUCTION

In 1954, the United States Supreme Court climaxed a series of rulings on school segregation with the pronouncement that separate educational facilities are inherently unequal and that *de jure* segregation of the races is therefore in conflict with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This ruling was not actively enforced until the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations of the 1960s, but since then *de jure* segregation has been virtually eliminated in the United States.

As *de jure* segregation has withered in the public schools, it has become increasingly apparent that racial and ethnic segregation is not solely nor even primarily caused by legal constraints. Segregation in residential patterns, for example, has often caused or perpetuated school segregation even when no legal barriers to integration remained. Also, the enrollment of children in private schools has often maintained segregation, even though parents may not have explicitly sought that effect.

The Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of *de facto* segregation *per se*, although recent cases in the lower courts have made the distinction between *de jure* and *de facto* segregation less and less clear.[1] Various policies of local school authorities have been ruled illegal either because segregation was an intended consequence of the policy or because separatist consequences of the policy were probable and foreseeable. Especially relevant to the voucher demonstration are recent court rulings on two types of school policies:

> ... Parent-pupil school selection arrangements, such as open enrollment, free transfers, and optional attendance zones are illegal practices to the extent that they result in more segregation than would some other educationally sound and readily available pupil assignment mechanism.
>
> ... Segregated classroom assignments and other intra-school racial discrimination are illegal. In a number of southern cases the courts have held that systems ... may not adopt pupil tracking devices that produce intra-school segregation. However, that is just the tip of an iceberg. ...[2]

These rulings are only part of a growing body of legal precedent which demands that school policies such as those proposed in the voucher demonstration be examined in terms of their segregating or desegregating effect on student enrollments.

Political as well as legal considerations also demand that any demonstration of the voucher idea be scrutinized for its effects on the racial and ethnic distributions of students. One of the major objections to the voucher idea has been that parents could use it as a means to achieve school segregation, much as Southern whites fled the public schools in the 1960s to form segregated private academies. That possibility has put off many political groups that might well support a voucher concept on other grounds.

The segregation problem was explicitly recognized in the CSPP report, *Education Vouchers.*[3] To counteract it, CSPP recommended a "regulated compensatory" voucher model containing several provisions that would prevent or at least discourage segregated schools. For example, each school would be allowed to fill as much as 50 percent of its enrollment by any criteria it wished, so long as these criteria did not discriminate against any racial minority. Thereafter the school would be required to fill its remaining enrollment based strictly on demand, with a lottery system for cases where demand exceeded supply. Schools also would be given economic incentives to attract and enroll poorer students, in the form of "compensatory" voucher funding based on the number of students enrolled from low-income families.

The regulated compensatory model proposed by Alum Rock was even more strongly regulated than the CSPP model to prevent discrimination in school enrollment policies. It provided that all applicants should be admitted to their first-choice programs, with a few exceptions when program resources were clearly limited or state laws would be violated. Programs would thus be required to expand to meet the demand for enrollment, and could not apply admissions criteria. As in the CSPP recommendation, a "compensatory" voucher incentive was also proposed so that schools would benefit financially to the extent that they attracted and enrolled students from low-income families.

As a final safeguard, the Office of Economic Opportunity stipulated as a condition of its initial grant to Alum Rock that "to the extent compatible with Federal legislation, the Governing Board of the Alum Rock School District will *insure that*

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[1] J. Flannery, "School Desegregation Law: Recent Developments," *Integrated Education,* May-June 1972, pp. 11-19.

[2] Ibid., p. 13.

[3] CSPP, *Education Vouchers.*

participating schools do not become racially segregated. Should initial assignment of children indicate *imbalance as defined by the State of California*, programs experiencing heavy under- or over-application by a particular group will be offered in additional buildings to assure that racial balance is maintained."[4]

In spite of such provisions, it was still possible that voucher parents would choose programs for their children in ways that would increase segregation, that schools' decisions to join or not join the demonstration would have the effect of maintaining or increasing segregation within the district, or that the demonstration would cause the district as a whole to become increasingly segregated vis-à-vis the San Jose area. The purpose of this section is to determine whether schools and programs became more segregated or more integrated during the first year of the voucher demonstration in Alum Rock, and if so, by what mechanisms.

MEASURING SEGREGATION

One cannot determine whether racial or ethnic segregation has increased or decreased without using some kind of quantitative measure. Numerous measures have been proposed,[5] but none is universally known and accepted. Three indicators of racial and ethnic group balance or imbalance are used in the analyses that follow:

1. The definition of imbalance contained in the Administrative Code of California, Section 14021 (c): any deviation in pupil proportions of more than 15 percent from the district mean for any racial or ethnic group. In 1972, for example the Alum Rock district was 51 percent Spanish-surnamed and 12 percent black. That year, any school with fewer than 36 or more than 66 percent Spanish-surnamed students would have been considered "imbalanced," as would any school with more than 27 percent black students.
2. $S = \Sigma |f_o - f_e|/2N$ measures the percent of students who would have to change location (i.e., school or program) to achieve identical ethnic proportions in each location.[6] (N = total number of students being considered, f_o = observed frequency of students in each ethnic group and location, and f_e = expected frequency of students in each ethnic group and location if ethnic group proportions were identical in each location.)
3. $\chi^2 = \Sigma (f_o - f_e)^2/f_e$ is an indicator that suggests whether an observed ethnic distribution among schools or programs might have occurred by a random assignment of students to schools or programs (f_o and f_e are observed and expected frequencies, as above). This is the well-known chi-square test.

HAS PARENTAL CHOICE RESULTED IN INCREASED SEGREGATION AMONG SCHOOLS?

Table 9.1 shows the proportion of Spanish-surnamed and black students enrolled at each Alum Rock school in October 1970 through October 1973. The proportion of students in each of these ethnic groups has increased gradually in the district

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[4] OEO Grant 90051, Special Condition 4.

[5] K. Taeuber and A. Taeuber, *Negroes in Cities*, Aldine Press, Chicago, 1965. Appendix A discusses several proposed measures of racial segregation.

[6] This measure was suggested by Otis Duncan. See Taeuber and Taeuber, op. cit., p. 30.

Table 9.1

ENROLLMENT OF SPANISH-SURNAMED AND BLACK STUDENTS IN ALUM ROCK, BY SCHOOL

School	Percent Spanish-Surnamed				Percent Black			
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1970	1971	1972	1973
Old voucher schools								
Cassell	41	44	50	50	12	13	13	14
Goss	59	60	63	61	16	15	15	16
McCollam	39	45	46	44	13	6	8	9
Meyer	37	45	50	49	11	13	13	17
Miller	62	57	62	58	9	11	12	15
Pala	44	41	47	46	5	6	5	6
Average	46	48	50	51	11	11	11	13
New voucher schools								
Arbuckle	46	50	48	53	24	25	26	19
Conniff	69[a]	72[a]	70[a]	71[a]	1	2	3	1
Dorsa	53	54	53	58	9	9	12	13
Fischer	42	48	49	50	10	10	13	11
Hubbard	58	63	59	57	12	12	13	16
Mayfair	62	64	65	60	19	18	16	12
Sheppard	50	51	52	52	11	13	16	12
Average	52	55	55	56	13	13	15	12
Nonvoucher schools								
Cureton	46	47	49	51	3	4	4	5
George	44	40	39	46	3	3	5	5
Linda Vista	25[a]	25[a]	29[a]	31[a]	2	2	2	3
Lyndale	44	48	49	46	5	6	9	9
Mathson	60	62	64	55	17	19	18	14
Ocala	--	--	--	38	--	--	--	21
Painter	43	49	53	52	7	8	7	7
Rogers	32	38	38	46	8	12	8	9
Ryan	29[a]	37	40	41	5	4	8	9
San Antonio	76[a]	67[a]	67[a]	72[a]	5	8	8	7
Shields	44	48	52	51	6	6	6	9
Slonaker	49	48	51	53	18	30[a]	27[a]	33[a]
Average	44	45	47	48	8	10	9	11
District average	47	49	51	51	10	11	12	12

SOURCE: Alum Rock School District records.

[a] Enrollments of these schools would be considered "imbalanced" according to the California criterion (*Administrative Code*, Sec. 10421(c)).

as a whole and in most of the Alum Rock schools since 1970; no other major trends in ethnic distribution are evident.

Five schools in Alum Rock were "imbalanced" in the 1970-73 period, according to the California 15-percent criterion. Each year since 1970, both Conniff and San Antonio Schools have enrolled at least 16 percent more Spanish-surnamed students than the district proportion, whereas Linda Vista School has enrolled at least 20 percent fewer. Since 1971 Slonaker School has enrolled at least 15 percent more black students than the district proportion, and in 1970 only, Ryan School enrolled 18 percent fewer Spanish-surnamed students than the district proportion. None of these instances of imbalance is attributable to the voucher demonstration. Only one of the five schools (Conniff) is a voucher school, and its percentage of minority enrollment has remained virtually unchanged since it joined the demonstration in September 1973.

Table 9.2 shows the magnitude of imbalance between schools, using the second measure of imbalance described above. The data reflect a desegregated district with a modest trend toward further desegregation since 1970.[7] Changes in ethnic distribution between voucher schools are so small that no trend is discernible. One may conclude that no significant change in ethnic distribution *between schools* can be attributed to the voucher demonstration in its first year. This does not seem surprising, by hindsight, given the preference of most parents for their neighborhood schools and the fact that the initial ethnic balance among voucher schools would discourage the identification of any school as "belonging" to a particular ethnic group.

HAS PARENTAL CHOICE FOSTERED SEGREGATION WITHIN SCHOOLS?

The decision by Alum Rock to allow parents to choose programs as well as schools raises the possibility that schools could become more segregated internally, wholly apart from segregation between schools. Tables 9.3 and 9.4 show the proportions of Spanish-surnamed and black students *in each mini-school.*

Almost all of the mini-schools would qualify as ethnically balanced even under the California 15-percent criterion, which was meant to apply to schools, not intraschool programs. In the first year, only 2 of 22 mini-schools would have been considered "imbalanced," and in the second year, only 4 of 45. Three programs, labeled "bilingual/bicultural" or "multicultural," have attracted a larger-than-average proportion of Spanish-surnamed students, while one program for "gifted" students has a smaller-than-average proportion of Spanish-surnamed students.

Table 9.5 shows the extent of ethnic imbalance within voucher schools as measured by the percent of students who would have to change programs to achieve identical ethnic distributions in each program at a given school. "S" varied from 0.8 to 8.1 percent in the first-year schools, and from 1.4 to 11.8 percent in the second-year schools.

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[7] A related index of segregation, Taeuber's "D," can be computed by combining Spanish-surnamed and black students into a single "minority" category:

$$D = \tfrac{1}{2} \sum_i \left| \frac{\text{Minority}_i}{\sum_i \text{Minority}_i} - \frac{\text{Majority}_i}{\sum_i \text{Majority}_i} \right| .$$

In Alum Rock, D was 22.3 in October 1972, making Alum Rock one of the more desegregated cities in the nation. See D. Kirby et al., *Political Strategies in Northern School Desegregation,* Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass., 1973, pp. 182-183.

Table 9.2

MAGNITUDE OF ETHNIC IMBALANCE BETWEEN SCHOOLS

Source	Date	S	Enrollment
Six Old Voucher Schools			
District	Oct 1970	10.5	4,005
District	Oct 1971	8.7	3,935
District	Oct 1972	8.2	3,888
DMC	Jun 1973	8.1	3,888
District	Oct 1973	8.3	4,067
DMC	Nov 1973	8.7	3,966
Seven New Voucher Schools			
District	Oct 1970	9.1	5,345
District	Oct 1971	9.1	5,265
District	Oct 1972	7.4	4,984
District	Oct 1973	5.7	4,726
DMC	Nov 1973	7.9	4,555
Twelve Nonvoucher Schools[a]			
District	Oct 1970	14.2	6,734
District	Oct 1971	14.8	6,669
District	Oct 1972	13.1	6,539
District	Oct 1973	11.4	6,324
Twenty-five Alum Rock Schools[b]			
District	Oct 1970	13.3	16,084
District	Oct 1971	12.3	15,869
District	Oct 1972	11.1	15,411
District	Oct 1973	9.7	15,117

SOURCES: DMC student files, June 1973 and November 1973; Alum Rock District records.

NOTE: S = percentage of students who would have had to change schools to achieve identical ethnic distributions in each school of a given category. For the analysis, students were divided into three groups: Spanish-surnamed, black, and other.

[a] Including Mt. Hamilton School; 13 schools in 1973 with the creation of Ocala Middle School.

[b] Including Mt. Hamilton School; 26 schools in 1973 with the creation of Ocala Middle School.

Table 9.3

ENROLLMENT OF SPANISH-SURNAMED AND BLACK STUDENTS IN OLD VOUCHER SCHOOLS, BY MINI-SCHOOL PROGRAM, 1973

School and Mini-school	Percent Spanish-Surnamed		Percent Black		Total Enrollment[a]	
	June	Nov	June	Nov	June	Nov
Cassell						
Cultural Arts	47	57	17	12	158	162
Daily Living	43	44	16	11	220	184
Traditional Plus	55	48	14	15	223	190
Kindergarten	49	47	12	10	112	105
Goss						
Activity-Centered/ Learning Unlimited	66	63	15	17	302	301
Seventh Grade School	62	60	15	20	87	92
Developmental Reading/ READ	65	63	15	19	269	235
McCollam						
Traditional	56	51	9	8	182	176
Enrichment	25[b]	28[b]	14	6	76	83
Continuous Progress	55	44	3	10	156	173
Individualized Learning	46	47	7	7	189	209
Meyer						
Basic Skills	51	50	14	17	390	287
Sullivan BRL/BRL-SILAS	56	59	11	10	151	216
Fine Arts	46	48	14	13	125	227
School 2000	42	45	19	22	130	168
Down to Earth	--	48	--	26	--	27
Miller						
Academic Skills	58	53	11	14	162	147
Individualized Learning	52	47	14	18	205	182
Multicultural	70[b]	73[b]	13	14	154	210
Pala						
Three R's Plus	47	50	9	9	212	133
Creative Arts	52	48	5	3	217	193
Fine Arts	49	43	6	5	204	170
Math-Science	30	48	17	9	64	96
Total, old voucher schools	53	52	12	13	3,988	3,966
Total, district[c]	51	51	12	12	15,411	15,117

SOURCES: DMC student files, June 1973 and November 1973; Alum Rock District records.

[a] Excluding students with blank ethnic codes and students with blank or miscoded mini-school codes.

[b] These programs would be considered "imbalanced" if California's 15-percent criterion were applied to programs instead of schools.

[c] From official district records for October of 1972 and 1973.

Table 9.4

ENROLLMENT OF SPANISH-SURNAMED AND BLACK STUDENTS IN NEW VOUCHER SCHOOLS, BY MINI-SCHOOL PROGRAM, NOVEMBER 1973

School and Mini-school	Percent Spanish-Surnamed	Percent Black	Total Enrollment[a]
Arbuckle			
Kindergarten	54	19	116
Learn by Doing	58	20	153
Learning for Life	55	20	156
Traditional	58	20	155
Coniff			
Bilingual-Bicultural	80[b]	1	299
Traditional	56	2	92
Dorsa			
Communication Plus	61	6	274
Fine Arts	50	14	301
Fischer			
Basic Studies	54	16	231
Careers	53	11	511
Open Level	42	10	57
Self Expression	49	13	158
Hubbard			
Adventures in Learning	62	14	273
Total Experience	53	19	265
Mayfair			
Bilingual-Bicultural	86[b]	4	210
Kindergarten	57	18	56
Learning Tree	58	20	140
Maximum Exposure	65	18	109
People to People	63	12	130
Sheppard			
Creative Achievement	48	12	459
Individualized Learning	54	10	241
Traditional	55	12	169
Total, new voucher schools	58	12	4,555
Total, district[c]	51	12	15,117

SOURCES: DMC student file, November 1973; Alum Rock District records.

[a] Excluding students with blank ethnic group codes and students with blank or miscoded mini-school codes.

[b] These programs would be considered "imbalanced" if California's 15-percent criterion were applied to programs instead of schools.

[c] From official district records for October 1973.

Table 9.5

MAGNITUDE OF ETHNIC IMBALANCE WITHIN SCHOOLS

(In percent)

School	S	
	June 1973	Nov 1973
Cassell	4.6	5.5
Goss	0.8	1.4
McCollam	8.1[a]	5.6[a]
Meyer	3.9	5.1[a]
Miller	7.6[a]	11.8[a]
Pala	4.6[a]	4.3
Arbuckle	--	1.7
Coniff	--	8.5[a]
Dorsa	--	5.4[a]
Fischer	--	3.7
Hubbard	--	4.3
Mayfair	--	11.3[a]
Sheppard	--	3.1

SOURCE: DMC student files, June and November 1973.

NOTE: S = percentage of students who would have had to change programs to achieve identical ethnic distributions in each program at a given school. For the analysis, students were divided into three groups: Spanish-surnamed, black, and other.

[a] The observed distribution of students among programs within these schools suggests a nonrandom relationship between ethnic group membership and program choice (χ^2 test).

Unfortunately, prevoucher data are unavailable on ethnic group distributions within schools that would indicate whether intra-school segregation has increased or decreased in voucher schools. In the absence of a comparative standard, one absolute standard of ethnic group balance can be applied: the chi-square test for "no relationship" between ethnic group membership and program choice.

In the first year, 3 of 6 voucher schools were so nearly balanced in ethnic proportions among programs that the relationship between ethnic group membership and program choice could be described as random. In the second year, 7 of 13 voucher schools had patterns of ethnic enrollment into programs of the same, essentially random nature.

A further use of the data in Table 9.5 will be to detect any trends in within-school ethnic balance as the demonstration progresses. Data already available for the 6 original voucher schools permit comparison of June 1973 and November 1973 enrollments. In this limited period, only small changes in S are evident. In four cases S seems to have increased, and in two cases it seems to have decreased, but all the magnitudes of change are small enough to be attributed to measurement error.

In conclusion, some ethnic imbalance exists *within* voucher schools. This imbalance is most noticeable in 4 programs, of which 3 are "bilingual/bicultural" or "multicultural" and one is a program primarily for "gifted"[*] students. There is no way to determine whether segregation within voucher schools has increased or decreased since before the demonstration, although future trends toward segregation or desegregation within voucher schools will be discernible.

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[*] California state law includes special provisions for the identification and instruction of students whose IQ exceeds 130. Such students are labeled "gifted."

X. THE FIRST YEAR IN RETROSPECT

This section briefly reviews some of the main points of this report, presenting the major findings of the Rand study to date.

WHAT KIND OF DEMONSTRATION TOOK PLACE?

The first year of the Alum Rock demonstration (1972-73), as sponsored by the Office of Economic Opportunity, was not a test of vouchers as defined in theory, because it included only public schools, and both school survival and staff employment rights were guaranteed. It was therefore known as a "transition" voucher model which was to look toward the inclusion of private schools in the future. The participating schools created a limited amount of educational diversity by setting up the mini-schools; but as of the second year there are still no private schools in the demonstration, and no demonstration schools will be closed down nor staff terminated because of lack of demand for a particular program (although some teachers have transferred out of programs where enrollment declined).

If the demonstration did not test the effectiveness of vouchers, what did it achieve and why should it interest educators and the general public? One prominent educator has commented wryly that it demonstrated the Alum Rock Superintendent's deftness in garnering federal funds (more than $4.5 million in the first two years) to carry out a program of school decentralization he was committed to anyway. But there is another way of looking at it that seems both more useful and more comprehensive.

It is clear that federal agencies can offer incentives for schools to follow innovative policies, but they cannot closely control the shape the innovations will take in American public schools, with their long tradition of local autonomy. That shape is largely determined by local priorities and interests. The first year of the demonstration in Alum Rock produced results that are consistent with this viewpoint. With federal support, Alum Rock showed that it was possible to combine decentralization of authority down to the school level with parental freedom to choose their children's school programs. These are important elements in a voucher system, and they were achieved without crippling strife among the parties involved. (Teachers did not rebel against administrators, for example, nor parents against the school system.) This accomplishment was perhaps easier in Alum Rock than it might be elsewhere because the district had already taken some steps to decentralize decisionmaking to the school level. Those elements of the voucher model that the district was less interested in—private schooling, economic competition, a detailed flow of evaluative information to parents—were either not implemented or received lower priority than OEO had sought.

ESTABLISHING THE VOUCHER DEMONSTRATION IN ALUM ROCK

The demonstration developed, then, as a sort of halfway house between "business as usual" and a voucher model. It seems to have done so because the two major parties involved, OEO and the school district, had disparate aims that called for compromise. The school district, in a low-income area of San Jose, California, was hard-pressed for funds and wanted further support in decentralizing authority from the central district administration to the local school level. OEO was bent on finding a school district that would agree to test vouchers. From the school district's viewpoint, various elements of the voucher model ranged from mildly desirable at best to completely unacceptable at worst. From the OEO viewpoint, vouchers looked like a way to make schools more responsive to the needs of poor children and their parents, but there was no way to test that view unless some school system would try it out.

In 1972, it appeared that, of the handful of districts that had shown some interest in vouchers, only Alum Rock combined innovative leadership, staff and community acceptance, and financial need to the point where some form of voucher test could be initiated. Many, if not most, of America's educators are opposed to vouchers because they introduce economic competition into local school systems, where such competition is virtually unknown and income has little connection with client satisfaction. Vouchers are also suspect because they could conceivably foreshadow de facto erosion of teacher tenure, the emergence of schools more segregated by race and social class than they are now, a breakdown of the Constitutional separation of church and state, and, in some educators' eyes, the potential destruction of the shared democratic values fostered by American-public education.

OEO funded several "feasibility" studies in different school districts during 1970 and 1971, with the hope that they would eventually lead to local voucher demonstrations. Each study, except the one in Alum Rock, ended with a local decision against vouchers. After two years of effort, it became clear that for OEO it was Alum Rock or nothing. The school district's problem was how to accommodate OEO's desire for a voucher system without alienating its own constituencies—parents, principals, teachers, and central district staff. Parents wanted neighborhood schools. Teachers wanted the preservation of tenure and no "unprofessional" competition. Principals and central staff did not want to get involved in a popularity contest among public schools, let alone compete with private schools. Nobody in the school system wanted economic competition to dominate educators' behavior. And many Alum Rock parents, teachers, and principals were not yet ready to accept the voucher idea.

A decision to exclude private and parochial schools, and to guarantee continued employment for the professional staff, defused much of the local opposition to the demonstration. So did the guarantee of "squatters' rights" to all parents who might want to continue sending their children to the neighborhood school.

Even with these compromises and modifications, only 6 of the district's 24 schools decided to take a chance on the demonstration. With so few schools in the demonstration, all similar in curriculum and method, OEO and the district hit upon a way to provide more educational diversity, by having each voucher school offer several programs to choose from. Small groups of teachers at each school joined together to devise these new programs—or mini-schools—22 of which emerged in the first year. The array of mini-schools was at least roughly the same at each school; diversity and competition were thus largely confined within the walls of the neighborhood school.

WHAT HAS THE FIRST YEAR OF THE DEMONSTRATION DEMONSTRATED?

The following are the major findings thus far:

1. Given the incentive of federal funding (10 percent of the district budget in the first year and 17 percent in the second), Alum Rock was able to decentralize decisionmaking to the school level and offer parents a choice among instructional programs, without stirring up disruptive conflicts within the school system or the community. Alum Rock is not highly organized politically, however, and as of 1972-73 there were no strongly supported interest groups that could effectively express dissent or exert pressure on the school system and OEO.

2. The real changes in Alum Rock may flow from the creation of mini-schools in each school. The mini-schools offer what parents perceive to be a genuine choice at the neighborhood school level. They also have changed the distribution of power within the school system. The small groups of teachers (from two to twelve per mini-school) who operate them now have considerable decisionmaking power over curriculum, admission rules, use of compensatory voucher funds, and school-parent relations. Consequently, they have also acquired considerable leverage in their dealings with principals and with district central staff. As a side effect, the demonstration has reduced competition between schools by introducing the mini-school as a competitive unit.

3. Because mini-schools are small (typically, fewer than two hundred students), and have small and cohesive faculties, certain time-honored values of the American school system are being reintroduced: children and teachers work together over a period of years, and older and younger children are grouped together. The mini-schools may be engendering something more closely approaching a community spirit and a sense of continuity than is possible in most urban school settings.

   It is by no means sure that the district has developed any important institutional reforms that will outlast the federal grant. It remains to be seen whether the voucher system grows any roots as a result of increasing parental awareness and the growth of teacher preference for their new autonomy.

4. On the whole, parents and teachers, when surveyed, are reasonably well satisfied with the demonstration, and parents seemed more satisfied during the second year than during the first. Voucher teachers were more satisfied at the end of the first year than at the beginning. Not too much should be read into parent reaction, however, because most parents said they were well satisfied with the schools before the demonstration in any case. Teacher reactions may be more important, and the increase in their support for the demonstration over time could lead to long-run changes in the district's approach to schooling. During the first year, teachers said they preferred the increased autonomy they enjoyed under the voucher system, and voucher school principals felt the same way. The fact that seven more schools joined the demonstration in 1973-74 is additional evidence of acceptance by school staff and the community. On the other hand, many teachers objected to the additional workload and the competitive atmosphere that they believed the demonstration engendered.

5. During the first year of the demonstration, Rand's data on student outcomes, as measured by achievement test scores, attendance rates, and student attitudes, were inconclusive or absent. Very few educational interventions produce significant short-run changes in achievement test scores, and the first year at Alum Rock was probably no exception. However, our evidence on this is limited and somewhat contradictory. Results from one set of tests (MAT) seem to show that

in 1972-73 voucher students gained about as much as Title 1 students did that year. However, results from the California State Testing program indicate that voucher students did somewhat worse compared with their own past performance and that of nonvoucher students, including those in Title I schools, in 1972-73. Our opinion is that voucher students have not been exposed to a relatively normal learning routine for long enough to warrant even tentative conclusions about the effects of a limited voucher model on achievement. Unexcused absence rates were slightly lower in voucher schools than in nonvoucher schools before the demonstration, and stayed lower during the first year. No student interviews were conducted until the spring of 1974, so there is no direct evidence on changes in student attitudes during the first year.

6. The fears of voucher critics that parent choice would result in increasing segregation by race or social class were not borne out. Most children went to the same school they had attended the year before, and there was very little difference in race or class composition among the constituent mini-schools of each school, except that multicultural programs enrolled slightly larger percentages of Mexican-American students than might be expected by chance.

7. The demonstration created some diversity in instructional programs, and parents liked having these choices. There were 22 mini-schools in 6 schools the first year, and 45 mini-schools in 13 schools the second year; but these figures overstate the amount of diversity, because many programs were similar from school to school.

8. Any major organizational change brings discord, and the voucher demonstration was no exception. But none of the conflicts in the first year seriously jeopardized the demonstration. Several potential sources of conflict were visible during the first year: between teachers and principals over mini-school policies and control of funds; between school personnel (central staff, principals, teachers) and parent counselors over the flow of information to parents (the more parents know about mini-schools and their performance, the greater their potential influence over school policy); between OEO and school personnel over demonstration ground rules. These conflicts either remained low-key or were resolved quickly when they did flare up.

9. It remains to be seen, during the five-to-seven-year course of the demonstration, whether any long-run changes occur in student outcomes, school organization, participant satisfaction, or relations between citizens and their schools. Swift changes are unlikely. American education is a stable system of institutions, and major reforms are likely to come slowly, if at all. This first-year report must be taken for what it is—a description of a newborn educational program in its first year of life. The course of this program's development and the possibilities for healthy and independent growth are still uncertain.